Al-Qaeda's Downfall

As major Islamic groups began to establish themselves through a combination of religious preaching, political discourse, and especially national social networks, Al Qaeda's first incarnation served as a social service provider, at the origin of the Persian Gulf. retirement. State, but possession With the jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the action was mainly aimed at foreign countries and the army. The superiority of this logic did not imply a premonition of frustrated local ambition, but that internal opposition to the 'near enemy' should be strategically separated from the 'distant enemy'. GCSP Geneva Papers - Research Series n° 3 9 In such a general context of the failure of Arab and Islamic State building, Al Qaeda appeared as a politico-religious project based on (i) the change of authority, (ii) the state evasion and (iii) militaristic empowerment of a non-state actor. However, al-Qaeda's early "successes" disguised a structural defeat it had caused itself. First, the rapid expansion of Al Qaeda's five regional offices was likely another indication of the organization's impressive global reach (in Europe, the Nile Valley, the Levant, the Maghreb and the Gulf) and capacity years later. one day against him. After the war on terror it gradually became clear that the regional units were very different from each other and that their relationship with the mother of Al Qaeda was bad at best. While al-Qaeda was able to make global progress, cumulatively and in the face of great adversity, in its first fifteen years, al-Qaeda earned strategic gains for every tactical defeat: retreat to Afghanistan, but advance into Iraq; limited guidance but proliferating cells; limited physical activity, but global and transnational effect; Additional enemies, but growing recruits: During the period 2006-2011, his leadership had changed into a meta-command, ultimately offering only political-religious and military-strategic commentary, with no operational leadership. What we can read as Al Qaeda's regionalization strategy as a whole has changed the overall picture of the organization. The necessary elasticity, which the group has adopted partly voluntarily and partly to accommodate the international campaign against terrorism, has led to an increasing distance from the already independent units.

The disappearance of Osama bin Laden from the al-Qaeda scene and the war on terror thus marks the end of the era of the original group formed in Afghanistan. It opens a new phase in which regional franchises will further develop their existing independence and thereby reconfigure the conflict by increasing the center of gravity of transnational terrorism. 10 GCSP Geneva Papers - Research Series No. 3 Introduction "Ghosts That I Ignored My Orders" Goethe, the Sorcerer's Apprentice In the summer of 2011, Al-Qaeda had accomplished the mission it had set itself in the summer of 1989, and ten years after carrying out the deadliest attack in New York and Washington. Against all odds, the latter comes into conflict with his enemies: he survives the George W. Bush administration; Development of new political weaknesses in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; Try new attacks on western targets; and expansion into new territories such as the Sahel were only additional opportunities for the group's global achievements in the 1990s and early 2000s.

A careful study of the group's history reveals that Al Qaeda's strength lies not so much in its post-9/11 mutation, but rather in its ability to continually renew itself. Unlike its offensive state opponents, who were often confined to a structurally defensive position, this transnational terrorist group had always written its own history. GCSP Geneva Papers - Research Series n° 3 11 However, Al Qaeda has taken a paradoxical step. Despite the steadily increasing overall impact, the organization eventually ended up in local conflict management. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, this strategic shift has been accompanied by great concern; avoid predictability. While the raids on New York and Washington gained them worldwide fame overnight, the group's leaders made no attempt to replicate the attacks in the United States. To cloud the waters, the group chose to turn its attention to Europe, focusing on states — Spain on March 11, 2004 and the United Kingdom on July 7, 2005 — whose rulers were the United States in the Iraq War. When this model proved effective and put other European states on edge, Al Qaeda did not expand it. It has entered a new phase of its post-9/11 strategy, focusing on the conflict in Iraq. After leading the insurgency there, he has continued to withdraw and support the revival of the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2006.1 In 2011, the United States lost more than 2,000 soldiers in Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, both deadliest years. This pattern took an unexpected turn, exemplified by Al-Qaeda's return to its native soil and toward the goal it originally sought to divert from, which was the deployment of local leaders. What constituted the group's unique strength in the 1990s and early 2000s, a well-thought-out geographic expansion in a recently launched transnational terrorist mode,2 was made possible by the immediacy and "provincialism" of the immediate concerns of the people. mid to late 2000s. Inasmuch as al-Qaeda has evolved as a transnational movement but has become embroiled in local contingencies, the ultimate question is whether there is ultimately compatibility between transnational movements and local terrorists. Paradoxically, after twenty years of this design, Al-Qaeda's dominant narratology almost systematically takes the form of clumsy scientific resistance. 1 On the development of relations between Al Qaida and the Taliban, see SS Shahzad, Inside Al Qaida and the Taliban - 9/11 and Beyond, London, Pluto, 2011. 2 Terrorism experienced its first moment of transnationalism in the 1970s , in which different groups with different identities and objectives, such as Baader-Meinhof, Black September, the Japanese Red Brigades and Carlos, had teamed up and often carried out coordinated attacks to pose a global threat against various states. 12 GCSP Geneva Papers - Research Series No. 3 to capture innovation from Al Qaeda terrorist projects.

