Research & Projects
Research & Projects
Feel free to reach me out if you are interested in one of my works. I am always happy to discuss.
Abstract:
This paper proposes a foundation for ambiguous beliefs in strategic interactions using the von Neumann-Morgenstern approach to ambiguity. A conjecture is a simplex isomorphic to the mixed action set, and it can be interpreted as a multiple-prior belief. "Equilibria in Ambiguous Beliefs" and "Ambiguous Nash Equilibria'' are defined and characterized in finite games and games with compact-convex action sets. Further characterization and comparative statics results are given for 2x2 games.
JEL Codes: C72, D81, D84.
Abstract:
This note introduces a notion of general direct recommendations in corporation games. A general recommendation maps a type profile to a simplex of distributions over decisions. I propose two ways to define incentive compatibility, leading to two distinct generalizations of the M-equilibrium. These partially solve the equilibrium non-existence problem. I apply these solution concepts to the games proposed in Myerson (1982) and Forges, Koessler, Salamanca (2024).
JEL Codes: C72, D81, D82.
Abstract:
A principal with strictly convex preferences designs a rule to allocate a divisible unit of resources to N agent. To win the resources, each agent proposes a lottery over policies. Competition aligns the agents' incentives to the principal's preferences but this is insufficient to ensure the principal's first best platform, which would require coordination from the agents. In general, non-market allocation mechanisms without transfers are inefficient in this class of games. Relevant applications include allocations of public funds in the presence of ambiguity and markets with complementary goods.
JEL Codes: C72, D47, H57.
Abstract
This paper analyzes how governments interact when choosing levels of polluting gas emissions. Each government faces a domestic principal-agent problem: the producing firm has some private information value that determines its efficiency. I analyze how strategic interaction and incompleteness of information impact emissions policies and pollution in this ``game between principals''. Asymmetric information alleviates free-riding problems, lessens the negative externality effect, and ultimately reduces pollution. The paper concludes with some positive implications from the point of view of a social planner.
JEL classification: C72, D82, Q51.