THE BENGAL FAMINE - EXTRACT 


Bengal, 1943

 

Angela Noblet was in love. A love which, just as Matron had

commanded, she kept carefully separate from her hospital

duties, where she remained under the command of her amour, the

newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lossing. She and

Teddy walked and picnicked, dined and danced. At the local

concert hall they watched the latest American films together −

Blood and Sand with Tyrone Power was a favourite − their feet

crunching on half-chewed betel nuts as they stood to sing ‘God

Save the King’. Then they strolled back to the hospital arm in

arm, alert for snakes and jackals, passing by the naked, grey-

bearded sadhu (holy man) as he recited his hypnotic evening

prayers. And soon the lovers even had a song.

 

We took a truck to the river Damodar, a mile or so away from

Asansol, taking along a wind-up gramophone, some records

and a rug to lounge on. There for the first time I heard a record-

ing of the great cellist Pablo Casals playing Après Un Rêve by

Fauré, an experience that made such an impression on me that

when I hear that plaintive melody so many years afterwards I

am wafted back to a moonlit river bank, with a vista of distant

mountains and romantic memories of my first real love affair.

But in India one always swings between the earth and the

stars. As I closed the lid of the gramophone I saw the busy

scarab beetle rolling its ball of dung along the ground.

 

 

Angela shared nothing of the physical side of this relationship

with her diary, but the couple were close enough to travel on

leave together, although she did carefully note that separate

bedrooms were in use at all times. One day, after leaving Asansol

on a slow train journey towards a lake resort called Bhimtal, they

suddenly ground to a halt alongside a goods train.

 

‘What’s that noise, darling? That tapping.’

‘I can see some people under the other train, I think. Hundreds

of them’

‘What are they doing?’

‘It’s sticks, they have sticks and little bowls.’

‘Good God, the poor wretches must be desperate.’

 

Angela had never shied away from the harsher side of life in

British India but now, peering through the grimy window of the

carriage, her eyes slowly adjusting to the dark, she was suddenly

face to face with something horrifi c, something that today many

people consider a war crime or even a genocide. Creeping along

the tracks underneath the goods train were dozens of men and

women pushing bamboo spikes up into the slatted fl oor of the

wagons, in the hope of puncturing a sack of grain. A thin trickle

of wheat was their reward, which they caught in small bowls. The

driver knew they were there and did nothing to stop them. When

the time came to move on, he let off a loud whistle to give them

a moment to escape from under his wheels. Angela wondered

aloud about people like this being not so sympathetically treated

elsewhere, parents maimed or killed in their desperation to fi nd

food for their families. A sergeant who had joined her at the

window said that half the grain would be gone by the time that

train reached Calcutta.

 

After an uncomfortable night made more so by what she had

witnessed, and by the hard beds of the ladies’ rest room at Bareilly

station, they took another train up into the mountains. Once

again the troubles of wartime India interrupted the journey. An

elderly Indian man started up a political conversation, asking what

they thought of Gandhi, his ‘iniquitous imprisonment’ as a result

of the ‘Quit India’ campaign and the fact that Indians under British

rule were starving to death in Bengal.

 

We told him about the plundering of the goods train. He remarked

severely that, because of the Japanese invasion, there was no rice

coming in from Burma and asked us when we were going to

‘drive those fellows’ out. We were suitably apologetic but explained

that we could not manage without Gandhi’s cooperation. He

demanded to know how the Mahatma could help us when we

had put him in jail. This seemed rather a circular argument so we

sat and smiled at him. He beamed back expansively through his

large spectacles, salaaming affectionately when we left the train.

 

This polite but firm disagreement on a train to a beautiful village,

where food was plentiful, tourists lounged on the verandas of splen-

did hotels and spent lazy days fi shing by the lake, captures perfectly

a sense present in many sources from this time, both Indian and

British. Anger mixed with fatalism. An understanding that, yes, of

course, war had made famine relief more difficult than ever before

but, alongside that, a bubbling fury that Indians themselves, while

risking their lives in huge numbers all around the world, were not

in a position to help their starving compatriots. And always close to

the surface there was another feeling, no less powerful for never

being tested in the real world, that however hard the authorities tried

to help, and try many of them did, they would surely, inevitably,

have done more had the food run short in Surrey, Manitoba, the

Western Cape, New South Wales or North Island.

 

The calamity unfolding in Bengal further accelerated momentum

towards independence and left an abiding stain on the reputation

of the Raj. Nobody knows how many died in the great famine

but it is probably between two and three million. That these

deaths took place at a time of exploding economic activity in

India − and even in other parts of Bengal such as Asansol − only

reinforced the shock and the outrage.

