Outstanding Research by a Doctoral Student Award, Economics Ph.D. Program, University of Alabama, 2026
Job Market Paper
Home Field Advantage: Local Credit Specialization and Demand Capture
Sole-authored
Proximity and industry specialization enable local lenders to gather and verify information about borrowers that distant lenders find difficult to obtain. How much do borrowers benefit from more informed lenders? How do those benefits arise? I exploit the 2005 ethanol mandate, which raised corn demand, to examine these questions. Across U.S. Corn Belt counties, farm earnings per resident rose approximately 9.6% more per standard deviation of local credit specialization, implying roughly $9.6 billion in additional farm earnings over 2005–2010. I examine two mechanisms: credit expansion and credit allocation. Specialized local banks did not expand agricultural lending more in counties with greater local credit specialization. Instead, their portfolios shifted toward production loans, while farmers’ non-real-estate interest expenses tended to grow less. Because operating lending requires more borrower-specific judgment than lending against readily appraised farmland, these findings are consistent with informed lenders improving credit allocation rather than expanding lending volumes. Lending volumes alone may therefore understate the cost of community-bank consolidation to borrowers.
Publications
Contests with Ambiguous Prizes
with Cary Deck, Emma Kate Henry, Tigran Melkonyan, and Samuel Redinger, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
This paper examines behavior in contests where the prize value is ambiguous. We develop a theoretical model of bidding in a Tullock contest with an ambiguous prize where contestants account for the ambiguity attitude of their rival. Ambiguity affects optimal behavior via two countervailing channels - a direct effect arising from contestants’ ambiguity about the value of the prize and an indirect effect corresponding to the effect of ambiguity on the opponent’s behavior. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we elicit individual risk and ambiguity attitudes and compare predicted and observed behavior in contests with an ambiguous prize, a risky prize and certain prizes. A comparison between contests with ambiguous and risky prizes shows that participants invest significantly less under ambiguity. Additionally, we decompose the effect of changing from a certain prize to an ambiguous prize into two components - the first is the effect of introducing risk and the second is the effect of introducing ambiguity. Empirically, we find that both effects are significant, but work in opposite directions.
Working Paper
Large and Small Depositors in the Banking System: Pooling and Financial Stability
with Robert Reed and Jiahong Gao
Banks serve large and small depositors together, yet the rationale for pooling such different deposit bases has not been formalized in a micro-founded model of banking. We build one in which, consistent with recent empirical work, large depositors carry greater resources but higher liquidity risk. Pooling emerges as an exchange: large depositors supply the scale that gives small depositors access to higher yielding investments, and small depositors accept lower early withdrawal payments that fund above-endowment early payments to large depositors. We characterize the full structure of deposit rates under pooling and segregation and establish explicit conditions under which both groups prefer the pooled arrangement. Participation by small depositors also informs the bank: because they carry less liquidity risk, small withdrawals beyond normal redemption demand reveal a run early, and early detection preserves the bank’s resources. The optimal pooled contract is therefore run-proof at any sunspot probability: under logarithmic preferences, pooling itself creates no fragility. Instability from pooling must instead operate through stronger risk aversion and the liquidity insurance it generates, which we examine in ongoing work.