UNIT 2: Epistemology: Knowledge & Truth
Mr. A. Wittmann - Earl Haig S.S.
Mr. A. Wittmann - Earl Haig S.S.
E1. Understanding Epistemology: demonstrate an understanding of the main questions in epistemology, and of the positions of major philosophers and schools of philosophy with respect to some of
these questions;
E2. Exploring Epistemology: demonstrate an understanding of epistemological theories, and evaluate responses to some of the main questions in epistemology by major philosophers and schools of philosophy;
E3. Making Connections to Epistemology: demonstrate an understanding of connections between epistemology and other areas of philosophy, other subject areas, and various aspects of society, including everyday life;
E4. Philosophical Reasoning in Epistemology: use philosophical reasoning skills to develop, communicate, and defend their own responses to epistemological questions.
A1. Exploring: explore topics related to philosophy, and formulate questions to guide their research;
A2. Investigating: create research plans, and locate and select information relevant to their chosen topics, using appropriate philosophical research and inquiry methods;
A3. Processing Information: assess, record, analyse, and synthesize information gathered through research and inquiry;
A4. Communicating and Reflecting: communicate the results of their research and inquiry clearly and effectively, and reflect on and evaluate their research, inquiry, and communication skills.
Lecture: Epistemology & Rationalism
Lecture: Empiricism
Seminar: Kekule’s Dream
Seminar: Science & the Attempt to Observe Reality
Seminar: Historical Facts
Seminar: Getting to Know You: The Corporate Probe
Reading: Plato, Meno, p.16-19
Reading: Descartes, Discourse, p.13-16
Reading: Descartes, Meditations, p.1-17
Reading: Berkelely, Principles of Human Knowledge, p.31-45
Reading: Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, p.11-15
Viewing: Scientific Method
Is there any knowledge that you acquire that is independent of experience? How?
Epistemology & Rationalism
Empiricism
Plato, Meno
Descartes, Discourse
Descartes, Meditations
Locke, Essay on Human Understanding
Berkelely, Principles of Human Knowledge
Video: Scientific Method
How do we attain knowledge? By what means? Such questions address one aspect of epistemological inquiry: the sources of knowledge.
The most obvious source is sense experience. How do you know that a book is in front of you? Because you can see and feel it. But sense experience is not our only source of knowledge. If someone asked you, “How do you know that if x is greater than y and y is greater than z, that x is greater than z?” What would you say? You don’t see or feel anything, but your reasoning tells you that the relation is true. Reasoning is another source of knowledge.
But sometimes we clearly get knowledge by experiences not easily defined. “I had a flash of intuition,” we say, or “My intuition tells me it is so,” or “All of a sudden, in a flash of intuition, I saw things clearly.” It’s very difficult to define intuition, perhaps impossible. Nevertheless, the term does label certain kinds of experience characterized by a conviction of certainty that comes upon us quite suddenly.
Take, for example, a most famous scientific discovery. Friedrich Kekulé, professor of chemistry in Ghent, Belgium, discovered that carbon compounds can form rings. Kekulé’s discovery did not come easily. For some time he’d been pondering the structure of benzene, but he couldn’t explain it. Then, one afternoon in 1865, he turned his mind away from his work:
I turned my chair to the fire and dozed. Again the atoms were gamboling before my eyes. This time the smaller groups kept modestly in the background. My mental eye, rendered more acute by repeated visions of this kind, could now distinguish larger structures, of manifold conformations; long rows, sometimes more closely fitted together; all twining and twisting in a snakelike motion. But look! What was that? One of the snakes had seized hold of its own tail, and the form whirled mockingly before my eyes. As if by a flash of lightning I awoke and this time also I spent the rest of the night working out the consequences of the hypothesis.
Kekulé had found his clue to the structure of benzene in his dream of the snake gripping its own tail.
QUESTIONS:
1. Intuition vs. Empirical Evidence: The text presents Kekulé’s dream as a "flash of intuition" that revealed the ring structure of benzene. Can a dream or intuitive insight be considered a valid source of knowledge on its own, or does it only become real knowledge after it is verified through sense experience and logical reasoning?
