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ADAM PAUTZ

I am a Professor of Philosophy at Brown University (CV link). I am interested in the traditional "big questions" about mind and nature. What is consciousness? What is to be a thinker? Is everything physical? How uniform and simple is nature? Are things as they appear? I try to make progress on these questions by using a mix of empirically-informed arguments and "armchair" arguments. Here are some things I've been working on recently:

Book Project: The Singularity of Consciousness (Table of Contents here). In this book I will argue against "identity physicalism" (Quine, Lewis, Sider, Dorr). My arguments will be off the beaten path: they are based on the significance of consciousness, easy determinate reference to qualities, "qualitative closure", and other things. Once we reject identity physicalism, we have a choice: "non-identity ground physicalism" (Schaffer, Campbell, others) or dualism (Chalmers, Kim, others)? I will argue that on both views the emergence of consciousness is "singular" in certain ways (building on the conclusion of this paper), and both views face the "T-shirt problem" (discussed by myself and Schaffer). So we can't decide between them and maybe we shouldn't care which is right. We must make our peace with the conclusion that consciousness is unlike other things and we can't figure out how it depends on the brain. But I will end on a positive note: we can still say interesting things about the role of consciousness in grounding reasons, value, and intentionality (e.g. I develop a "consciousness-based" form of David Lewis's interpretationism about belief and desire).

Laws of Appearance. In my book Perception and earlier articles, I put forward “the puzzle of the laws of appearance” for representationalism. In recent articles, E.J. Green, Mark Sainsbury, Ned Block, and Eric Mandelbaum have suggested empirical explanations of the laws of appearance. I am writing a paper criticizing these empirical explanations. Others have suggested that naive realism can do better, so that the laws of appearance provide a novel argument for naive realism. I am also writing a paper against this thought.

Consciousness-Based Interpretationism about Belief and Desire. In a few recent essays (here, here, and here), I have developed a multi-stage, consciousness-based form of David Lewis's interpretationism about belief and desire. (Robbie Williams has developed a somewhat different multistage form of Lewis's view.) I argue that my "consciousness-based" version solves certain Quinean indeterminacy worries for Lewis's version. It also explains (i) why there are necessary connections between perception and belief (e.g. Smith, Byrne), and (ii) why the beliefs/desires of pre-linguistic creatures are necessarily limited and an outer language extends thought (e.g. Wittgenstein, Bermudez). I plan to write a follow-up essay that addresses some criticisms of this view (e.g. Buchanan&Dogramaci and Williams) and that argues that "surface-level" theories of belief and desire like interpretationism are consistent with the the "language of thought" hypothesis and its motivations.

News
Forthcoming:

Mary on Black and White Earth: The Significance Argument Against Identification Physicalism
The Importance of Being Conscious. Ed. with Geoff Lee. Oxford University Press.
How to Achieve the Physicalist Dream: Identity vs Ground
A Look at French and Phillips' Naive Realism

