Books

Since the mid-1990s, Japan’s regional economic strategy has transformed. Once characterized by bilateralism, informality, and neomercantilism, Japanese policy has shifted to a new liberal strategy emphasizing regional institution building and rule setting. As two major global powers, China and the United States, wrestle over economic advantages, Japan currently occupies a pivotal position capable of tipping the geoeconomic balance in the region.

Japan’s New Regional Reality offers a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s geoeconomic strategy that reveals the country’s role in shaping regional economic order in the Asia-Pacific. Saori N. Katada explains Japanese foreign economic policy in light of both international and domestic dynamics. She points out the hurdles to implementing a state-led liberal strategy, detailing how domestic political and institutional changes have been much slower and stickier than the changing regional economics. Katada highlights state-market relations and shows how big businesses have responded to the country’s interventionist policies. The book covers a wide range of economic issues including trade, investment, finance, currency, and foreign aid. Japan’s New Regional Reality is a meticulously researched study of the dynamics that have contributed to economic and political realities in the Asia-Pacific today, with significant implications for future regional trends.

Saori N. Katada examines international financial stability in the aftermath of financial crises--and how such stability is maintained through collective action among major financial powers across the Pacific, the United States, and Japan. She explores the important role that financial support by the Japanese government played in solving the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, as well as its lack of support for the Mexican rescue in 1994--95 and its inconsistency during the recent Asian financial crisis.

Banking on Stability looks at Japan's willingness to cooperate financially with the United States--its most important trade partner--in cases where such compliance yields an improvement in relations. Katada argues that the Japanese government carefully weighs the benefits arising in international and domestic realms when taking on the role of collective crisis manager and concludes that Japan is no exception in having private gain as a central motivation during international financial crises.

In the early 21st century, five rising powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) formed an exclusive international club, the BRICS. Although not extreme revisionists, the BRICS recognize an ongoing global power shift and contest the West's pretensions to permanent stewardship of the existing economic order. Together they exercise collective financial and monetary statecraft to achieve larger foreign policy goals. The BRICS share common resentments-of U.S. dominance of the global financial system, of playing junior roles in economic governance, and of serving as frequent targets of financial sanctions. They also share common objectives, such as obtaining greater financial autonomy and influence within the Bretton Woods institutions. Their financial statecraft ranges from pressure for the internal reform of international organizations and markets to operating outside the system through the creation of both new multilateral institutions and opportunity structures in international financial markets. To the surprise of many observers, the joint actions of the BRICS have been largely successful. The BRICS' future depends not only on their bargaining power and ability to successfully adjust to market shifts, but also on their ability to overcome domestic impediments to sustainable economic growth, which is the ultimate basis for their international influence.

Bolder economic policy could have addressed the persistent bouts of deflation in post-bubble Japan, write Gene Park, Saori N. Katada, Giacomo Chiozza, and Yoshiko Kojo in Taming Japan's Deflation. Despite warnings from economists, intense political pressure, and well-articulated unconventional policy options to address this problem, Japan's central bank, the Bank of Japan (BOJ), resisted taking the bold actions that the authors believe would have significantly helped.

With Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's return to power, Japan finally shifted course at the start of 2013 with the launch of Abenomics—an economic agenda to reflate the economy—and Abe's appointment of new leadership at the BOJ. As Taming Japan's Deflation shows, the BOJ's resistance to experimenting with bolder policy stemmed from entrenched policy ideas that were hostile to activist monetary policy. The authors explain how these policy ideas evolved over the course of the BOJ's long history and gained dominance because of the closed nature of the broader policy network.

The explanatory power of policy ideas and networks suggests a basic inadequacy in the dominant framework for analysis of

the politics of monetary policy derived from the literature on central bank independence. This approach privileges the interaction between political principals and their supposed agents, central bankers; but Taming Japan's Deflation shows clearly that central bankers' views, shaped by ideas and institutions, can be decisive in determining monetary policy. Through a combination of institutional analysis, quantitative empirical tests, in-depth case studies, and structured comparison of Japan with other countries, the authors show that, ultimately, the decision to adopt aggressive monetary policy depends largely on the bankers' established policy ideas and policy network.