2. The Mechanics of the "Aha!" Moment: Kekulé struggled with the structure of benzene for a long time before having his dream while resting. Does this suggest that intuition is a sudden, mystical phenomenon, or is it simply the subconscious mind processing data that was already gathered through traditional study and reason?
3. Hierarchy of Knowledge: The author highlights three distinct sources of knowledge: sense experience, reasoning, and intuition. Is one of these sources inherently more reliable than the others when seeking truth, or do we need a combination of all three to fully understand the world?
4. Defining the Indefinable: The text notes that intuition is characterized by a "conviction of certainty that comes upon us quite suddenly," yet it is nearly impossible to define. How can we distinguish between a genuinely truthful intuitive insight and a strong personal bias or mistaken feeling?
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Source: Quoted in Gardner Lindzey, Calvin Hall, and Richard F. Thompson, Psychology (New York: Worth, 1975), 320.
Can we ever observe the world as it is, independently of ourselves? Or do our very attempts to observe the world always change the world? Psychologists and sociologists often face this problem, because the very fact that people are being observed leads them to behave differently from how they would behave if they were not being observed. The more accurately you try to determine how angry you feel, for example, the less you experience the anger you are trying to observe.
Or consider the results of a famous series of experiments called the Hawthorne studies, which tried to discover what kinds of job conditions would improve the productivity of workers. Workers were observed under various different working conditions (including noise, darkness, bright light, music, silence). The Hawthorne researchers discovered, much to their surprise, that the productivity of the workers they studied always improved no matter what the conditions. It was only much later that the researchers realized that it was the fact that the workers were being observed and were being rewarded with so much attention that led them to be more productive. Making objective observations— that is, observations that are not contaminated by the observer’s activities and choices—is very difficult when observing the psychological or social world.
But surely the physical world can be observed objectively—that is, without it being changed by our observations. Or can it? Consider the problem of trying to measure precisely the temperature of a volume of warm water: If we insert a thermometer into the water, the temperature of the thermometer will change the original temperature of the water.
But it is when we reach the basic constituents of all matter—subatomic particles—that our attempts to observe the physical world most radically alter that world. For to observe that world, we must shoot some kind of radiation (light rays or gamma rays) at it and observe the reflected radiation. But the energy of the radiation always disturbs the subatomic particles, leaving us uncertain about what was there before the observation. In fact, modern physics explicitly holds that on principle it is impossible to observe subatomic particles without disturbing them so much that we cannot be sure where they are or how fast they are moving. Here is how a physics textbook explains the impossibility of observing the subatomic world in a way that would eliminate our uncertainty about that world:
In Newtonian mechanics, still applicable to the macroscopic world of matter, both the position and velocity of a body are easily calculable; e.g., both the position and the velocity of the earth in its orbit can be known precisely at any instant. Inside the atom this is not possible. We have already learned that electrons orbiting within atoms can absorb light energy in units proportional to the frequency of the light and that in doing so they shift energy levels. Now suppose that we could “see” an electron. You need light to see it, but when you turn on the light to see it, the electron absorbs some of the light energy and instantly moves to another energy level with a different velocity. This is implied in Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: It is impossible to obtain accurate values for the position and momentum of an electron simultaneously. In other words, observation causes a reaction on the thing observed. . . . This principle of uncertainty . . . sets fundamental limits upon our ability to describe nature.
QUESTIONS:
1. The Hawthorne Effect in Daily Life: The text demonstrates how observing workers improved their productivity simply because they felt noticed. Where else in modern society—such as in schools, social media, or workplaces—do you see people altering their behavior purely because they are being observed? Is it ever possible to capture "authentic" human behavior?
2. Psychological Self-Observation: The author notes that "the more accurately you try to determine how angry you feel... the less you experience the anger." How does the act of analyzing your own emotions change the emotional experience itself? Does introspective self-awareness help or hinder our ability to process feelings?
3. Subjectivity vs. Objectivity: Given that both physical tools (like a thermometer in warm water) and subatomic measurements (like light hitting an electron) alter what is being measured, is absolute "scientific objectivity" an achievable goal, or is it a helpful ideal we can only approximate?
4. Philosophical Implications of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle: Modern physics shows that at a fundamental level, observation inevitably disturbs the observed system. Does this scientific limit imply that reality exists independently of our perception, or is reality inherently bound to our interaction with it?
