Research

The New Diversity Theory (NDT) represents a novel approach to public reason liberalism, providing an alternative to the traditional, Rawlsian public reason paradigm. One of the NDT's distinctive features is its emphasis on the potential advantages of a diverse society, with a particularly strong focus on the epistemic benefits of diversity. In this paper, I call into question whether societal diversity has the epistemic benefits that New Diversity theorists claim. I highlight a number of pernicious epistemic phenomena that tend to arise in diverse contexts, ultimately arguing that the only feasible way around these epistemic pitfalls is through widespread convergence on certain intellectual virtues. If these virtues are indeed necessary, then the benefits highlighted by the NDT should only be expected in societies that reflect certain kinds of diversity. More precisely, only the kinds of diversity that can still persist despite homogenization along the lines of certain intellectual virtues are compatible with the NDT's claims. Building upon this insight, I then highlight features of the NDT that require further development in order for it to serve as a compelling alternative to its Rawlsian counterpart.

A chief virtue of Rawlsian public reason liberalism is that it protects minority communities by requiring that coercive policies be justifiable to citizens regardless of race, class, gender, religion, or cultural background. In this way, marginalized groups are ensured full participation in the public reason process, so long as they can articulate their reasons in a way that appeals to the values of political liberalism. However, I argue that some of the most marginalized voices in society are subject to epistemic injustices that render them unable to meet the demands of public reason. To avoid contributing to conditions of epistemic injustice, Rawlsians must either exchange their version of public reason for a less demanding alternative, or else accept that the Rawlsian account incurs a duty to remedy particular instances of epistemic injustice.

One way of understanding the nature of thick concepts (BRAVE, CORRUPT, GENEROUS, etc.) is non-reductive thickness, the denial that thick concepts are fusions of distinct descriptive and normative concepts. Non-reductive thickness is purported to have a number of metaethical implications, including incompatibility with the normative supervenience thesis. In this paper, I will argue that the claim that non-reductive thickness threatens the normative supervenience thesis rests on an equivocation between two variants of the outrunning phenomenon. One of these versions, a strong, metaphysical understanding of outrunning, straightforwardly implies the falsity of the normative supervenience thesis. The other version of outrunning, a weaker, epistemic understanding, does not. I will make the case that the weaker version of outrunning can satisfy the motivation for non-reductive thickness and is more theoretically plausible, showing that thick concepts do not actually pose a threat to normative supervenience.

Most of us share the sense that the cultural groups to which we belong are valuable. But what is it precisely that makes a culture valuable to its members? There are of course a number of answers that you could give which appeal to the contingencies of the particular culture(s) to which you belong. Perhaps being a member of your cultural group gives you access to certain annual traditions, linguistic frameworks, relational ties, aesthetic and culinary experiences, structures for helping navigate life's challenges, etc. While the specific benefits imparted to members by their cultures will vary widely depending on the culture in question, this paper aims to locate any goods that are not due to being part of either Culture X or Culture Y particularly, but rather that are goods imparted to cultural members qua cultural members. We can refer to the challenge of identifying such goods as the Cultural Value Question (CVQ). This paper offers a novel response to this question by appealing to the goods life narratives impart onto those individuals who possess them. I argue that the value of belonging to a culture is analogous with the value of conceptualizing your life in narratival form, opening up a rich variety of resources for answering the CVQ.

If a plurality of cultures are conceived of as a plurality of narratives, we can frame the question as follows: Why is having a plurality of narratives preferable to having only one? Arguably, diverse narratives play a vital role in shaping our phenomenal and moral imagination. Entering into a narrative encourages the formation of new concepts, as well as the consideration of ways of life that may have previously escaped our purview. Such a view offers an alternative to the pro-diversity arguments advanced by figures like Joseph Raz and Will Kymlicka, which appeal to the connection between cultural diversity and the preservation of liberal autonomy.  

One of the purported benefits of the Rawlsian public reason project is that it floats free of any robust metaethcial commitments. Regardless of one’s metaethical views, and regardless of which metaethical view is correct, public reason works just the same. However, many reject this picture as fundamentally misguided. Intuitively, if some version of metaethical realism is true, this exerts pressure on a theory of public justification to care about what is true, regardless of what is publicly agreed upon. However, far from making the public reason tradition irrelevant, this paper argues the truth of metaethical realism could generate strong moral reasons to care about public justification. In what follows, I will articulate three distinct vindications of the public reason project that assume the truth of metaethical realism. These distinct paths all provide reason to think that the truth of metaethical realism does not undermine the public reason project, and in fact provides novel possibilities for its defense.

It seems spiritually and morally appropriate, perhaps even spiritually and/or morally required to reflect on the details of certain instances of evil. However, reflection on evil also seems to be advised against and is even considered spiritually or morally dangerous in other instances. This paper seeks to develop a principled account as to why reflection upon instances of evil is called for in some instances but warned against in others, identifying the morally and spiritually salient factors at play.