This volume documents and explains the remarkable resilience of emerging market nations in East Asia and Latin America when faced with the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Their quick bounceback from the crisis marked a radical departure from the past, such as when the 1982 debt shocks produced a decade-long recession in Latin America or when the Asian financial crisis dramatically slowed those economies in the late 1990s. Why?

This volume suggests that these countries’ resistance to the initial financial contagion is a tribute to financial-sector reforms undertaken over the past two decades. The rebound itself was a trade-led phenomenon, favoring the countries that had gone the farthest with macroeconomic restructuring and trade reform. Old labels used to describe “neoliberal versus developmentalist” strategies do not accurately capture the foundations of this recovery. These authors argue that policy learning and institutional reforms adopted in response to previous crises prompted policymakers to combine state and market approaches in effectively coping with the global financial crisis.

The nations studied include Korea, China, India, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, accompanied by Latin American and Asian regional analyses that bring other emerging markets such as Chile and Peru into the picture. The substantial differences among the nations make their shared success even more remarkable and worthy of investigation. And although 2012 saw slowed growth in some emerging market nations, the authors argue this selective slowing suggests the need for deeper structural reforms in some countries, China and India in particular.

Regional cooperation in East Asia on various issue areas, such as emergency liquidity mechanisms in finance, the exponential growth of free trade agreements and policy coordination on the environment and public health, developed rapidly after the Asian Financial Crisis. A decade later, the global financial crisis offered a new opportunity for the nascent regional cooperation mechanisms to acquire new depth and meaning - this time, however, in a very different context due to the unfaltering rise of China. How have inter-state cooperation mechanisms, which were devised originally to deal with the problems of the past crisis, fared in the recent global economic turbulence? Can regional integration effectively insulate East Asia from the vagaries of the international market? Should East Asian nations heed the call for regionalism or globalism?

This volume not only offers one of the first assessments of how the global economic crisis has affected the prospects for regional integration in East Asia, but it also addresses a number of long-standing debates of interest to East Asian specialists, economists and policymakers: Are crises catalysts for revamping developmental models? Do they provide solid foundations for regional solidarity and integration? Can they help catapult countries into the global limelight?

An unacknowledged key feature of East Asian FTA diplomacy is the region's active cross-regional preferential trading relations. In sharp contrast to the Americas and Europe, where cross-regional initiatives gained strength after the consolidation of regional trade integration, East Asian governments negotiate trade deals with partners outside of their region at an early stage in their FTA policies. The book asks three main questions: Are there regional factors in East Asia encouraging countries to explore cross-regionalism early on? What are the most important criteria behind the cross-regional partner selection? How do cross-regional FTSs (CRTAs) influence their intra-regional trade initiatives? Through detailed country case studies from China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, we show the ways in which these governments seek to leverage their CRTAs in the pursuit of intra-regional trade integration objectives, a process that yields a much more permeated regionalism.

Since September 11 2001, the global ability to manage international problems and conflicts has faced major challenges. This capacity rests on the power and influence of key players in the international system; obviously, the United States plays a pivotal role, but while most analyses of international relations have designated Russia and China the next most influential actors, the major economic powers of Germany and Japan also have important roles to play. These two countries together represent two-thirds of the size of the US economy and with America account for more than half of global gross product. This engaging analysis focuses on the foreign policies of these two countries, their attitudes and policies towards the United States, the international institutions of Pax Americana, regional and international co-operation and conflict, and towards compliance and sanctions against non-compliance. Intellectually innovative, this comparative work is ideally suited to courses on global governance, comparative politics and foreign policy.

Financial statecraft' goes beyond sanctions against rogue states. The aims of financial statecraft may be defensive or offensive, its targets bilateral or systemic, and its instruments financial or monetary. Regions and countries profiled include Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, India, Southeast Asia, China, and Japan.