Recent articles on my work: essays by Green, Sainsbury, Goth, Speaks, Morgan, Block, Masciari on my puzzle about the "laws of appearance"; Schaffer and Rubenstein on my "T-shirt problem" in metaphysics; Epstein, Ho, Beck, Marvan and Polak, Balmer, Dalbey&Saad, and Sharp on my empirical arguments against phenomenal externalism; Buchanan&Dogramaci, Chalmers on my interpretationism; Lennon on my recombination argument against cognitive experiences; Cutter&Crummett on psychophysical harmony, Saad on my "subset principle".
Publications
On singularity of consciousness:
Representationalism about ConsciousnessPhenomenal consciousness is representational or intentional. So the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness becomes the hard problem of intentionality. The next six essays address this problem.
The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal ExternalismCriticizes armchair arguments against externalist reductive theories of phenomenal intentionality. We need empirical arguments. Discussions of this essay: Saad link, van Cleve link.
Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical RelationPhenomenal intentionality is a singular form of intentionality. Empirical findings show it is internally determined. So standard externalist models for reducing intentionality don't apply to it. Discussions: Chalmers, Cohen, Allen, Masrour.
The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: An Empirical Argument Further develops the empirical arguments of "Sensory Awareness is not Wide". Discussions: Cutter, Beck, Hill, Berger, O'Callaghan, Rosenqvist, Epstein, Ho.
A Simple View of Consciousness The above two essays targeted externalist reductive models. This essay argues that no reductive model works for phenomenal intentionality. The conscious-of relation is irreducible. Discussions: Levine, Kriegel, Cutter-Tye, Schaffer.
How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? Brains-in-vats show spatial phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Discussions: Speaks, Block, Saad.
Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake? A dilemma for reductive theories of phenomenal intentionality. Presents a "subset principle" to explain psychophysical link. Discussions: Bradley, Cohen, Shoemaker email, pp. 80-82 of Papineau, Saad.
The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness The above series of essays presented the argument from phenomenal intentionality for the irreducibility of consciousness. This essay adds arguments from normative significance and vagueness. Discussions: Kriegel, Duncan.
How to Achieve the Physicalist Dream? (2020 online draft)Identity physicalism achieves the physicalist dream. But it doesn't work because consciousness is irreducible, as argued in above essays. Once we accept this, we can either accept ground physicalism or dualism. But they are equally complex and non-uniform. It's a toss up. Discussions: Schaffer and Rubenstein.
Consciousness and Coincidence: Comments on ChalmersGiven certain assumptions, dualism and non-reductive ground physicalism about consciousness both face a novel "coincidence" problem. Although I think one is right, have no solution. Discussions: Chalmers, Cutter-Crummett, Saad.
A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness (2015) Russellian monism (and "panpsychism") doesn't help with the puzzle of consciousness. It comes in two forms: reductive and non-reductive or "primitivist". Both face objections. Tye's book develops a similar dilemma. Discussion: Goff, Cutter.
Is Russellian monism (or pansychism) better than dualism? (2017) This paper responds to comments on my 2015 paper above by Luke Roelofs. I argue "No".
A Note on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (2015)IIT is too obscure to be evaluated. For one thing, it is offered as a theory of the "degrees" or "levels" of consciousness, but it is unclear what that means. See section 1.6 of Carruthers' book for related point. Discussion: Scientific American, Wikipedia, Lau's blog.
What is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness? Develops the themes of the previous note in more detail. Discussion: Lee, Schaffer, Tye.
"Consciousness first" ideas:
The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality (2008)Sketches a multistage, consciousness-first theory of intentionality. Discussions of this paper: Bourget-Mendelovici, Kriegel.
Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? Argues against "cognitive experiences" using separation cases. Then sketches an alternative consciousness-first approach to intentionality. Discussions: Goff, Montague, Chudnoff, Fürst, Lennon, Mendelovici,
Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory Answers Goff and Montague on my criticisms of cognitive experiences. Then develops in more detail my alternative consciousness-first approach to intentionality. Discussions: Buchanan-Dogramaci, Lennon, Chalmers, Chalmers M&L.
Varieties of Interpretationism about Belief and Desire My "consciousness first" variety of interpretationism may have some advantages over Robbie Williams's alternative variety. Response: Williams.
Review of Williams The Metaphysics of Representation A discussion of Robbie Williams's alternative variety of interpretationism.
Review of Mendelovici The Phenomenal and the Representational A critical discussion of Mendelovici's consciousness-first approach to intentionality, which differs from my own.
Review of Langsam The Wonder of ConsciousnessA critical discussion of Langsam's consciousness-first approach to the mind, which differs from my own.
On perception and illusion:
Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World? An empirical argument against naive realism involving evolution of perceptual success. Also presents a puzzle about knowledge of universals. Discussions of this paper: Beck, Chalmers, Epstein, Korman-Locke.
Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Develops empirical and other arguments against Bill Fish's brand of naive realism. Responses: Fish, Langsam, Niikawa and Niikawa.
Naïve Realism and the Science of Sensory Consciousness (2018)Many forms of naive realism are empirically inadequate. They violate "internal dependence". Others (e. g. Beck's) may be empirically adequate, but they depart from core naive realist ideas and are problematic. Discussion: Fish, Beck, Epstein, Ho.
Naive Realism v Representationalism: An Argument from ScienceThis paper has two parts. In the first part, I argue against what I call "basic" naive realism on empirical ground. Then I turn Craig French and Ian Phillips’ modified naïve realism as set out in their recent paper "Austerity and Illusion"
The Internal Physical State View of ExperienceChapter 2 from my book Perception. Argues against the internal physical state view. Discussion: Papineau.
An Argument Against Papineau’s Qualitative View of Sensory ExperienceIn my book *Perception* (2021), I developed an argument from spatial experience against Papineau's type of view (also Pautz 2010, 2017). Here I elaborate on that argument in the light of Papineau’s discussion. His reply is here.
Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument Summarizes my empirical and other problems for naive realism and the internal physical state view. Then argues that representationalism avoids those problems. Discussions: Beck, Fish, Papineau, Marvan and Polak.
Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content? An IBE argument for representationalism about experience over naive realism and the internal state view. Discussions: Alford-Duguid-Arsenault, Siewert, Lycan, Brewer, Brewer, Langsam, Watzl, Sundstrom, Johnston.
The Representational View of ExperienceChapter 3 from my book Perception. An IBE argument for representationalism about experience. Answers recent objections due to Campbell, Papineau and others.
Philosophical Theories of Colour Once we accept representationalism, we face the question: what in the world are the colors we experientially represent? This paper is an overview of the major theories. The six essays below take up these theories.
Byrne and Hilbert on the Unitary-Binary Structure of the Color (2003)Reductive physicalist theories of color cannot explain color structure in terms of hue-magnitudes. See this essay for more. Also sketches the argument of "Sensory Awareness not Wide". Discussion: Byrne-Hilbert.
Can Colour Structure be Explained in terms of Colour Experience? (2006)Reductive physicalists cannot explain color structure in terms of color experience. Sketches a representationalist form of color eliminativism (Chalmers 2006 independently proposed a similar "edenic" view). Discussion: Cohen, Cutter, Davies, Allen, Byrne-Hilbert, Logue.
Color Eliminativism (2006)A two-step argument for color eliminativism. First we should accept a primitivist theory of color. Realist primitivism faces an evolutionary debunking argument. This plus simplicity considerations lead to eliminativism. Discussion: Cohen, Korman&Locke, Wright.
How Does Color Experience Represent the World? Summarizes my answer to the question: what in the world are the colors we experientially represent? Discusses other sensible properties.
Review of Cohen The Red and The Real A critical discussion of Cohen's theory of color, which may differ from my own illusionist-representationalism theory.
Review of Chirimuuta Outside Color A critical discussion of Chirimuuta's theory of color, which differs from my own illusionist-representationalist theory.
Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence Representationalists face the question: if you should hallucinate a tomato, is there something you can visually attend to? I argue no and then use this to criticize "transparency". Discussions: Sethi, Schellenberg, Bengson-Korman, Kriegel, Frey, Conduct, Gupta, Tye.
What Are the Contents of Experiences? Representationalists face another question: what are the representational contents of experience? This paper clarifies the issue and then argues for a "thin" view. Discussions: Logue, Raleigh, Speaks, Forrest, Genone, Macpherson.
The Perceptual Representation of Objects and Natural Kinds A discussion of Jeff Speaks' answer to the question: what are the representational contents of experience? Response: Speaks.
The Puzzle of the Laws of AppearanceDevelops a puzzle for representationalists. Although I accept representationalism, I have no answer to this puzzle for it. Discussions: Speaks, Block, Lycan, Tye, Sainsbury, Green.
Other things:
Representationalism and Phenomenal-Neural Dependence (1998, NEUPC Journal)An early version of "Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical Relation".
Reply to Geoff Lee and Casey O'CallaghanA reply to Geoff and Casey's comments on my empirical arguments against phenomenal externalism.
Ignoring the Real Problems for Phenomenal Externalism A reply to Hilbert and Klein's response to "The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: An Empirical Argument".
BIVs and Spatial Content: Reply to Sydney Shoemaker (2010)Reply to Shoemaker's discussion of my argument against the internal physical state view (e.g. Papineau).
Puzzles of Spatial Experience: Reply to Farid MasrourA discussion of Farid Masrour "Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism".
Retentionalism vs Extensionalism: Reply to Barry DaintonA discussion of Barry Dainton's views on time consciousness from a representationalists point of view.
Is Experience Predicative? Reply to Mark JohnstonA discussion of Johnston's "The Problem with the Content View"
Review of Hill's Consciousness (Analysis Reviews)Some questions about Chris Hill's innovative form of representationalism.
Themes in Ned Block’s Philosophy of Consciousness (with Daniel Stoljar)Overview of Block's seminal work. Asks about his reason for accepting a biological theory, and about how it might cohere with his claim that lack a reason for or against consciousness in non-biological androids.
Inquiry and Belief: Comments on Friedman (2015)I raise some counterexamples to Friedman's DBI principle. Then I propose an alternative principle which follows from general platitudes about knowledge.
An Argument against Fodorian Inner Sentence Theories of Belief and DesireI argue against versions of Fodor's theory of belief and desire that imply that "surface-level duplicates" can radically differ in their beliefs and desire (I have no objection to versions that don't have this implication).
Does the Rich Content View of Experience Matter? Comment on Matthew Frise. Asks whether the rich content view (e.g. Siegel) matters to other debates.
Are Disputes about Frog Representation Merely Verbal? John Morrison apparently disagrees with Neadner, Shea and Millikan on what and how frogs represent. I question whether it is a "substantive" disagreement in the sense of Sider.
The Arrationality of Perception: Comments on Susanna Siegel (PPR)Raises some counterexamples of Siegel's "downgrade thesis" involving seamless transitions. Also suggests it is inconsistent with plausible epistemic principles.
What is My Evidence that Here is a Cup? Comments on Susanna SchellenbergPresses objections about seamless transitions and about the graded character of perceptual justification. For more on graded perceptual justification see Munton.
Comment on Bill Brewer A question for Brewer about the graded character of perceptual justification and his reply.
Comment on Anil Gupta Three questions for Gupta about hallucination, his rejection of representationalism, and the nature of pain.
Propositions and Properties (PPR)We shouldn't expect an explanation of the instantiation-conditions of properties. So why expect an explanation of the truth-conditions of propositions? Discussion: Merricks, Gilmore.
Against Armstrong on the Resemblance of Universals (AJP 1997)Using a point about the composition of structural universals, I construct an argument against Armstrong's analysis. Armstrong's response letter. Discussions: Morganti, Rodriguez-Pereyra.
Armstrong on Functional Laws (1996, The Dualist Journal)Armstrong's theory of functional laws cannot handle the functional laws that appear in actual science.
An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics (PhilStudies)Fregean account must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid or reject a plausible Exportation rule. Discussion: Schiffer, Bave, and Felka&Steinberg.

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