Out of hatred, barbarity and irrationality, we are presented with a mixture of elements rooted in the denial, reductionism and personalization of this warrior revolution of terror. Some try to understand the mechanisms by which al-Qaeda would disappear, while overlooking the lasting influence of a group that has already reached counterfeit status (in Lebanon, Algeria, Iraq, Somalia, Indonesia, etc.). Thus, "assaulting ideology", "severing ties", "refusing to take refuge" or even "getting involved on the periphery" remained political options that have prevailed in many circles. What these analyzes have in common is that the initiative is placed on the side of the states, which paint a misleading portrait of a reactive Al-Qaeda that only walks through the holes created by the actions and omissions of these states, so exactly what conflicts. proved so many times that it turned out to be true. While the "structural" reasons that allowed al-Qaeda to thrive are increasingly recognized, the common perception remains that this "overwhelming competition" is a reality controlled by the center. While it could be argued that by forcing its enemy to divert its attention and resources (including political capital and military equipment) to areas initially unforeseen in this conflict, Al Qaeda exerted a more consistent influence on events on the periphery.

As a global private company, the transnational war that ended launched by al-Qaeda in the 1980s was only a change in the scale and type of postcolonial struggle in the Arab and Islamic regions. in opposition to various Islamist groups, from the fight against local regimes labeled as authoritarian, corrupt and repressive, to the direct fight against the United States for its support of these regimes. Such a development: a so-called movement from al adou al qareeb (the near enemy, i.e. the local dictatorial regimes) to al adou al ba'id (the distant enemy, i.e. their western supporters), as stated in the literature of Islamists. Groups 5: It was a conscious choice of several Islamic leaders who met in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. The strategic shift was also the objective result of the distant and sometimes counterproductive results of the internal campaigns many of these Islamist groups had conducted in their respective countries, notably Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and Algeria. Rebellion as an Export From the early 1950s to the mid-1990s, most Arab and Islamic states experienced a steady increase in Islamists to varying degrees.4 Surgeon by profession, al Dhawahiri (commonly misspelled as al Zawahiri because of slang), Egyptian pronunciation) is a radical Egyptian Islamist theologian who, after being incarcerated in Egypt in the early 1980s, settled in Afghanistan, where he merged his Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with Al-Qaeda and married Bin Laden (whom he first met in Saudi Arabia). ) United 1986). 5 See especially the writings of Abu Musab Al Suri; P. Cruickshank and MH Ali, “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda”, Studies on Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 2, No. 30, Ess. 1, 2007, pp. 1-14; and B. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad - The Life of Al Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al Suri, New York, Columbia University Press, 2008. 14 GCSP Geneva Papers - Investigation Series No. 3 Opposition. The context of these conflicts was fourfold. First, in many of these places, the postcolonial governments that came to power after the respective countries gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s had often simply replaced the existing religious options offered by alternative (Islamist) groups of the 1930s. and forty. the result was that the original dispute over the state continued after the introduction of the nationalist regimes; an often violent involvement that sometimes takes place clandestinely, sometimes in the headlines. Second, the new nationalist regimes soon, if not immediately, exhibited authoritarian tendencies, which Islamist groups suffered the most because of both their oppositional nature and their threatening potential. Egypt, in particular, has been the scene of violent fighting between the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The writings of one of the movement's leading figures and theologians, Sayyid Qutb, executed in August 1966, have over time become an important ideological reference for Al Qaeda and have influenced many of its actors, especially Ayman. Al Dhawahiri (often the flagship work of Al Qaeda). Qutb, Ma'aleem Fil Tareeq or "Milestones on the way" quoted from 1964). Third, the regimes' failed political performance and poor socioeconomic record have pushed many segments of these societies into the open arms of Islamists. So, from a peripheral option, the alternative options and social services offered by the groups gained ground and eventually gained popularity in many Muslim theaters. In Algeria, for example, a better organized and more committed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) than the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) gained the support of large numbers of Algerians in the period 1988-1991, culminating in an election victory. in Dec. 1991, frustrated with the military. Finally, to the extent that the country supported the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the complex ties - political, economic, military, and security - that most of these governments had with the United States allowed Islamic groups to "corrupt" and condemn "corruption". crime" against their respective countries, but also against the Ummah (Islamic community) as a whole.