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Sources: Verne H. Booth, Elements of Physical Science: The Nature of Matter and Energy (London: Macmillan, 1970), 327–328
What is a historical fact? Take, for example, what passes for a simple historical fact: “In the year 49 BCE, Caesar crossed the Rubicon.” This is a familiar fact, and one of some importance. Yet, as the most distinguished American historian Carl L. Becker pointed out more than a half century ago, this simple fact has strings tied to it. It depends on numerous other facts so that it has no meaning apart from the web of circumstances that produced it. This web of circumstances, of course, was the chain of events arising out of the relation of Caesar to Pompey, the Roman Senate, and the Roman Republic. As Becker states,
Caesar had been ordered by the Roman Senate to resign his command of the army in Gaul. He decided to disobey the Roman Senate. Instead of resigning his command, he marched on Rome, gained the mastery of the Republic, and, at last, we are told, bestrode the narrow world like a colossus. Well, the Rubicon happened to be the boundary between Gaul and Italy, so that by the act of crossing the Rubicon with his army Caesar’s treason became an accomplished fact and the subsequent great events followed in due course. Apart from these great events and complicated relations, the crossing of the Rubicon means nothing, is not an historical fact properly speaking at all. . . .[It is] a symbol standing for a long series of events which have to do with the most intangible and immaterial realities, viz.: the relation between Caesar and the millions of people of the Roman world.
Clearly, for Becker “the simple historical fact” is only a symbol, an affirmation about an event. And because it’s hardly worthwhile to term a symbol cold or hard, indeed dangerous to call it true or false, one might best speak of historical facts as being more or less appropriate.
QUESTIONS:
Facts vs. Symbols: Becker argues that "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is less of a cold, hard fact and more of a "symbol standing for a long series of events." Do you agree that isolated facts have no inherent historical meaning on their own? Why or why not?
Evaluating History as "Appropriate" rather than "True": The passage suggests it might be better to describe historical facts as "more or less appropriate" rather than strictly "true or false." How does shifting our view of history from "truth" to "appropriateness" change the way we study and interpret past events?
The Role of Context in Defining Facts: According to the text, the crossing of the Rubicon only became an act of treason because of the boundary's legal significance and Caesar’s specific political context. Can you think of another historical or modern event where a simple physical action only gained significance because of the "web of circumstances" surrounding it?
The Impact of Selection in History: If historical facts are actually broad symbols dependent on complex networks of cause and effect, how do historians decide which specific moments (like crossing a river) are important enough to represent an entire era or shift in history?
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Source: Carl L. Becker, “What Are Historical Facts?” Quoted in Coming Age of Philosophy, ed. Roger Eastman (San Francisco: Canfield, 1973), 451–452.
Steve was surprised at the questions on the test he was given to fill out. The questions were odd and seemed to keep asking the same thing in different words:
Do you think most companies take advantage of people who work for them when they can? Did you ever think about stealing money from places where you have worked? Do you believe you are too honest to steal?
Steve was applying for a job at a well-known clothing store chain. He hoped to start working there as a clerk and to someday be able to work his way up to a management position. The “test” he was taking was supposed to be part of his “interview,” but it was making him feel that his potential employer questioned his honesty.
If you knew that a member of your family was steal- ing from a place where he works, do you think you would report it to the owner of the company? Were you ever tempted to take company money without actually taking any? Do you keep out of trouble at all costs? Do you think it okay to get around the law if you don’t actually break it?
Why such questions? The answer’s simple:Retail stores, banks, brokerage houses, and fast-food restaurants subject potential hires to a preemployment screen to determine whether they’d steal from the firm. Is such a determination possible? Yes, claim the sponsors of one such test, the Reid Report, originally developed by John Reid and now, in 2009, being sold and administered by Vangent Human Capital Management, who says on its Web page that “In addition to hiring and selecting the ‘right people,’ we help our clients instill and develop the ‘right behavior’ through award-winning learning solutions.” The Reid Report asks questions of the job candidate, which at best seem to relate only indirectly to the job he or she will be doing:
How much money do you pay each month as a result of divorce or separate maintenance for the support of your wife and children? In the past five years about how much money, if any, have you gambled?
