Francetich, A. and B. Schipper, "Discrete Screening of a Continuum of Types"
In our paper titled ``Discrete Screening,'' we analyze the problem of a principal using contracts designed on a discrete grid to screen an agent with discrete types, assuming that the contract grid is rich enough to allow the principal to offer distinct contract to different types. This work looks at the case where the space of agent's type is richer than the contract grid, so that total screening is infeasible. We explore how the principal pools agent types when designing contracts.
Francetich, A., "Agency Role Reversal in Start-Up Partnerships"
In start-up partnerships, depending on the circumstances and expertise, the CEO may often need to step in as manager, while the manager temporarily steps up as CEO. Thus, contracts must account for the differences in tasks and responsibilities due to such role reversals. This project investigates the contract-design problem between two partners in a long-term partnership where, each period, the roles of principal and agent are i.i.d. draws based on a given probability. The partner in the role of principal must incentivize the partner in the role of agent to exert effort to produce output; but said incentives can leverage the probability that the agent may become the principal in the future, as well as who has had each role in the past for longer.
Francetich, A., ``When to Dissolve a Partnership''
This work analyses the problem of timing the dissolution of a partnership between a savvy partner, who posses proprietary private information about the evolution of the value of the joint venture, and a silent partner who only observes public information. In each period, the agent with proprietary information privately observes the resale value and chooses whether or not to continue with the partnership. We explore how the potential signalling of proprietary information affects the timing of the partnership dissolution.