When contemporary Islamist movements emerged, dispute settlement procedures existed, and disputes concerned only the identity of those authorized to take control of the state and carry out "construction works." British invasions in 2003, or Afghanistan in the second half of the 20th century and early 21st century, competition was much more primitive and encompassed larger ethnic, indigenous and sectarian dimensions. inherent and eminently martial in its conception and attitude. Whether in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq, or elsewhere in the Muslim world, the major Islamic groups that had emerged over the past half-century were primarily characterized by a solid social anchorage in their national environment and the presence of a social reform. expressed in ideological and religious terms. Groups such as Al Ikhwan al Muslims (the Muslim Brotherhood) emerged as popular movements in Egypt in the 1930s, radicalized in the mid-1950s as a result of nationalist unrest and Nasserist repression, and sometimes accepted violence before officially giving up. Others, such as Al Jabha Al Islamiya lil Inqadh (Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)) in Algeria, built massive community-level social service infrastructure in response to the severe socio-economic crisis that shook the country in the 1980s, hoping not to. claim access to political power through the 1991 vote. 6 For a complete history of contemporary Islamist movements, see F. Burgat, Islamism in the Shadow of Al Qaeda, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2008. The Birth of Islamism militarized 16 GCSP Geneva Documents - Investigation Series No. 3 However, the Islamic Brothers are expected to cross the borders of Egypt with the establishment of sister organizations in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, thus expressing an early form of transnationalism and pan-Islamism, and then the Algerian FIS on the heels of Al Jama 'in criminal led by Mustapha Bouyali. In the late 1980s, an Al Islamiya Al Musalaha (Armed Islamic Movement) entered this country in the early 1980s, both were unequivocal expressions of mainly Egyptian and Algerian socioeconomic frustration and political anomie, with religious revival as a remedy for the failed state and was seen as a hope for a better future for the nation. Far from such an admittedly limited belief in systemic reform by Islamist groups, which initially adhered to the rules, al-Qaida, for its part, never engaged in election campaigns or national development issues.

Al-Qaeda began as an Arab-dominated group formed outside of an Arab country with a global Islamist action agenda whose main goal was to counter the alleged Western hegemony in Muslim countries and counter this rule through the use of terrorist violence. that was fundamental to them pointing to the United States and its allies. A transnational Islamist army Al-Qaida's specific difference as a transnational Islamist army was marked by the first programmatic actions it took during its development phase. Between 1989 and 1995, the group focused on occupying this army and training its men. According to al-Qaeda, this was the result of the failure of discredited Arab governments to defend their country. The development of a group of Arab Islamists from the Middle East and North Africa allied with Muslims from Asia and Africa into an armed policy was, in their view, the result of a double realization in which private actors concluded that their states were too weak. for their citizens to defend, but just as strong to be caught. Central to the group's history is a mixture of resistance and not, as is often claimed, hopelessness and hopelessness.7 The strategy also included the management of financial and logistical resources.7 One of the omens of this strategy was the operation led of Hezbollah in Beirut on April 18, 1983 against the US naval barracks and the headquarters of the French paratroopers who killed 241 Marines and 58 paratroopers and led to the withdrawal of the United States from Lebanon. The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaida GCSP Geneva Papers - Research Series No. 3 17 and the training of professional, disciplined and reliable soldiers, as well as a corps of officers and permanent contacts. The movement's assertiveness also stemmed from its battle-hardened state. Since the early 1980s, some of these Islamist fighters have migrated to Afghanistan to join the resistance against the Soviet occupation. These operators, later known as 'Afghan Arabs', soon formed a relatively close-knit group that gained regional fame and some success in their jihad against the Soviets. In particular, and as an alliance was built with local Afghan Islamist factions, eventually an alliance with the Taliban (who would take control of the country in 1996) and influential local leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, these Arab fighters greatly increased. . under a single, poorly organized coordination.