Borg-Warner, Target, Best Buy, and the Gap are only a few of the 6,000 U.S. companies that use integrity or honesty tests to try to weed out dishonest employees who may steal from the company’s inventory. Like other honesty tests, the Reid test is based on a profile of what potential thieves are supposed to be like. Thieves are supposed to think about stealing more than other people, are more tolerant of theft, feel less punitive toward other thieves, and construct rationalizations for stealing. Honest people, on the other hand, are assumed to have high personal standards, want dishonest people to be severely punished, and believe that most other people are honest like themselves.
Will everyone steal at work if the conditions are right? Do you believe you are too honest to steal at work? Do you think it is humanly possible for the average person to be completely honest on the job?
Before completing the Reid Report, Steve will have answered questions about his loans and debts, outside income, and personal habits (including drug and drink- ing habits). He will have confessed to any past acts of theft, to his own feelings about people who steal, and to any crimes he has committed in the past. Indeed, by the time he’s finished, he will have revealed to his prospective employer many important details of his financial status, his physical and mental health, and his personal life. What will become of this information? Reid will keep the inventory dealing directly with theft. The rest of the information will be returned to the employer. And, oh yes, Reid and Associates will or will not recommend that Steve be hired.
QUESTIONS:
1. Ethical & Privacy Boundaries: Steve feels that the pre-employment test directly questions his integrity and invades his personal privacy. At what point does a company's desire to protect its assets cross the line into an unethical invasion of an applicant's personal life?
2. Test Accuracy vs. Human Behavior: The Reid Report relies on specific profile assumptions—such as the idea that honest people prefer severe punishments for thieves while dishonest people rationalize theft. Do you agree with these psychological assumptions, or could factors like personal empathy cause an honest person to fail this profile?
3. Financial & Personal Pressure: Questions about personal debt, divorce payments, and gambling are designed to gauge financial distress as a motive for theft. Is it fair to use an applicant's financial struggles or personal habits to predict workplace criminality, or does this unfairly penalize people who are simply experiencing hard times?
4. Corporate Trust & Workplace Culture: How might starting a job with a high-scrutiny integrity test impact a new employee’s trust, morale, and long-term commitment to a company, especially for someone like Steve who hopes to work his way up to management?
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Source: Velasquez, Manuel. Philosophy: A Text with Reflection readings, 9th ed. Thomson Wadsworth, 2010
Introduce Thesis Proposal Assignment
Work periods
Lecture: Kant & Transcendental Idealism
Lecture: Theories of Truth
Seminar: The Egocentric Predicament
Seminar: Knowledge and Gestalt Psychology
Seminar: Society and Truth
Seminar: Can a Scientist Pray
Reading: Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p.7-14
Reading: Velasquez, On Hume, p.1-5
Reading: Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.1-20
Reading: Velasquez, On Kant, p.1-9
Is it skeptical to say, that we only obtain knowledge of how things appear, not their true nature?
Kant & Transcendental Idealism
Theories of Truth
Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Velasquez, On Hume
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
Velasquez, On Kant
In 1910 U.S. philosopher Ralph Barton Perry published an article titled "The Ego-Centric Predicament." In it he makes apoint about "objects/events" outside us--that is, real objects. Perry addresses a question that Western philosophers have long debated: What is the metaphysical status of objects/events? What are things like outside our perception of them?
Perry reasoned that we can never observe things apart from our perception of them. This was obvious enough to Perry, because we must perceive any real object/event in order to know it. If we can't know things apart from our perception of them, then we can never know whether our perception of things changes them thus, the egocentric predicament.
Professor of philosophy James Christian has extended Perry's point by suggesting that the egocentric predicament entails an illusion. This egocentric illusion lies in the fact that all our mortal lives we must occupy a physical organism--that is, we must occupy a point in space and time. As a result, ti appears to each of us that we are the center of creation. Conversely, it appears to each of us that the whole cosmos revolves around that point in the space-time that we occupy. What's more, wherever we go in space-time, this egocentric illusion pursues us, because we move our center. In a word, every living, conscious creature experiences itself as the true center of the cosmos, when in fact the cosmos has no true center.
