Research
My research interests are in the areas of Industrial Organization and Auction Theory
My latest research on Industrial Organization:
(with Sjaak Hurkens and Doh-Shin Jeon) On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist, Journal of Mathematical Economics 60, 2015.
(with Doh-Shin Jeon) The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia, Journal of Industrial Economics 65, 2017.
(with Sjaak Hurkens and Doh-Shin Jeon) Dominance and Competitive Bundling, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, 2019.
(with Doh-Shin Jeon) On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete, Games and Economic Behavior 115, 2019.
(with Andrea Greppi) On Bundling and Entry Deterrence, Review of Industrial Organization 58, 2021.
(with Doh-Shin Jeon and Byung-Cheol Kim) Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Two-sided Monopoly Platform, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, 2022.
(with Federico Innocenti) Partial Compatibility in oligopoly, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 188, 2021.
(with Doh-Shin Jeon and Nikrooz Nasr) Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs and Data Portability, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 15, 2023.
(with Doh-Shin Jeon) Data Portability and Competition: Can Data Portability Increase both Consumer Surplus and Profits?, forthcoming in European Journal of Law and Economics, 2023.
My latest research on Auction Theory:
(with Nicola Doni) Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 13, 2013.
(with Massimiliano Landi) Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19, 2019.
(with Nicola Doni) A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19, 2019.
(with Nicola Doni) On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment of Gentry, Li, Lu (2017), Games and Economic Behavior 120, 2020.
In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders, Journal of Economic Theory 198, 2021.
(with Massimiliano Landi and Andrey Sarychev) Competing auctions with non-identical objects, Journal of Mathematical Economics 106, 2023; Supplementary Material for Competing auctions with non-identical objects.
(with Massimiliano Landi) Auctioning Vehicle Registration Permits, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 221, 2024, Share Link valid till May 18, 2024; Supplementary Material for Allocating Vehicle Registration Permits, March 2024.
(with Massimiliano Landi) Entry fees in competing auctions with Hotelling differentiation, July 2023.
(with Massimiliano Landi) Competing auctions with entry fees, September 2023.
Some older research
Selling to the Highest Valuation Bidder under Risk Aversion and Asymmetry, Economics Letters 79, 2003.
(with Ilaria Cingottini) On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders, Economics Letters 91, 2006.
(with Doh-Shin Jeon) Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain and the Institution of Science, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 66, 2008.
(with Doh-Shin Jeon) Bundling and Competition for Slots, American Economic Review 102, 2012.