A first group was formed in 1980 after Abdullah Azzam's fatwa declared him a “fard ayn” (personal obligation).8 Emphasizing the logic of flight, Azzam stated: “Anyone who can fight the jihad in Palestine against the Arabs must start there. And if he can't, he has to go to Afghanistan. "See Cheikh Abdullah Azzam, Al Difa" An Aradi Al Muslims - Aham Fouroudh Al I'Yaan (Defense of the Muslim Land - The First Devotion to Iman) [Faith], reproduced, integrated in 1984 in a message of July 4, 2007 d' Ayman al Dhawahiri. See also Abu al Wali al Masri (Mustapha Hamid), “The history of the Afghan Arabs, from the moment of their arrival in Afghanistan into their departure with the Taliban”, Al Sharq Al Awsat, London, 8-14. December 2004 Birth of Militarized Islamism 18 GCSP Geneva Papers - Research Series No. Three of all the Muslims fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan were staunch Islamists, most of whom came from the Gulf and Nile Valley and had already made significant pledges to local communities in the 1970s. These people fueled their activism. an adult dimension, they saw the migration to Afghanistan as a relief from the stagnating struggle against their "near enemy". The creation of a second contingent, mainly North African, was formed in mid-1986 following the success of the original group in its participation in the uprising against the Soviets and in light of the growing prospect of their withdrawal. After the official establishment of Al-Qaeda in 1988-1989, a third tier, made up of arrivals from Europe and the United States, strengthened the organization and played a particularly important role in preparing several attacks on American targets around the world. With the departure of some of the fighters from the first and second wave (either to their countries of origin, in particular Algeria, where the Islamic Salvation Front was engaged in violent conflict with the government, or to join the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina ), there was a certain natural leakage among the fighters of the new generation. In short, the first group brought commitment and energy and the second group added number and commitment, while the third group brought renewal and focus at a crucial stage. Thus, the original al-Qaeda army took the form of a transnational group of about 20,000 men, who came from three different backgrounds: (i) disintegrated, aging but battle-hardened "Afghan Arabs" who were expelled from Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. saved; (ii) new, younger recruits, drawn to the lure of the Afghan success story and serving as mid-level agents overseen by a guild of senior executives (Abu Ubaida Al Banshiri, Abu Hafs Al Masri and Abu Zubayda); and increasingly after the mid-1990s (iii) secret transnational cells in the Middle East, Europe and East Africa waiting to be activated for a new type of attack in the western metropolises. The latter subgroup, best embodied in the Hamburg cell led by Mohammad Atta and which would produce the decentralized model of Al Qaeda from 2006, would become the vehicle for the series of spectacular operations led by Al Qaeda in. it will be the decade 1995-2005.

