"Wealth, Power, and Legacy: Strategies of Elite Influence in U.S. Campaign Finance"
The super-rich play a disproportionate role in shaping American electoral politics through campaign contributions. This dissertation examines the strategies, motivations, and long-term influence of the super-rich in the political arena. Donors not only provide direct financial support to candidates, but they also leverage alternative channels such as Super PACs and dark money organizations to circumvent contribution limits and maximize their impact. Beyond individual giving, dynastic wealth further entrenches political power, as billionaire heirs inherit not only financial resources but also patterns of political engagement. Using a variety of data sources, this project uncovers both the visible and hidden dimensions of elite influence, offering new insights into the relationship between wealth, political access, and democratic representation. By tracing how economic elites sustain and evolve their political influence over time, this research contributes to broader debates on inequality, campaign finance, and the growing impact of elite power in American democracy.
Black, Latino, and Asian-American candidates have disproportionately ran as Democrats in the modern political era. Yet the number of nonwhite Republican candidates for U.S. Congress reached a record high of 260 in 2022, nearly tripling the number who ran in 2016. I utilize a candidate-level dataset to provide the first account of who these nonwhite Republican candidates for Congress are, where they run, and how they fare both electorally and financially. I find that despite increases in the number of nonwhite Republicans who run for office, these candidates are not well positioned to win. In comparison to their white counterparts, nonwhite Republicans are less experienced candidates who run in unfavorable districts and raise less money. Additionally, I employ an original survey of 2022 congressional candidates and find that nonwhite Republicans report facing greater institutional and electoral hurdles than white Republicans. Overall, these findings further our understanding of how the barriers to political representation may differ across social groups, while highlighting the enduring limitations that the Republican Party faces in broadening its electoral tent.
"The Advantage of Candidate Wealth in American Elections." With Danielle Thomsen.
Congress is widely known to be a “Millionaires’ Club,” yet the mechanisms by which wealthy candidates are advantaged in their pursuit of office have remained vague. We draw on a new dataset of the assets of over 5,000 nonincumbent U.S. House candidates to examine the electoral benefits of wealth. We find, first, that rich candidates fare far better in the early money chase than their poorer counterparts. In addition, the second-quarter return on large contributions, which wealthy candidates secure more of, is much greater than that on small-dollar ones. Third, candidates are more likely to drop out when they face a rich competitor. Rich candidates are unsurprisingly more likely to be elected, but the relationship diminishes once early contributions are taken into account. Our findings collectively point to the large advantage that comes with wealth, and we shed new light on how representational inequalities are perpetuated.
"Inherited Influence: The Political Giving of Billionaire Heirs."
The outsized influence of the super-wealthy on American politics has become increasingly salient in an era of growing economic stratification. Billionaires in particular are central power players, but with wealth concentrated among the elderly, they will not be around forever. Thus, the heirs of the mega-rich deserve closer examination as they have the potential to shape the contours of political giving both in the present and decades to come. I leverage an original dataset of the Forbes 400 Wealthiest Americans and their children to analyze the giving patterns of billionaire heirs, comparing their financial involvement in politics to that of their parents. I find that while the children of billionaires give less in magnitude than their parents, they often mirror their parent’s ideological leanings. Nonetheless, notable exceptions arise. When differences do emerge, heirs tend to give to more Democratic-aligned causes and candidates than their parents. A within-family research design reveals that a major factor driving this divergence is an heir’s level of involvement in the family business. These findings have important implications for understanding the evolving landscape of political giving, the role of generational wealth in shaping political influence, and the ways in which this influence furthers representational inequalities.
"How are Primary Nominees Decided? The Role of Large-Dollar Donors." With Danielle Thomsen.
A leading explanation for how nominees are selected is that party elites rally around their preferred candidate. Our paper provides an alternative explanation: we argue that nominees are propelled by individual large-dollar donors, with party donors and interest groups responding to signals sent by these donors. We draw on reports from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and detailed fundraising data to examine the behavior of large-dollar donors, party donors, and political action committees (PACs) across the election cycle. Our central argument is that large-dollar donors play a larger early role than either PACs or party donors and that parties and groups are more risk averse than leading accounts suggest. These groups are better understood as followers instead of leaders. We test several observable implications of our argument and find support at both the donor level and candidate level. We also provide a comprehensive analysis of when prominent donors give money across the election cycle and how much they decide to give. Our analyses of the dynamics of giving yield rich insights into the relative influence of a host of actors within both the critical pre-primary period and throughout the election cycle.
"Grads Teach Grads: Student-Led Workshops to Complement Department Graduate Methods Offerings.” With Jacob Sutherland, Alisson Rowland, and Elane Westfaul.
Political science PhD program research and teaching methods training are not created equal. Departments vary in the structure and content of their methods curricula. As a result, graduate students may find themselves taking methods training less directly aligned with their research or seeking out supplementary training on their own. In this article, we suggest one possible approach for departments to enhance training opportunities for their students: graduate student-led methods workshops. In these workshops, advanced graduate students develop and present a workshop on a research or teaching method they are familiar with and regularly use. This article presents an overview of a trial run of a workshop series at a political science PhD program, and provides a practical analysis of the strengths and limitations of such a workshop program.