Research & Projects
Research & Projects
Feel free to reach me out if you are interested in one of my works. I am always happy to discuss.
Abstract:
Organizations, such as countries and firms, operate through internal communication systems. I study ambiguous communication in multiple-principal settings with disjoint agent sets (corporation games in the language of Myerson (1982). Ambiguous recommendation mechanisms yield a non-empty solution concept, whereas equilibria in direct recommendation mechanisms in general do not. Under certain assumptions, ambiguous recommendation mechanisms yield the same set of equilibrium outcomes as recommendation mechanisms where agents can report information about other organizations. As the main application, I provide a rationale for using ambiguous announcements in the context of nuclear deterrence.
JEL Codes: C72, D81, D82.
Abstract:
This paper proposes a foundation for ambiguous beliefs in strategic interactions using the von Neumann-Morgenstern approach to ambiguity. A conjecture is a simplex isomorphic to the mixed action set, and it can be interpreted as a multiple-prior belief. "Equilibria in Ambiguous Beliefs" and "Ambiguous Nash Equilibria'' are defined and characterized in finite games and games with compact-convex action sets. Further characterization and comparative statics results are given for 2x2 games.
JEL Codes: C72, D81, D84.
Abstract:
In this paper, I analyze three related topics around ambiguous information, applying the von Neumann-Morgenstern approach to ambiguity. First, I extend Bayes updating to account for ambiguous prior information and ambiguous data-generating processes, and describe implications for decision-makers. Then, I incorporate this framework into games with communication, analyzing games with vague cheap talk and ambiguous communication equilibria. Finally, I provide a consumption-based asset pricing model that incorporates multiple priors.
JEL Codes: C72, D81, D83, D91.
Abstract:
I extend the notions of Correlated and Bayes-Nash Equilibria using the von Neumann-Morgenstern approach for ambiguity. Following the approach to mechanism design in Myerson (1991), I define two versions of incentive compatibility under ambiguity to study general principal-agent problems with ambiguous communication. A version of the Revelation Principle for ambiguous communication is provided.
JEL Codes: C72, D47, D81, D82.
Abstract:
A principal with strictly convex preferences designs a rule to allocate a divisible unit of resources to N agent. To win the resources, each agent proposes a lottery over policies. Competition aligns the agents' incentives to the principal's preferences but this is insufficient to ensure the principal's first best platform, which would require coordination from the agents. In general, non-market allocation mechanisms without transfers are inefficient in this class of games. Relevant applications include allocations of public funds in the presence of ambiguity and markets with complementary goods.
JEL Codes: C72, D47, H57.
Abstract
This paper analyzes how governments interact when choosing levels of polluting gas emissions. Each government faces a domestic principal-agent problem: the producing firm has some private information value that determines its efficiency. I analyze how strategic interaction and incompleteness of information impact emissions policies and pollution in this ``game between principals''. Asymmetric information alleviates free-riding problems, lessens the negative externality effect, and ultimately reduces pollution. The paper concludes with some positive implications from the point of view of a social planner.
JEL classification: C72, D82, Q51.