The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda GCSP Geneva Papers - Research Series n° 3 19 Building on the waves of riots and uprisings (especially in Cairo, Casablanca and Algiers in the 1980s) that sealed the historic failure of the 'postcolonial Arab state' paint a convincing picture of the accumulated resentment, alienation and anomie, which should ultimately lead to the popular revolutions of 2011 - a modern Islamist movement has emerged precisely from the factor that enables state-building as an alternative, namely the reinvention of the "political" sphere through the export of terrorism. In that sense, Al Qaeda's action was something like a statement that state vulnerability was not inevitable; that its terms are merely the product of a narrative and as such can be corrected in the same and, more revolutionary way, that violence - including offensive international violence - is not just a prerogative of the state. So usurp that Al-Qaida, die traditionalell dem Staat zukam, und bot eine international inakzeptable präskriptive Agenda an, und war von Anfang an gegen Staatliche Abschreckung immun. Die Geburt des militarisierten Islamismus 20 Genfer Papiere des GCSP - Forschungsreihe Nr. 3 Globalisierung und Franchising Durch die Autonomisierung der Gewaltanwendung in den 1990er Jahren und die Erzeugung von Mimetismus seitens mehrerungvorungvorungvorungvorungvorungvorunge rregion Grupzystemer region It is führte auch in eine Segackvonden denational Globale Kripponungen denational USA, als der trregion Operations reacted, die auf die Führung und Mitgliedschaft von Al Qaida auf der gantengnir, Welt abenzielsegnir in Osteuropa), die letztendlich zur Verhaftung und Ermordung Bin Ladens in Abbottabad, Pakistan, im Mai 2011 führten. Darüber hinaus als Akteur, dessen Gewalt in seiner fähigkeit anchors war, blessing Feinde durch Regelmäßige Wiederholung seiner Unermüdlichkeit zu stören und zu Lahmen, booth Al-Qaida vor einer eigenen neuen Herausforichenhörichüen stand Al-Qaida vor einer eigenen neuen Herausforich wüberhmen, näter eigenen neuen Herausforich wüberhmen, näter eigenen neuen Herausforichüenfühnederung züdeterien zu derlün derrmün der Mchüenfühnederung erienench. In dieser Hinsicht, die Bombenanschläge vom 7. July 2005 in London wohl die letzte Operation dar, which directly von der zentralen Al-Qaida-Organisation initiiert und cordiniert wurde. Im Juli 2006 veröffentlichte Ayman al Dhawahiri eine Videonachricht, die im Al Jazeera-Netzwerk ausgestrahlt wurde, in der er dem Vereinigten Königreich mit weiteren Angriffen drohte und Videomaterial einer Aussage des Londoner U-Bahn-Bombers Shehzad Tanweer zu demselben gefilmten Testamentsmodell vorstellte, das die Organisation hatte für einige der Kommandomitglieder vom 11. September eingesetzt und über die Medienabteilung von Mouassassat Al Sihab freigelassen. In dieser Hinsicht waren die Anschläge, die mit den Bombenanschlägen vom 1. Oktober 2005 auf ein Einkaufszentrum und ein Strandrestaurant auf Bali begannen, wohl das Werk lokaler Organisationen – die in ihrer Rangfolge an Bedeutung gewannen –, die jetzt lose von Al Qaidaed inspiriert wurden und eigenständig handeln (selbst wenn sie aus Gründen der Werbung behaupteten, Al-Qaida-Verbindungen zu haben). Diese Entwicklung, das Ergebnis zweier zufälliger Phänomene, nämlich der bewussten Regionalisierungsstrategie von Al Qaida und der Dezentralisierung der GCSP Geneva Papers — Research Series n° 3 21 sowie einer Franchise-Forderung innerhalb der regionalen islamistischen Organisationen selbst nach den Anschlägen vom 11. schwächendes und verwirrtes Bild für die ursprüngliche Al-Qaida-Gruppe In den folgenden Jahren würde es unmöglich werden, von Al Qaida im Singular zu sprechen. Bereits im Jahr 2002 schien die Führung von Al Qaida den Wert einer Vervielfachung ihrer Einsatzorte als Überlebensmechanismus erkannt zu haben, als sie anscheinend gezwungen war, angesichts der vorrückenden US- und britischen Truppen in Afghanistan einen strategischen Rückzug durchzuführen und als Kraftmultiplikator.

The group's savvy use of technology, including sporadic postings on Islamist websites (eg, ansar.info, al-ekhlaas.com, ansarnet. info, alneda.com, jehad.com and azzam.com), was also a distinctive feature of the organisation's modus operandi transcending boundaries. To the extent that these operations necessarily relied, in the post-11 September context, on increased independence by mid-level operators (who could select, for instance, the nature of targets), they ended up highlighting to the mother Al Qaeda the value of decentralisation setting the stage for a strategy of regionalisation which appeared to have been pursued actively from 2005 onwards. Globalising and Franchising 22 GCSP Geneva Papers — Research Series n° 3 A Conglomerate of Affiliates Generally, we can observe the following in relation to the regionalisation phase in Al Qaeda's history. When the franchises were created ex nihilo (Egypt) or when independently-organised existing groups (Somalia's Al Shabaab, Lebanon's Fajr Al Islam) announced that they were ready to rally Al Qaeda, the latter's strategy was minimally impacted and, in the case of the Egyptian attempt, adversely so as there was public opposition to the design on the part of Al Jama'a Al Islamiya. When groups came into existence in the context of a tactical campaign designed carefully by the mother Al Qaeda (weakening the United States in Iraq, exposing Western vulnerabilities in Europe), the strategy was more successful. Finally, when the franchises were established on top of formally existing Islamist groups (Algeria's Salafist Group for Predication and Combat (GSPC, from its commonly-used French appellation, Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat)) or conflict hubs (Yemen/Saudi Arabia), there was impact but the newlycreated organisations reverted rapidly to their own modus operandi (kidnappings in North Africa and insurgency in the Gulf). An important nuance in the Arabian Peninsula is that whereas in Saudi Arabia the insurgency initially failed due to a successful repression campaign by the Saudi authorities, in Yemen the militants' behaviour appeared to shift from 2008 onwards towards more frontal opposition to the state.9 As time went by, talk of a reconstituted, strengthened and resurrected Al Qaeda proliferated among officialdom, security experts and the mainstream media. In early 2007, the New York Times reported that Al Qaeda was working precisely as Osama Bin Laden had initially envisaged.

