The chair of each session is the last speaker of that session
Information design - Day 1, 10:30-12:00, LT2
Uncharted Waters: Selling a New Product Robustly
Zhang, Kun
Coordination through Information Design in the Presence of Hype
Teh, Christopher
Full Information Disclosure in Linear Persuasion Games
Sun, Junze
Behavioural and experimental economics - Day 1, 1:00-2:30, LT2
The Benefits of Being Misinformed: Information Moderation under Misperception
Staab, Manuel
Buy It Now, or Later, or Not
Lin, Senran
Mechanism design - Day 1, 3:00-5:00, LT2
Optimal Mechanism Design with Referral
Zhang, Jun
The Simple Economics of the Impossibility of Efficient Trade
Le, Toan
A Collusion-Proof Dynamic Mechanism
Rodivilov, Alexander
Assignment mechanisms with public preferences and independent types
Francisco Silva
Public good provision - Day 1, 10:30-12:00, Grattan
Buyer-optimal Learning in Collective Purchase Problems
Park, Junrok
Voluntary contributions to a public good, when and how much
Shi, Yunjie
Irreversibility, Complementarity, and the Dynamics of Public Good Provision
Deng, Liuchun
Search and innovation - Day 1, 1:00-2:30, Grattan
Sequential Information Acquisition and Optimal Search
Khalfan, Nawaaz
The Simple Economics of Sellers’ Dynamic Search Under Continuous Demands
Rabenhorst, Joel
Incentives in R&D Competition
Roig, Guillem
Networks - Day 1, 3:00-5:00, Grattan
Strategic Diffusion: Public Goods vs. Public Bads
Thornton, DJ
Matching and Bargaining on Buyer-Seller Networks
Li, Duozhe
Affective Polarization, Media Outlets, and Opinion Dynamics
Della Lena, Sebastiano
The Network Origins of Entry
Zenou, Yves
Matching and market design - Day 2, 9:00-10:30, LT2
Bayesian school choice: welfare comparison of immediate acceptance and deferred acceptance mechanisms
Hafalir, Isa E
Storage Games
Balakin, Sergei
Who gets the bonus? Affirmative Action Reforms in High School Admissions in China
Kesten, Onur
Auctions - Day 2, 11:00-12:30, LT2
Optimal Hotelling auctions
Muir, Ellen
Flat-Bids Equilibria in Multi-Unit Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
Dharanan, G V A
Paying to Overbid
Idione Meneghel
Game theory and industrial organisation - Day 2, 13:30-2:30, LT2
Compellingness in Nash Implementation
Kunimoto, Takashi
Tournaments with Reserve Performance
Ryvkin, Dmitry
Teams and coalitions - Day 2, 9:00-10:30, Grattan
Diversity in Teams
Smirnov, Vladimir
Words, not deeds – the interplay of cheap talk and transparency in joint projects.
Agastya, Murali
Coalitional Power and Fair Queueing
Sun, CJ
Mathematical economics and decision theory - Day 2, 11:00-12:30, Grattan
On Equilibria in Constrained Generalized Games with the Weak Continuous Inclusion Property
Uyanik, Metin
A stricter canon: general Luce models for arbitrary menu sets
Ryan, Matthew
Dynamic Hurwicz Expected Utility and Neo-Additive Sources
Grant, Simon
Financial Economics - Day 2, 13:30-2:30, Grattan
Financing Innovation with Future Equity
Hodor, Idan
On the Timing of Credit Rating
Vasconcelos, Luis