Christian observes that when al humans take themselves as the center of things, we make aristocentric claims that is, inordinate claims to superiority for ourselves or our group. Aristocentric claims arise because we fail to correct for the egocentric illusion. Taking ourselves as cosmic centers, we may claim that our existence has special meaning, that we have a special knowledge or message, or that we have special powers. Rarely, however, do we make these claims in the singular. This is not surprising, for our arrogant pride would invite scorn and ridicule. But we do make aristocentric claims in the plural: W"e are something special," "We are favored people," or "We have a unique destiny." The beauty of such claims si that they're so easily reinforced by group members. Sociologists have a word for any form of aristocentrism, ethnocentricity, the preoccupation with and belief in the superiority of one's own culture.
When Ralph Barton Perry spoke of the egocentric predicament, he had in mind a timeless metaphysical concern. But, as so often happens, purely philosophical musings have a way of slipping into our everyday lives.
QUESTIONS:
1. Bridging Metaphysics and Everyday Life: Perry argues that we can never know objects apart from our perception, while Christian suggests this creates an illusion of being the center of the universe. In what ways do you see this theoretical "egocentric illusion" manifest in ordinary, day-to-day situations or personal relationships?
2. Group Dynamics and "Aristocentric" Claims: According to the text, people rarely claim individual superiority due to fear of ridicule, but readily make collective claims ("We are special"). Why is it so much easier for groups to hold ethnocentric or aristocentric beliefs, and what modern examples illustrate this dynamic?
3. Epistemological Limitations: Perry points out that because we cannot observe things outside our own perception, we can never know if our perception alters reality. If we accept that we can never truly step outside our own minds, how should this impact our confidence in scientific knowledge or personal truth?
4. Overcoming the Illusion: Christian notes that wherever we go, the egocentric illusion follows us because we carry our frame of reference with us. Is it possible for a person or society to fully "correct" for this illusion, or are humans inherently bound to view the cosmos through a self-centered lens?
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Source: James Christian, Philosophy: An Introduction of the Art of Wondering (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1973), 50-58.
Some patterns of visual stimulation are more meaningful to us than others. Consider the following pattern. How would you describe it?
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Probably you’d say that you see three sets of two horizontal lines each rather than six separate lines. This is so because you perceive items close to each other as a whole. Now consider this pattern:
o x o
o x o
o x o
Because we perceive items that resemble each other as units, you’d probably describe what you see as two vertical rows of circles and one of Xs rather than three horizontal rows of circles and Xs.
Why is one pattern of visual stimulation meaningful while another is not? One answer lies in past experience: Patterns that outline shapes are meaningful if they match shapes that you have experienced and remembered. But meaningfulness also seems to be imposed by the organization of the visual system.
Some years ago, a group of German psychologists, Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Köhler among them, studied the basic principles of organization in perception. They insisted that a perception of form is an innate property of the visual system. This group of psychologists became known as Gestaltists, from the German word gestalt, meaning “form.” Gestaltists focus on subjective experience and the exploration of consciousness. They see the most significant aspect of experience as its wholeness or inter- relatedness. Thus, Gestaltists believe that any attempt to analyze behavior by studying its parts is futile because such an approach loses the basic characteristic of experiences: their organization, pattern, and wholeness. For Gestaltists, no stimulus has constant significance or meaning. It all depends on the patterns surrounding events. For example, a 510 basketball player looks small when seen as part of a professional basketball team but of normal size as part of a random group of individuals.
As part of their focus on subjective experience and the exploration of consciousness, Gestalt psychologists formulated a number of descriptive principles of perceptual organization. Two are illustrated previously in the two simple patterns: the principles of similarity and proximity.
QUESTIONS:
1. Innate Processing vs. Past Experience: The text suggests that visual meaningfulness comes from both past experiences (memory) and innate organization within our visual system. How do these two factors interact when we encounter a completely novel visual pattern or object?
2. The Principle of Relational Context: According to Gestalt psychologists, a stimulus has no constant meaning because its interpretation depends entirely on surrounding context (e.g., the 5'10" basketball player). How might this principle of perceptual relativity apply to human social behavior or emotional experiences, rather than just physical objects?
3. Limits of Reductionism in Psychology: Gestaltists argued that analyzing behavior or experience by breaking it down into individual parts is futile because it destroys the overall "wholeness." Do you agree with this critique? In what psychological contexts might breaking a phenomenon down into small parts be helpful, and where does it fail?