In July of the same year, using language echoing the prescient August 2001 memorandum to President George W. Bush (“Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”), the US National Intelligence Council produced an estimate entitled “Al Qaeda Better Positioned to Strike the West”.10 9 G. Johnsen, “The Expansion Strategy of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, CTC Sentinel, vol. 2, issue 9, 2009, pp. 8-11; and C. Boucek, “The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Yemen”, CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, Issue 9, 2010, pp. 5-7. 10 National Intelligence Council, “The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland”, National Intelligence Estimate, July 2007; P. Grier, “Why US Sees Al Qaeda as a Growing Threat”, The Christian Science Monitor, 17 July 2007; M. Mazzetti and DE Sanger, “Al Qaeda Threatens, US Frets”, The New York Times, 22 July 2007; M. Mazzetti, “New Leadership is Seen on Rise within Al Qaeda”, The New York Times, 2 April 2007, pp. A1 and A11; and P. Haven, “Al Qaeda Ops Show Leadership in Control”, Associated Press, 13 July 2007. The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda GCSP Geneva Papers — Research Series n° 3 23 Such narrative of ongoing success could just as well have been delivered every year since the autumn of 2001. But for the loss of the ability to use at will the Afghan territory (as it was able to for the training of its foot soldiers throughout the 1990s) and the killing or arrest of several senior and mid-level operatives (most of whom had been involved in the planning of the 11 September attacks; notably Mohammed Atef, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubayda, and Ramzi Bin Al Shaiba), no significant – decisive and lasting – blows had been dealt to the group. Al Qaeda was thus arguably just as strong as it was in 2001, then enjoying its status of stealth menace largely ignored by its enemies, now mutated into a multifaceted global powerhouse whose enemies are kept guessing its next moves, until the death of its symbolic leader Bin Laden. Such development – surprising given the resources allocated, urgency of the issue and amount of attention – was due in large part to the investment which Al Qaeda had placed in its forwardlooking strategy.11 However, such efficient performance and survival by Al Qaeda may paradoxically mask the tipping point of the group's leadership control over both its “brand name” and the restrained and paced strategy Bin Laden and al Dhawahiri had long sought to painstakingly assemble.

