THE BENGAL FAMINE - EXTRACT
Bengal, 1943
Angela Noblet was in love. A love which, just as Matron had
commanded, she kept carefully separate from her hospital
duties, where she remained under the command of her amour, the
newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lossing. She and
Teddy walked and picnicked, dined and danced. At the local
concert hall they watched the latest American films together −
Blood and Sand with Tyrone Power was a favourite − their feet
crunching on half-chewed betel nuts as they stood to sing ‘God
Save the King’. Then they strolled back to the hospital arm in
arm, alert for snakes and jackals, passing by the naked, grey-
bearded sadhu (holy man) as he recited his hypnotic evening
prayers. And soon the lovers even had a song.
We took a truck to the river Damodar, a mile or so away from
Asansol, taking along a wind-up gramophone, some records
and a rug to lounge on. There for the first time I heard a record-
ing of the great cellist Pablo Casals playing Après Un Rêve by
Fauré, an experience that made such an impression on me that
when I hear that plaintive melody so many years afterwards I
am wafted back to a moonlit river bank, with a vista of distant
mountains and romantic memories of my first real love affair.
But in India one always swings between the earth and the
stars. As I closed the lid of the gramophone I saw the busy
scarab beetle rolling its ball of dung along the ground.
Angela shared nothing of the physical side of this relationship
with her diary, but the couple were close enough to travel on
leave together, although she did carefully note that separate
bedrooms were in use at all times. One day, after leaving Asansol
on a slow train journey towards a lake resort called Bhimtal, they
suddenly ground to a halt alongside a goods train.
‘What’s that noise, darling? That tapping.’
‘I can see some people under the other train, I think. Hundreds
of them’
‘What are they doing?’
‘It’s sticks, they have sticks and little bowls.’
‘Good God, the poor wretches must be desperate.’
Angela had never shied away from the harsher side of life in
British India but now, peering through the grimy window of the
carriage, her eyes slowly adjusting to the dark, she was suddenly
face to face with something horrifi c, something that today many
people consider a war crime or even a genocide. Creeping along
the tracks underneath the goods train were dozens of men and
women pushing bamboo spikes up into the slatted fl oor of the
wagons, in the hope of puncturing a sack of grain. A thin trickle
of wheat was their reward, which they caught in small bowls. The
driver knew they were there and did nothing to stop them. When
the time came to move on, he let off a loud whistle to give them
a moment to escape from under his wheels. Angela wondered
aloud about people like this being not so sympathetically treated
elsewhere, parents maimed or killed in their desperation to fi nd
food for their families. A sergeant who had joined her at the
window said that half the grain would be gone by the time that
train reached Calcutta.
After an uncomfortable night made more so by what she had
witnessed, and by the hard beds of the ladies’ rest room at Bareilly
station, they took another train up into the mountains. Once
again the troubles of wartime India interrupted the journey. An
elderly Indian man started up a political conversation, asking what
they thought of Gandhi, his ‘iniquitous imprisonment’ as a result
of the ‘Quit India’ campaign and the fact that Indians under British
rule were starving to death in Bengal.
We told him about the plundering of the goods train. He remarked
severely that, because of the Japanese invasion, there was no rice
coming in from Burma and asked us when we were going to
‘drive those fellows’ out. We were suitably apologetic but explained
that we could not manage without Gandhi’s cooperation. He
demanded to know how the Mahatma could help us when we
had put him in jail. This seemed rather a circular argument so we
sat and smiled at him. He beamed back expansively through his
large spectacles, salaaming affectionately when we left the train.
This polite but firm disagreement on a train to a beautiful village,
where food was plentiful, tourists lounged on the verandas of splen-
did hotels and spent lazy days fi shing by the lake, captures perfectly
a sense present in many sources from this time, both Indian and
British. Anger mixed with fatalism. An understanding that, yes, of
course, war had made famine relief more difficult than ever before
but, alongside that, a bubbling fury that Indians themselves, while
risking their lives in huge numbers all around the world, were not
in a position to help their starving compatriots. And always close to
the surface there was another feeling, no less powerful for never
being tested in the real world, that however hard the authorities tried
to help, and try many of them did, they would surely, inevitably,
have done more had the food run short in Surrey, Manitoba, the
Western Cape, New South Wales or North Island.
The calamity unfolding in Bengal further accelerated momentum
towards independence and left an abiding stain on the reputation
of the Raj. Nobody knows how many died in the great famine
but it is probably between two and three million. That these
deaths took place at a time of exploding economic activity in
India − and even in other parts of Bengal such as Asansol − only
reinforced the shock and the outrage.
