WORKING PAPERS
Algorithm as Manager: How Algorithmic Judge-Case Assignment Influences Court Performance[Draft]
Job Market Paper
Algorithms are increasingly used in high-stakes sectors to manage complex decisions, yet their performance in managerial roles remains understudied. This paper examines the impact of algorithmic case assignment in the Chinese court system, where algorithms have been adopted to enhance fairness and impartiality. Leveraging a natural experiment from 2014 to 2020, during which courts transitioned from human-led assignments to either random or machine learning (ML)-based assignment systems, I analyze 66 unstructured million case documents to assess the effects on assignment patterns, court performance, and judicial effort. Using a generalized Difference-in-Differences approach, I find that random assignment weakens the link between judge experience and case complexity, leading to modest declines in performance and effort. In contrast, ML-based assignment preserves assignment patterns and court performance levels comparable to manual systems. These findings provide novel insights into the role of algorithms in high-stakes, managerial decision-making, extending the literature on both judicial reforms and algorithmic performance in the workplace.
How Supreme is the Supreme People’s Court of China? Caseloads and Judicial Output of the Supreme People’s Court
with Kwai Hang Ng
Is the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) of China fulfilling the role of a supreme court that shapes the legal development of a country? Or is it a superior court that focuses on supervising the work of its subordinate courts? This article answers the question by breaking down and analyzing the caseload of the enigmatic court. We introduce a novel method to break down different components of the caseload of the SPC. We also differentiate the cases handled by the newly created circuit courts from the headquarters. The result is a dedicated dataset on the SPC caseloads from 2014 to 2020, the pivotal years of its expansion. Our analysis highlights the dominance of retrial petitions over appeal cases. Only 10\% of the caseload consists of appeal cases. The small percentage of judicial resources dedicated to adjudicating appeal raises doubt about the SPC's ability to function as a supreme court. Institutional barriers significantly restrict the SPC’s judicial development, as it focuses more on overseeing lower courts than on broad legal innovation. We further show that while filing a retrial petition has become easier, successfully petitioning the SPC for a retrial has become more difficult. As the caseload increased, the courts might have had to be more conventional and conservative, contributing to the lower success rate.
Motherhood Penalty on Non-mothers: Does Expected Fertility Rate Induce Gender Discrimination in Recruitment?
This paper challenges the traditional view of the motherhood penalty, suggesting that employers may discriminate against non-mothers due to expectations of future motherhood. It investigates how China's upper fertility limit, particularly the shift from the One-child policy to the Universal Two-child Policy, affects gender-specific job opportunities in the public sector. The study, covering 2013-2020, finds that the increase in the fertility limit led to a higher percentage (8.4-9.7\%) of male-only job openings compared to female-only ones (1.9-2.7\%), especially in high-skilled positions. This indicates statistical discrimination, with employers expecting women to have more children and, thus, invest less time in their jobs post-policy change.
WORK IN PROGRESS
It’s All About Who You Know: Patronage Networks and Public Sector Headcounts in China
with Xiaoxia Huang
Using the most comprehensive dataset on Chinese public sector job listings (approximately 800,000 records) spanning from 2013 to 2023, this project examines how patronage networks shape the distribution of public sector headcounts — an important resource not well understood in the Chinese context. Leveraging leadership turnovers as an identification strategy, the generalized Difference-in-Differences analysis reveals that jurisdictions led by politically connected leaders tend to have a greater number of public sector jobs. Interestingly, the effect of patronage on job allocation is more pronounced in agencies accountable to the provincial government, and less so in agencies that report directly to the central government. This article demonstrates that patronage not only influences the allocation of public sector jobs in electoral democracies, where it serves as a tool to reward supporters, but also operates in one-party systems like China, where networks play a significant role in both political and societal spheres.
Superstar Takes It All: Occupation Wage Inequality Change Since Remote Work
Every Radish Has Its Pit: Distinguishing Rigged Job Posts from Public Sector