Ultimately, though, a phasing out of the “mother Al Qaeda” – which may come out as a natural temporal factor or as result of the death of Bin Laden – is not necessarily something envisioned 11 See RO Nelson and TM Sanderson, A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, February 2011. 12 J. Binnie, “Dead Man's Shoes: Al Qaeda Looks to a Future Without Bin Laden”, Jane's Intelligence Review, June 2011, pp. 8-13. Globalising and Franchising 24 GCSP Geneva Papers — Research Series n° 3 with apprehension by the group's leaders. The two men have indicated repeatedly that the movement should go on in their absence. In that perspective, in the second half of the 2000s, Al Qaeda formally created five official branches. These were: (i) Al Qaeda in Europe (Qaedat Al Jihad fi Europa) with no known official leadership; (ii) Al Qaeda in Egypt(Tandhim Al Qaeda fi Misr) headed by Mohammed Al Hukayma; (iii) Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (Tandhim Al Qaeda fi Bilad Al Rafidayn) led successively by Abu Musab al Zarqawi (killed on 8 June 2006), Abu Hamza al Mouhajir also known as Abu Ayub al Masri (killed on 18 April 2010), Abu Omar al Baghdadi (also killed on 18 April 2010) and Noman Nasser al Zaidi known as Nasser al Din Abu Suleiman; (iv) Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Tandhim Al Qaeda fil Maghreb Al Islami) directed by Abdelmalek Droukdel known as Abou Musab Abdelweddoud; (v) Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Tandhim Al Qaeda fil Jazira Al Arabiya) spearheaded serially by Yusuf al Ayeri (killed on 31 May 2003), Khaled Ali al Haj (killed on 15 March 2004), Abdelaziz al Muqrin (killed on 18 June 2004), Salah al Oofi (killed on 18 August 2005), Nasser al Wuhaychi and Said Ali Al Shihri. Moreover, a short-lived, non-official Al Qaeda in Palestine would issue a communiqué13 in October 2006, and the Lebanese group Fatah Al Islam claimed, in May 2007, inspiration from Al Qaeda and expressed readiness to follow Osama Bin Laden's fatwas. Similarly, the Somali rebel group Al Shabaab would in February 2010 unilaterally declare that it was joining Al Qaeda's global jihad campaign.14 Finally, the presence amongst Al Qaeda's central leadership of a US citizen, Adam Gadahn (Azzam Al Amriki), and his regular messages to America were a constant indication of the group's permanent threat to the United States, as would subsequently those of another US citizen of Yemeni origin, Anwar al Awlaki. 13 RF Ali, “Al Qaeda's Palestinian Inroads”, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 6, issue 8, 17 April 2008; S. Erlanger and HM Fattah, “Jihadist Groups Fill a Power Vacuum”, The New York Times, 31 May 2007, p. A1; and E. Cunningham, “Up Next: Al Qaeda in Palestine?”, The Christian Science Monitor, 11 January 2011. 14 DPA/AFP, “Somalia's Shabaab Join Al Qaeda's Global Jihad”, 2 February 2010. The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda GCSP Geneva Papers — Research Series n° 3 25 Al Qaeda in Europe Little is known about the European branch, which, within hours of the 7 July 2005 London bombings had claimed the attack, by way of an online message, under a denomination indeed stressing the secretive nature of the group: Jamaat Al Tandhim Al Sirri li Munadhamat Qaedat al Jihad fi Europa (Group of the Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda in Europe). The group had certainly operated within the modus operandi of the mother Al Qaeda, and Ayman Al Dhawahiri would, in July 2006, confirm that the operation had been commandeered by Al Qaeda; the commando's leaders – Mohammed Siddiq Khan and Shezhad Tanweer – having reportedly travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to be trained in preparation for the operation. European-based Al Qaeda militants had also previously conducted the 11 March 2004 attack on the Atocha train station in Madrid and had claimed that attack through an e-mail sent to the London newspaper Al Qods Al Arabi and signed under the name Abu Hafs Al Misri Brigades, in reference to Al Qaeda's original chief of military operations Mohammed Atef who had been killed in November 2001 during the US bombing of Kabul. The relationship between the two European groups was demonstrably asserted when on 30 May 2005, ahead of the London attacks, the Abu Hafs Al Misri Brigades had posted a message on several Islamist websites stating: “We ask all waiting mujahideen, wherever they are, to carry out the planned attack”.15

Since the London attacks both entities have remained silent. Al Qaeda in Egypt The episode of the Egyptian avatar is the less significant in Al Qaeda's international pedigree, and met in effect with failure. On 5 August 2006, Ayman al Dhawahiri announced that the Egyptian Al Jama'a Al Islamiya (Islamic Group) had joined Al Qaeda to form a branch in Egypt under the leadership of Mohammad Khalil al Hukayma. In short order, the Jama'a denounced the announcement, and it turned out that al Hukayma was a low-level Egyptian Islamist operator with no significant following in Egypt or elsewhere. As this might have been known to al Dhawahiri himself, alternatively the move may have constituted a way for the former Egyptian Islamist leader to tactically use al Hukayma to offset the legiti15 Adnkronos International (ADI), “The Abu Hafs al Misri Brigades Have Called their 'Sleeping' European Cells to Action”, 30 May 2005. Globalising and Franchising 26 GCSP Geneva Papers — Research Series n° 3 macy of non-violent Islamist groups in Egypt and lure a new generation of violent recruits from the region to the newly-announced entity. Worthy of a try as this may have seemed to headquarters, Al Qaeda in Egypt did not, however, conduct any operations and little was heard of it subsequently except for a call made by al Hukayma in June 2007 to attack American and Israeli targets in Egypt “including women and children”.16

