9AM GMT (6AM Rio de Janeiro, 9AM London, 10AM Paris, 12PM Istanbul, 2:30PM New Delhi, 5PM Shanghai, 6PM Tokyo/Seoul, 8PM Sydney, 10PM Auckland)
Huaxia Zeng (School of Economics, SUFE) "Equity in Strategic Exchange"
Host: Marcus Pivato
Abstract. New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others unanimously perceive her object the best, if and only if preferences are single-peaked, and (ii) an upper bound on fairness attainable is that, if two agents' objects are considered the best by all agents partitioned evenly into two groups, it is guaranteed that one, not both, gets her favorite object. This indicates an unambiguous trade-off between incentives and fairness in the design of exchange rules.
(Joint work with Peng Liu)