 

Rice was the staple food of Bengal’s poorer communities. The

year-long crisis began when a combination of a rare plant disease

and a tropical cyclone in late 1942 destroyed much of the crop and

sent prices soaring. Some traders hoarded what they could in the

anticipation of even higher prices to come. Local officials did little

to stop this. Those who could pay did so, but soon Calcutta and the

larger regional towns were filling with people who could not afford

the new prices and were forced to look for food elsewhere. Because

of the intense fear of invasion, a policy known as ‘denial’ also played

a tragic part. Boats and food supplies had been confiscated from

border regions to prevent the Japanese from seizing them. As a

result villages that had relied upon fi shing began to struggle to feed

themselves, farmers were no longer able to travel upstream to their

paddy fi elds and it became much harder to move what rice supplies

there were to the places that needed them most.

 

Soon entire families, weak with hunger, began to succumb to

disease and corpses appeared on the streets. In Calcutta emaciated

figures begged for scraps outside grand hotels where well-dressed and

mostly white guests still enjoyed their gala dinners and Saturday night

balls. The authorities attempted to organise relief camps and bring in

fresh supplies of food, but the many pressures of war, the shortage of

merchant ships and some bad flooding later in 1943 disrupted every-

thing still further. Help was always late and inadequate and soon the

scale of the misery was overwhelming. Letters reached Indian soldiers

in North Africa and Italy revealing the desperation in their home

villages, causing such anxiety that their officers pressed the authorities

to do more. Clive Branson, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, was

now serving in India and what he saw appalled him.

 

 ‘It is all very well to parade members of the 4th Indian Division around England but the sincerity of that praise wears a bit thin if those men’s relatives are dying of hunger in the villages of Bengal.’

 

‘I thought I was a sophisticated hard-boiled egg and could take

a detached view of things,’ wrote Satyen Basu, a doctor in the

Indian Army, ‘but witness a baby barely two years old lying in the

lap of his brother of about six, both so devitalised that they are not

able even to move from the street corner and biding their time to

be shifted by somebody, sometime, alive or dead.’

 

Burma and Malaya had traditionally supplied rice to Bengal

but, as Angela Noblet’s fellow passenger had rightly pointed out,

the Japanese had stopped all that. In the past so-called ‘Famine

Codes’ had picked up early signs of distress and triggered official

action. But as the crisis deepened during the first half of 1943

everything seemed to happen in slow motion, in glaring contrast

to the intense activity in the war economy. Neighbouring regions

did not rush food to Bengal for fear of running short themselves

or − so it was whispered − because politically connected merchants

wanted to keep the price up. Churchill’s government did try to

help but the issue took months to reach the top of the relevant

in-trays in London.

 

Hundreds of thousands of tons of grain then arrived in Bengal despite intense pressure on maritime resources and the threat of Japanese submarines. However, amid a general lack of urgency and ‘grip’, some of that food got caught up for weeks in bottlenecks at the ports and railway hubs. And still the people died. Churchill even appealed directly to Roosevelt for help with relief aid but the President said that he could not spare the shipping. Again, amid so many other priorities, the starvation of poor Bengalis never quite made it to the top of anyone’s list.

 

The men who ran British India have received much furious

criticism for the famine. But one of the least effective arms of the

state was the democratically elected (albeit on a limited franchise)

Bengali government of Khwaja Nizamuddin. Another Cambridge-

educated politician, Nizamuddin would one day become Prime

Minister of Pakistan. But in 1943 his administration was slow to

transport food from areas of surplus into the worst affected parts

of his region. After the war the celebrated Indian economist

Amartya Sen studied all the available data about food production

and storage in Bengal and other parts of the country in 1943. He

concluded that there should have been enough in northern India

to feed Bengal, but speculation, inflation and hoarding exposed

the poorest class of people to fatal danger, and then officialdom

didn’t react decisively until it was much too late. Such was the

dysfunction that India continued to export rice even as Bengalis

starved. In charting the economic forces that shaped the Second

World War historian Richard Overy also considered what

happened in Bengal to be avoidable, an example of administrative

oversight when faced with a familiar case of ‘market distortion

and uneven distribution’ of a staple foodstuff. Food surpluses else-

where in India − some lying tantalisingly close by − were not

mobilised in time to do any good.

 

One key insight into the official British mindset comes from the

letters of the governor of Bengal, John Herbert, a much more

powerful man than Khwaja Nizamuddin. Herbert first played

down the crisis, complaining about the ‘bad press’ it was generating

and worrying that the huge number of wretched people trying to

find a means to survive posed a security threat and a ‘particular

nuisance in areas where troops are concentrated’.