4. Real-World Design Applications: The text highlights two basic Gestalt principles: proximity (lines grouped together) and similarity (rows of Xs and Os). How do modern user interface (UI) designers or advertisers use these two principles to organize information and guide human focus?
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Velasquez, Manuel. Philosophy: A Text with Reflection readings, 9th ed. Thomson Wadsworth, 2010
In The Art of Awareness, J. Samuel Bois reports the following experiment:
A psychologist employed seven assistants and one genuine subject in an experiment where they were asked to judge how long was a straight line that they were shown on a screen. The seven assistants, who were the first to speak and report what they saw, had been instructed to report unanimously an evidently incorrect length. The eighth member of the group, the only naive subject in the lot, did not know that his companions had received such an instruction, and he was under the impression that what they reported was really what they saw. In one-third of the experiments, he reported the same incorrect length as they did. The pressure of the environment had influenced his own semantic reaction and had distorted his vision. When one of the assistants, under the secret direction of the experimenter, started reporting the correct length, it relieved that pressure of the environment, and the perception of the uninformed subject improved accordingly.
QUESTIONS:
The Mechanics of Conformity: What specific factors made the subject conform to an obviously incorrect answer, and how does this reflect real-world situations where individuals prioritize group consensus over their own direct observations?
Psychological Relief and Dissent: Why did the presence of just one dissenting assistant dramatically improve the naive subject's accuracy, and what does this suggest about the power a single non-conformist holds in a group setting?
Visual vs. Internal Perception: The author notes that the environment "distorted his vision." Do you believe the subject genuinely began to see the line differently, or was he merely altering his verbal response to avoid social conflict? What is the difference between distorted perception and social compliance?
Modern Applications: How do the dynamics shown in this experiment apply to present-day environments, such as social media platforms, workplace decision-making, or political discourse? What safeguards can organizations put in place to prevent this type of environmental pressure?
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Source: J. Samuel Bois, The Art of Awareness (Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown, 1973).
A 2007 study of scientists conducted by sociologist Elaine Howard Ecklund, found that two-thirds of university-based scientists say they are religious and practice a spirituality. One of them is John Polkinghorne, a respected British scientist who made significant contributions to the field of elementary particle physics. While Professor of Mathematical Physics at Cambridge University (one of the most prestigious universities in the world), he became an Anglican priest. When asked once by an interviewer, “Can a scientist pray?” he replied:
Well, that depends on what you mean by prayer. Scientists, I think, very often pray without knowing they’re praying. A sense of wonder at the beauty and fruitfulness of the world is a very common scientific experience. Actually, that’s a sort of tacit prayer of adoration to the Creator, but of course many of my scientific friends wouldn’t be able to see it that way. I suppose the real point of the question, “Can a scientist pray?” is in terms of petitionary prayer: can we actually ask God for something? I think we’ve come to see a picture of the physical world that is open, is subtle and supple. We’re beginning to see a picture of the physical world in which we can understand ourselves as its inhabitants, because we know we have powers to act in the world; hence the world must really be open for us to act within it. It seems to me likely also to be open to God to act within it. In other words, God’s providential interaction with history is not ruled out by what we know about scientific process.
QUESTIONS:
1. Redefining Prayer through Science: Polkinghorne suggests that a scientist’s "sense of wonder at the beauty and fruitfulness of the world" is a form of prayer, even if they don't realize it. Do you agree that awe or wonder at nature can be considered prayer? Why or why not?
2. Prayer of Adoration vs. Petitionary Prayer: The text distinguishes between a "tacit prayer of adoration" (awe/wonder) and "petitionary prayer" (asking God for something). Why might asking for specific outcomes be harder for a scientist to reconcile with their worldview than feeling awe for the universe?
3. An "Open, Subtle, and Supple" Universe: Polkinghorne describes the physical world as "open, subtle, and supple," leaving room for human agency and divine action. How does this view contrast with the idea that the universe operates strictly like a fixed machine governed only by rigid laws?
4. Faith and Scientific Identity: Ecklund’s study found that two-thirds of university scientists identify as religious or spiritual. Why do you think the popular perception is often that science and faith are fundamentally at odds, despite evidence showing many scientists practice spirituality?
