Attention-Driven and Fundamental Information Acquisition: Asymmetric Effects on Consensus Analyst Forecast Bias (with José Gabriel Astaíza, EAFIT)
Journal of Economics and Business (Under review)
This study examines how investor information acquisition affects bias in consensus analysts’ target price forecasts. We distinguish between two channels: fundamental information acquisition, proxied by EDGAR file downloads, and attention-driven information acquisition, captured by Bloomberg news search and readership activity. Using quarterly data on 2,449 U.S. firms, we show that these channels have asymmetric and context-dependent effects. Greater acquisition of fundamental information is associated with significantly lower one-year-ahead consensus forecast bias, consistent with a monitoring mechanism through which investors detect and respond to overly optimistic forecasts. In contrast, attention-driven information acquisition does not systematically improve forecast accuracy. We further find that media attention is positively associated with forecast bias and attenuates the bias-reducing effect of fundamental information acquisition. This effect is weaker for hard-to-value firms and during periods of elevated economic uncertainty. Overall, our results highlight that the impact of investor information acquisition depends critically on both its underlying source and the information environment in which it operates.FinTech and Digital Fraud: Evidence from Self-Reported Complaints on Social Media
(with Hernando Hernández)
Journal of Digital Economics (Under review)
Digital Financial Inclusion has revolutionized financial access; however, its rapid expansion has triggered a surge in financial fraud that official statistics fail to capture in real time. This research proposes a novel framework to quantify this phenomenon using Big Data from social media. We developed the Fraud Risk of Social Knowledge index, a high-frequency indicator derived from more than 300,000 user complaints on X (formerly Twitter) using transformer-based language models and clustering techniques. We validate the index against traditional metrics and estimate its impact on DFI in Mexico, Colombia, and Chile through panel regressions. Our findings demonstrate that a 1% increase in social media-reported fraud leads to a 1% reduction in DFI penetration, confirming that distrust is a critical barrier to digital adoption. These results underscore the vital role of AI-driven monitoring in digital finance and the need to understand fraud mechanisms to protect consumers and ensure the long-term sustainability of the digital financial ecosystem.Digital Wallet Adoption and Financial Fraud: A Staggered Difference-in-Difference analysis (with Hernando Hernández, Roy Mersland and Kjetil Andersson)
Higher Rates, More Credit? A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of an Increase in the Lending Rate Cap (con Rubén Salas, Felipe Ramos y Yudi Pereira)
A Continuous Time AR(2) with Random Coefficients: Exact Discretization, Estimation, and Forecasting (with Milena Hoyos and Daniela Cardenas)
Financial capability and Financial well-being: A study among rural population in Colombia? (with Sebastian Cardenas)
How optimal are fines in cartel cases? An evaluation of the case of Colombian fining policy.
In Colombia, the available sanctions for hard-core cartels include monetary fines against both business entities and individuals. For business entities, the maximum fine per offense charged is the greater of (i) 100,000 current legal minimum monthly wages, presently equal to 98,065 billion pesos or about USD 28.8 million or (ii) 150% of the profits derived from the anticompetitive conduct (Article 25 of Law 1340). The SIC sanctioned between 2009 and 2019 around eight hardcore cases imposing fines using the first criteria exclusively, arguing that the option permitting fines of up to 150% of the illicit profits is unavailable as a practical matter because the profits cannot effectively be calculated. In such circumstances, is the maximum sanction of 28.8 million sufficient to produce a deterrent effect? What happens when very large firms are involved? The purpose of this study is to analyze the deterrence property of this peculiar rule. In doing so, we expect to provide evidence in favor of applying the second criteria available in the law and propose a practical formula to compute it.Liquidity premium and return predictability in U.S. Inflation-linked Bonds Market
This paper discusses the predictive role of alternative measures of the liquidity premium of TIPS relative to Treasury bonds for government excess bond returns. The results show that the liquidity premium predicts positive (negative) TIPS (nominal Treasury) excess returns. The explanatory power of the TIPS liquidity premium is statistically significant and economically meaningful for short-term excess TIPS maturities and for long-term nominal Treasury bonds. I also find that the out-of-sample forecasting power of liquidity for nominal Treasury excess returns appears to have been addressed by the events during the recent financial crisis. By contrast, I have evidence of out-of-sample forecasting ability during both normal and bad times for TIPS’ excess returns. Available here.A triple difference estimator with placebos to deal with systematic unobserved factors (with Milena Hoyos and Jorge Muñoz)
Gobernanza institucional y de datos en finanzas abiertas. En: Inclusión financiera y Open Data: El caso colombiano. Editorial FCE-UNAL. (Capítulo de libro. Con Diana Forero)
Oportunidades y retos para la creación de valor a través de una política de datos abiertos. En: Inclusión financiera y Open Data: El caso colombiano. Editorial FCE-UNAL. (Capítulo de libro)