Rice was the staple food of Bengal’s poorer communities. The
year-long crisis began when a combination of a rare plant disease
and a tropical cyclone in late 1942 destroyed much of the crop and
sent prices soaring. Some traders hoarded what they could in the
anticipation of even higher prices to come. Local officials did little
to stop this. Those who could pay did so, but soon Calcutta and the
larger regional towns were filling with people who could not afford
the new prices and were forced to look for food elsewhere. Because
of the intense fear of invasion, a policy known as ‘denial’ also played
a tragic part. Boats and food supplies had been confiscated from
border regions to prevent the Japanese from seizing them. As a
result villages that had relied upon fi shing began to struggle to feed
themselves, farmers were no longer able to travel upstream to their
paddy fi elds and it became much harder to move what rice supplies
there were to the places that needed them most.
Soon entire families, weak with hunger, began to succumb to
disease and corpses appeared on the streets. In Calcutta emaciated
figures begged for scraps outside grand hotels where well-dressed and
mostly white guests still enjoyed their gala dinners and Saturday night
balls. The authorities attempted to organise relief camps and bring in
fresh supplies of food, but the many pressures of war, the shortage of
merchant ships and some bad flooding later in 1943 disrupted every-
thing still further. Help was always late and inadequate and soon the
scale of the misery was overwhelming. Letters reached Indian soldiers
in North Africa and Italy revealing the desperation in their home
villages, causing such anxiety that their officers pressed the authorities
to do more. Clive Branson, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, was
now serving in India and what he saw appalled him.
‘It is all very well to parade members of the 4th Indian Division around England but the sincerity of that praise wears a bit thin if those men’s relatives are dying of hunger in the villages of Bengal.’
‘I thought I was a sophisticated hard-boiled egg and could take
a detached view of things,’ wrote Satyen Basu, a doctor in the
Indian Army, ‘but witness a baby barely two years old lying in the
lap of his brother of about six, both so devitalised that they are not
able even to move from the street corner and biding their time to
be shifted by somebody, sometime, alive or dead.’
Burma and Malaya had traditionally supplied rice to Bengal
but, as Angela Noblet’s fellow passenger had rightly pointed out,
the Japanese had stopped all that. In the past so-called ‘Famine
Codes’ had picked up early signs of distress and triggered official
action. But as the crisis deepened during the first half of 1943
everything seemed to happen in slow motion, in glaring contrast
to the intense activity in the war economy. Neighbouring regions
did not rush food to Bengal for fear of running short themselves
or − so it was whispered − because politically connected merchants
wanted to keep the price up. Churchill’s government did try to
help but the issue took months to reach the top of the relevant
in-trays in London.
Hundreds of thousands of tons of grain then arrived in Bengal despite intense pressure on maritime resources and the threat of Japanese submarines. However, amid a general lack of urgency and ‘grip’, some of that food got caught up for weeks in bottlenecks at the ports and railway hubs. And still the people died. Churchill even appealed directly to Roosevelt for help with relief aid but the President said that he could not spare the shipping. Again, amid so many other priorities, the starvation of poor Bengalis never quite made it to the top of anyone’s list.
The men who ran British India have received much furious
criticism for the famine. But one of the least effective arms of the
state was the democratically elected (albeit on a limited franchise)
Bengali government of Khwaja Nizamuddin. Another Cambridge-
educated politician, Nizamuddin would one day become Prime
Minister of Pakistan. But in 1943 his administration was slow to
transport food from areas of surplus into the worst affected parts
of his region. After the war the celebrated Indian economist
Amartya Sen studied all the available data about food production
and storage in Bengal and other parts of the country in 1943. He
concluded that there should have been enough in northern India
to feed Bengal, but speculation, inflation and hoarding exposed
the poorest class of people to fatal danger, and then officialdom
didn’t react decisively until it was much too late. Such was the
dysfunction that India continued to export rice even as Bengalis
starved. In charting the economic forces that shaped the Second
World War historian Richard Overy also considered what
happened in Bengal to be avoidable, an example of administrative
oversight when faced with a familiar case of ‘market distortion
and uneven distribution’ of a staple foodstuff. Food surpluses else-
where in India − some lying tantalisingly close by − were not
mobilised in time to do any good.
One key insight into the official British mindset comes from the
letters of the governor of Bengal, John Herbert, a much more
powerful man than Khwaja Nizamuddin. Herbert first played
down the crisis, complaining about the ‘bad press’ it was generating
and worrying that the huge number of wretched people trying to
find a means to survive posed a security threat and a ‘particular
nuisance in areas where troops are concentrated’.
