1) L. Kockesen and E. A. Ok, “An introduction to game theory,” Koc University, New York University, vol. 8, 2007.
2) D. Kar, T. H. Nguyen, F. Fang, M. Brown, A. Sinha, M. Tambe, and A. X. Jiang, “Trends and applications in stackelberg security games,” Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, pp. 1–47, 2017.
3) B. An, M. Tambe, and A. Sinha, “Stackelberg security games (ssg): Basics and application overview,” Improving Homeland Security Decisions, p. 485, 2017.
4) J. Pita, M. Jain, F. Ordoñez, C. Portway, M. Tambe, C. Western, P. Paruchuri, S. Kraus, “Armor Software: A game theoretic approach for airport Security"
5) F. Fang, T. H. Nguyen, R. Pickles, W. Y. Lam, G. R. Clements, B. An, A. Singh, B. C. Schwedock, M. Tambe, and A. Lemieux, “Paws—a deployed game-theoretic application to combat poaching,” AI Magazine, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 23–36, 2017.
6) C. Zhang, “Opportunistic crime security games: Assisting police to control urban crime using real world data,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 2016.
7) C. Zhang, S. Gholami, D. Kar, A. Sinha, M. Jain, R. Goyal, and M. Tambe, “Keeping pace with criminals: An extended study of designing patrol allocation against adaptive opportunistic criminals,” Games, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 15, 2016.
8) M. Felson and R. V. Clarke, “Opportunity makes the thief,” Police research series, paper, vol. 98, no. 1-36, p. 10, 1998.
9) P. Paruchuri, Keep the adversary guessing: Agent security by policy randomization. University of Southern California, 2007.
10) J. Tsai, S. Rathi, C. Kiekintveld, F. Ordoñez, and M. Tambe, “Iris-a tool for strategic security allocation in transportation networks,” AAMAS (Industry Track), pp. 37–44, 2009.
11) J. Pita, M. Tambe, C. Kiekintveld, S. Cullen, and E. Steigerwald, “Guards: game theoretic security allocation on a national scale.” in AAMAS, vol. 11, 2011, pp. 267–290.
12) Z. Yin, Addressing uncertainty in Stackelberg games for security: Models and algorithms. University of Southern California, 2013.
13) J. Pita, M. Jain, F. Ordoñez, M. Tambe, S. Kraus, and R. Magori-Cohen, ˜ “Effective solutions for real-world stackelberg games: When agents must deal with human uncertainties,” in Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 1. Citeseer, 2009, pp. 369–376.
14) Y. D. Abbasi, M. Short, A. Sinha, N. Sintov, C. Zhang, and M. Tambe, “Human adversaries in opportunistic crime security games: Evaluating competing bounded rationality models,” in Proceedings of the third annual conference on advances in cognitive systems ACS, 2015, p. 2.
15) Y. D. A. A. Sinha, M. Short, and N. S. C. Z. M. Tambe, “Human adversaries in opportunistic crime security games: How past success (or failure) affects future behavior,” equilibrium, vol. 1, p. 1. [
16) M. E. Taylor, C. Kiekintveld, C. Western, and M. Tambe, “A framework for evaluating deployed security systems: is there a chink in your armor?” Informatica, vol. 34, no. 2, 2010.