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Source: John Polkinghorne, “Divine Action: An Interview with John Polkinghorne,” by Lyndon F. Harris, Cross Currents 48, no. 1 (1998) (http://www.crosscurrents.org/polkinghorne.htm).
Lecture: Theories of Scientific Truth
Lecture: Is Truth Relative?
Seminar: The Problem of Induction
Seminar: Our Knowledge of the World
Seminar: Kanzi, the Rational Chimpanzee?
Seminar: Truth and Paradox
Review, credit recovery, complete overdue work
Reading: Boroditsky, How Language Shapes Thought, p.63-65
What does Boroditsky mean by language shapes the way we think? Can argument be made against this claim?
Theories of Scientific Truth
Is Truth Relative?
Towards Quantum Language Model
Boroditsky, How Language Shapes Thought
All of science is based on an unproven assumption: the assumption that the future will be like the past. Science is based on inductive reasoning: from observations made in the past, the scientist draws conclusions about the laws and theories that will operate in the future. In fact, all our knowledge of the world around us is based on inductive reasoning that assumes the future will be like the past. We know that water will satisfy our thirst because it did so in the past, that the sun will rise tomorrow because it did so in the past, that gravity will attract objects to the ground because it did so in the past, that evolution will alter species in the future because it did in the past, that quantum theory will continue to predict the behavior of atomic particles in the future because it did so in the past. But how do we know that the future will be like the past? You might be tempted to reply that you know it will because the future has always been like the past. But a moment's reflection will show you that this is circular reasoning, it assumes what it is trying to prove. For you are reasoning that since in the past the future was like the past, then in the future the future will be like the past. But this reasoning assumes that what happened in the past must happen in the future, and this is exactly what you are trying to prove. So past experience does not justify our assumption that in the future the future will be like the past. And if we cannot prove that this assumption is true, then doesn't all our knowledge about the world around us rest on an unproven assumption?
QUESTIONS:
1. If science relies on the unproven assumption that the future will resemble the past, how does this affect our confidence in scientific facts versus pure mathematical or logical proofs?
2. The text points out that using past success to justify inductive reasoning leads to circular logic. Is there any way to justify our reliance on induction without falling into this trap?
3. If we cannot logically guarantee that nature will remain uniform, is it possible that a fundamental law of physics could suddenly change tomorrow? What would that mean for our understanding of reality?
4. Given that everyday survival depends on assuming the future will mimic the past (like expecting water to quench thirst or gravity to work), is belief in induction better understood as a rational choice or a necessary human instinct?
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Source: Velasquez, Manuel. Philosophy: A Text with Reflection readings, 9th ed. Thomson Wadsworth, 2010
What kind of world do we live in? Physicists today generally describe it as a flux of energy that exists in different forms at different levels. Because of the limitations of our sense organs, our brains cannot know directly about all of the world’s energy. Indeed, a relatively small part of the electromagnetic spectrum—that is, of the entire range of radiation—can stimulate our eyes. In other words, although we can hear or feel parts of it, we can’t see a large portion of the spectrum. Electromagnetic energy covers a wide range of wavelengths, from extremely short gamma rays, having wavelengths of about a billionth of an inch, to the extremely long radio waves, which have wavelengths that are miles long. In fact, we can see very little of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Our ears also sense a limited range of the mechanical vibrations transmitted through the air. Similarly, although we can smell and taste certain chemical substances and feel the presence of some objects in contact with our skin surface, most of what occurs in our environment cannot be perceived by these senses either. In effect, the great flux of energy that physicists say exists is largely lost to our senses. We know about it only indirectly, through specially devised instruments that can detect radio waves, X-rays, infrared rays, and other energy forms that we can’t directly experience. What implications do these facts hold for our view of reality? If nothing else, they should make us wonder just how complete a picture of reality we have and how accurate our interpretation of it is. In New Pathways in Science, Sir Arthur Eddington addresses this issue:
As a conscious being I am involved in a story. The perceiving part of my mind tells me a story of a world around me. The story tells of familiar objects. It tells of colors, sounds, scents belonging to these objects; of boundless space in which they have their existence, and of an ever-rolling stream of time bring- ing change and incident. It tells of other life than mine busy about its own purposes.