Reading official communications such as Herbert’s it is possible to see something else lying behind the tardiness − an ingrained acceptance of poverty and inequality as just ‘an Indian thing’, something natural, some-
thing baked into how the people in charge regarded life and death
here. One day, perhaps just after riding in his official car through
streets full of desperate human beings, Herbert wrote this:
I hope we can get out some effective propaganda to counteract the present unhelpful tales of horror in the press which manifests itself largely in photographs which might have been taken in Calcutta at anytime during the last ten years.
You did not have to be a follower of Subhas Chandra Bose to
recoil at such an attitude. And the obvious question that such
comments prompted quickly appeared on a million lips: ‘Does
anyone doubt, were the victims white, that more would be done
to help them?’ All this horror unfolded a year after the chaotic
retreat from Burma and just months after the ‘Quit India’ campaign
had revealed the depth of support for independence − a triple
catastrophe for the Raj. This was well understood by Archibald
Wavell who took over as Viceroy in October 1943. He injected
new energy into the relief eff ort and used the army to transport
food into Bengal from areas of surplus, but the fight he had to get
help from London depressed and infuriated him:
I feel that the vital problems of India are being treated by His
Majesty’s Government with neglect, even sometimes with
hostility and contempt . . . [the famine] is one of the greatest
disasters that has befallen any people under British rule and
damage to our reputation both among Indians and foreigners in
India is incalculable.
There are some today who will tell you that Winston Churchill
hated Indians and wanted them to die, actively choosing to starve
Bengal out of sheer malice or as a twisted kind of revenge for the
‘Quit India’ campaign. Just about everything Churchill ever said
was written down somewhere, along with lots of things that he
might or might not have said. You can find ample evidence of his
romantic, paternalistic love for India and plenty of his furious
anger towards Indian nationalists and rebels. One day when
particularly enraged about Gandhi, in a drunken snarl he infa-
mously called Hinduism ‘a beastly religion’. There are numerous
examples, too, of how very old-fashioned views of India and
Indians affected his thinking. At one point, he exploded with
‘Muslims are warriors and Hindus are windbags’.
Churchill did not want Indians to starve but in the end it did
come down to priorities. When describing his role in the famine
the more sympathetic writers point to the unprecedented scale of
the war eff ort being managed from London. Churchill’s team had
to organise supply convoys upon every ocean and numerous great
campaigns on land, sea and air across multiple continents. Amid all
of this − and with the future of the world in the balance − why
would suffering in Bengal suddenly trump all other considerations?
But now and again you can hear something else, something that
lurked at the margin of this subject like an unwelcome spirit. It was
the subtext of many conversations about the famine in both
London and India and it went something like this:
It’s India. Famines happen there. There are too many people
and a lot of them live on the margin of starvation even at the
best of times. We are not heartless men. We do what we can
and we do it better than anyone else. But we can’t do every-
thing. Oh, and there is a war on, don’t you know?
When told of the need to rush food supplies to Greece in 1944
Churchill revealed a hierarchy of concern that was clearly based
upon both racial prejudice and a caricature of Indians as helpless
peasants: ‘The starvation of anyway underfed Bengalis matters less
than that of sturdy Greeks.’ Indians didn’t have to hear private
conversations like that to know how the men at the top of the
empire could sometimes dismiss their most pressing concerns.
When released from house arrest and able to speak in public again,
Gandhi immediately called what happened in Bengal ‘a manmade
famine’. Sucheta Kripalani, a future Congresswoman, damned ‘the
utter callousness with which the government behaved . . . perhaps
one of the reasons that really drove iron into our souls’.
Because if the British could not or would not manage the country primarily in the interest of Indians then they should stand down and let
Indians themselves take their turn (and it is indeed worth noting
here that there were no serious famines ever recorded in India after
independence, although one did take place in Bangladesh in 1974).
Whether callous, careless or both, it was hard to deny the moral
force of all this, especially if you claimed the right to govern this
place based upon your ability to organise the essentials of life
better than the people you ruled. A century earlier, when another
natural disaster led to a nation-changing famine in rural Ireland,
the British state was condemned both for a lack of action and for
allowing prejudices about the rural Catholic Irish to undermine
what limited action it did take. A famously angry leader column
in the Galway Vindicator, written on New Year’s Eve 1846, thun-
dered that the London government’s refusal to interfere in ‘the
market’ of food
puts to blush every feeling of humanity and libels the very name
of Christian . . . It is, we repeat it, nothing less than the murder
of the people . . . Even now [the authorities] seem inhumanly
apathetic. Good God, was there ever such cruelty perpetrated
before by any Government calling itself either civilised or
Christian? Again we ask ‘Must the people starve?’
Britain’s reputation in Ireland is to this day affected by the way
that question was answered. The long-term impact of the Bengal
famine, and the way it was addressed, was not very much differ-
ent. Because when the question ‘must the people starve?’ was
asked once again the answer that came back was bleakly and sadly familiar.