Work in progress

Reputation Building Under Demand Externalities

This paper examines reputation dynamics in marketplaces with demand externalities. I develop a model where sellers' quality investments influence the platform's future consumer base, creating externalities that myopic sellers don't internalize. The platform faces a trade-off between immediate gains from copycatting and maintaining a reputation for intellectual property protection. I show that stronger initial reputation and a larger consumer base extend reputation maintenance, while reputation effects are non-monotone in demand externalities.

Competition in Digital Advertising with Asymmetric Consumer Information (joint with R. A. Salonia)

We examine how supply-side information asymmetries affect demand-side competition in digital advertising markets with vertical integration. Our model features two demand-side platforms competing in first-price auctions, where one platform observes user preferences through vertical integration. We show that even minimal information asymmetries significantly advantage the integrated platform. Information asymmetry reduces consumer welfare by leading to less relevant advertisements being shown to downstream users compared to the information-sharing benchmark.