 

Reading official communications such as Herbert’s it is possible to see something else lying behind the tardiness − an ingrained acceptance of poverty and inequality as just ‘an Indian thing’, something natural, some-

thing baked into how the people in charge regarded life and death

here. One day, perhaps just after riding in his official car through

streets full of desperate human beings, Herbert wrote this:

 

I hope we can get out some effective propaganda to counteract the present unhelpful tales of horror in the press which manifests itself largely in photographs which might have been taken in Calcutta at anytime during the last ten years.

 

You did not have to be a follower of Subhas Chandra Bose to

recoil at such an attitude. And the obvious question that such

comments prompted quickly appeared on a million lips: ‘Does

anyone doubt, were the victims white, that more would be done

to help them?’ All this horror unfolded a year after the chaotic

retreat from Burma and just months after the ‘Quit India’ campaign

had revealed the depth of support for independence − a triple

catastrophe for the Raj. This was well understood by Archibald

Wavell who took over as Viceroy in October 1943. He injected

new energy into the relief eff ort and used the army to transport

food into Bengal from areas of surplus, but the fight he had to get

help from London depressed and infuriated him:

 

I feel that the vital problems of India are being treated by His

Majesty’s Government with neglect, even sometimes with

hostility and contempt . . . [the famine] is one of the greatest

disasters that has befallen any people under British rule and

damage to our reputation both among Indians and foreigners in

India is incalculable.

 

There are some today who will tell you that Winston Churchill

hated Indians and wanted them to die, actively choosing to starve

Bengal out of sheer malice or as a twisted kind of revenge for the

‘Quit India’ campaign. Just about everything Churchill ever said

was written down somewhere, along with lots of things that he

might or might not have said. You can find ample evidence of his

romantic, paternalistic love for India and plenty of his furious

anger towards Indian nationalists and rebels. One day when

particularly enraged about Gandhi, in a drunken snarl he infa-

mously called Hinduism ‘a beastly religion’. There are numerous

examples, too, of how very old-fashioned views of India and

Indians affected his thinking. At one point, he exploded with

‘Muslims are warriors and Hindus are windbags’.

 

Churchill did not want Indians to starve but in the end it did

come down to priorities. When describing his role in the famine

the more sympathetic writers point to the unprecedented scale of

the war eff ort being managed from London. Churchill’s team had

to organise supply convoys upon every ocean and numerous great

campaigns on land, sea and air across multiple continents. Amid all

of this − and with the future of the world in the balance − why

would suffering in Bengal suddenly trump all other considerations?

 

But now and again you can hear something else, something that

lurked at the margin of this subject like an unwelcome spirit. It was

the subtext of many conversations about the famine in both

London and India and it went something like this:

 

It’s India. Famines happen there. There are too many people

and a lot of them live on the margin of starvation even at the

best of times. We are not heartless men. We do what we can

and we do it better than anyone else. But we can’t do every-

thing. Oh, and there is a war on, don’t you know?

 

When told of the need to rush food supplies to Greece in 1944

Churchill revealed a hierarchy of concern that was clearly based

upon both racial prejudice and a caricature of Indians as helpless

peasants: ‘The starvation of anyway underfed Bengalis matters less

than that of sturdy Greeks.’ Indians didn’t have to hear private

conversations like that to know how the men at the top of the

empire could sometimes dismiss their most pressing concerns.

 

When released from house arrest and able to speak in public again,

Gandhi immediately called what happened in Bengal ‘a manmade

famine’. Sucheta Kripalani, a future Congresswoman, damned ‘the

utter callousness with which the government behaved . . . perhaps

one of the reasons that really drove iron into our souls’.

 

Because if the British could not or would not manage the country primarily in the interest of Indians then they should stand down and let

Indians themselves take their turn (and it is indeed worth noting

here that there were no serious famines ever recorded in India after

independence, although one did take place in Bangladesh in 1974).

Whether callous, careless or both, it was hard to deny the moral

force of all this, especially if you claimed the right to govern this

place based upon your ability to organise the essentials of life

better than the people you ruled. A century earlier, when another

natural disaster led to a nation-changing famine in rural Ireland,

the British state was condemned both for a lack of action and for

allowing prejudices about the rural Catholic Irish to undermine

what limited action it did take. A famously angry leader column

in the Galway Vindicator, written on New Year’s Eve 1846, thun-

dered that the London government’s refusal to interfere in ‘the

market’ of food

 

puts to blush every feeling of humanity and libels the very name

of Christian . . . It is, we repeat it, nothing less than the murder

of the people . . . Even now [the authorities] seem inhumanly

apathetic. Good God, was there ever such cruelty perpetrated

before by any Government calling itself either civilised or

Christian? Again we ask ‘Must the people starve?’

 

Britain’s reputation in Ireland is to this day affected by the way

that question was answered. The long-term impact of the Bengal

famine, and the way it was addressed, was not very much differ-

ent. Because when the question ‘must the people starve?’ was

asked once again the answer that came back was bleakly and sadly familiar.