New article out in The Philosophical Quarterly!
14. (2023). 'Knowledge as a (non-factive) mental state.' Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00697-0
13. (2023). 'Thinking about past minds: Cognitive science as philosophy of historiography.' Journal of the Philosophy of History. https://brill.com/view/journals/jph/17/2/article-p219_3.xml
12. (2022). 'I hear you feel confident.' The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac007
11. (2021). 'Knowledge and the Brain: Why the Knowledge-Centric Theory of Mind Program Needs Neuroscience.' Behavioral and Brain Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X20001557
10. (2021). 'Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes).' Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01714-0
9. (2021). 'Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.' Theoria. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12334
8. (2021). 'Knowing Falsely: The Non-Factive Project.' Acta Analytica. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00471-3
7. (2020). ‘The Neural and Cognitive Mechanisms of Knowledge Attribution: An EEG Study.’ Cognition. 203C, 104412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104412
6. (2020). ‘Epistemic judgments are insensitive to probabilities.’ Metaphilosophy 51(4): 499-521. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12444
5. (2019). 'Neural Phase: A New Problem for the Modal Account of Epistemic Luck.' Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02517-x
4. (2019). 'The Myth of Stochastic Infallibilism.' Episteme. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.24
3. (2019). 'Postnarrativism, Historiographical Evaluation, and Truth.' Journal of the Philosophy of History. https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341422
2. (2019). 'There are actual brains in vats now.' Logos and Episteme 10(2): 135-145. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910212
1. (2018). ‘Do judgements about risk track modal ordering?’ Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7(3): 200-208. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.388