A sign of the times, such modern-day merger of a successful local start-up with an established and recognisable global brand was also equally in line with age-old bay'a ceremonials among Arab tribes whereby one swears an oath of allegiance to a leader and receives the latter's blessing. In an equally public message, Bin Laden responded the following 27 December agreeing to the request.17 Two days after the killing of al Zarqawi in June 2006, his replacement, Abu Hamza al Muhajir, confirmed the bay'a addressing Bin Laden thus: “We are at your disposal, ready for your command.”18 Following Bin Laden's official agreement, al Zarqawi launched what probably was the fiercest and most violent Al Qaeda campaign, hitting indistinctly 16 ABC News, “Al Qaeda in Egypt Leader Calls for Attacks on Women and Children”, 25 June 2007. 17 Audiotaped message aired on Al Jazeera. Also see CNN, “Purported Bin Laden Tape Endorses al Zarqawi”, 27 December 2004. 18 Audiotaped message aired on Al Jazeera. Also see S. Moubayed, “Meet the New Leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq”, Asia Times, 14 June 2006. The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda GCSP Geneva Papers — Research Series n° 3 27 at Westerners in Iraq and at Iraqi Shia. Near-daily bombings, kidnappings and beheadings would mark the brutal reign of al Zarqawi until his death on 8 June 2006.19 His successors, al Muhajir and al Baghdadi, oversaw a decreasing level of violence until their death in April 2010. Ultimately the organisation would come to be subsumed under an Iraqi national umbrella resistance syndicate initially known as the Mujahideen Shura Council and then Dawlat Al Iraq Al Islamiya (Islamic State of Iraq) formed on 15 October 2006 alongside several other Iraqi groups including Junud Al Sahaba (the Soldiers of the Prophet's Companions) and Jaysh Al Fatiheen (the Army of the Liberators). In spite of the 2008 US partial withdrawal, Al Qaeda in Iraq continued its relentless attacks in the country, whether as Islamic State or on its own, often targeting anti-Al Qaeda units and recruits and displaying its flag on the scene of attacks it had conducted under the new leadership, in late 2010 and 2011, of Nasser al Din Abu Suleiman. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) Such tactical manoeuvring was not needed in the case of another leading Islamist group.

On 11 September 2006, Ayman al Dhawahiri declared that the Algerian GSPC was also joining Al Qaeda to lead the fight in North Africa. Accordingly, the GSPC altered its name and, on 11 January 2007, became Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Al Qaeda fi Bilad al Maghrib Al Islami). Subsequently, in a videotaped message aired on 3 November 2007, al Dhawahiri announced that a Libyan group, the Fighting Islamic Group (a little-known organisation which briefly emerged in 1995 vowing to overthrow Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi) had joined AQMI and urged the mujahideen in North Africa to topple the leaders of the Maghreb. As it were, the GSPC had unilaterally pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in September 2003, and had also shared a long-distance anti-French strategy with al Zarqawi after the latter threatened that country on 18 May 2005 for its treatment of Muslims. The evolving radicalisation of Al Qaeda's branch in the Maghreb is certainly cause for the local states' concern as its design was always meant to target the wider region.20 19 See F. Hussayn, “Al Zarqawi: The Second Al Qaeda Generation”, Al Qods Al Arabi, London, 21-22 May 2005. 20 See CS Smith, “North Africa Feared as Staging Ground for Terror”, The New York Times, 20 February 2007, p. A1 and A6. Also see M.-MO Mohamedou, “The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, GCSP Policy Paper n°15, Geneva, May 2011. Globalising and Franchising 28 GCSP Geneva Papers — Research Series n° 3 From islands of connection but no full picture of regional and intercontinental cooperation, the AQMI move has increasingly been towards more formal expansion underscored by the mother Al Qaeda's renewed local preoccupations. In spite of the publicised name change, the new North African group reverted to the original GSPC mode of sporadic skirmishes with Algerian police and military forces, and regular kidnapping of Westerners in the larger Sahel region. However, by 2011, the group had visibly expanded its domain of action throughout the Maghreb and striking alliances in Sub-Saharan Africa with groups such as the Boko Haram in Nigeria.