As a scientist I have become mistrustful of this story. In many instances it has become clear that things are not what they seem to be. According to the storyteller... I have now in front of me a substantial desk; but I have learned from physics that the desk is not at all the continuous substance that it is supposed to be in the story. It is a host of tiny electric charges darting hither and thither with inconceivable velocity. Instead of being solid substance my desk is more like a swarm of gnats.
So I have come to realize that I must not put overmuch confidence in the storyteller who lives in my mind.
QUESTIONS:
1. Direct vs. Indirect Perception: The author notes that much of the energy flux around us is invisible to our basic senses and only known through specialized scientific instruments. Does relying on instruments rather than direct experience change what it means to "know" something? Why or why not?
2. The Mind as a Storyteller: Sir Arthur Eddington describes the perceiving part of the mind as a "storyteller" that presents a comfortable picture of solid objects, colors, and continuous time. In what everyday scenarios is this simplified narrative useful, and where might relying on it lead us astray?
3. Scientific vs. Everyday Reality: Eddington contrasts the desk of common sense (a solid, stable surface) with the desk of physics (a dynamic swarm of subatomic charges). When two accurate descriptions of the same object contradict our physical experience, which one represents "true" reality?
4. Biological Limitations and Epistemology: If human sense organs evolved only to process a tiny fraction of the electromagnetic spectrum and mechanical vibrations, how might our fundamental understanding of concepts like space, time, and matter differ if we could directly sense radio waves or infrared light?
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Source: Sir Arthur Eddington, New Pathways in Science (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), 11.
According to Dr. Emily Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, author of Ape Language and the Human Mind, Kanzi, a Bonobo chimpanzee, has mastered the art of language at a level comparable to that of a two-and-a-half-year-old human. Dr. Savage-Rumbaugh has written that although she and other researchers were trying to teach Kanzi’s mother to use a twelve-symbol keyboard to communicate with them, Kanzi learned to use the keyboard on his own. According to Savage-Rumbaugh, Kanzi initially used the keyboard to make one-word requests for food items. Then, he progressed to combining symbols to request multiple items, such as “raisin peanut.” Later he began to put two or three symbols together to communicate sentences and also learned to understand sentences spoken by a human in English. One feat caught on videotape occurred when Kanzi was told, “Give the dog a shot.” Kanzi picked up a toy hypodermic syringe in front of him and injected a stuffed toy dog. Kanzi also correctly responds to complex commands such as “Show me the ball that’s on TV” and “Get the ball that’s in the cereal.” In an interview with the New York Times (April 14, 1998), Dr. Savage-Rumbaugh discussed her work with Kanzi and Panbanisha, another language- using Bonobo:
Q: Do your apes speak?
A: They don’t speak. They point to printed symbols on a keyboard. . . .
Q: How do you know when the chimps point to symbols on the keyboard that they are not just pointing to any old thing?
A: We test Kanzi and Panbanisha by either saying English words or showing them pictures. . . . If we give similar tests to their siblings who haven’t learned language—they fail. Many times we can verify through actions. For instance, if Kanzi says “Apple chase,” which means he wants to play a game of keep away with an apple, we say, “Yes, let’s do.” And then, he picks up an apple and runs away and smiles at us.
Dr. Savage-Rumbaugh’s work has many critics, particularly Dr. Noam Chomsky and Dr. Steven Pinker, both language experts at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who argue that the chimps’ behavior merely shows that they have learned how to perform elaborate tricks but that they do not truly understand the meanings of the symbols they use. The philosopher René Descartes would have agreed with them; in 1637 he wrote: “There are no men so dull and stupid that they cannot put words together in a manner to convey their thoughts. And this proves not merely that animals have less reason than man, but that they have none at all, for we see that very little is needed to talk.”
QUESTIONS:
1. Self-Taught vs. Trained Learning: Kanzi picked up symbol usage spontaneously while researchers were attempting to teach his mother. Does this self-directed learning make a stronger case for genuine language acquisition than formal training, or could it still be explained as basic observational conditioning?
2. Language vs. Trick Performance: Critics like Noam Chomsky, Steven Pinker, and René Descartes argue that Kanzi is performing elaborate tricks rather than using true language. What specific criteria should define "true understanding" of language, and does Kanzi’s response to commands like "Give the dog a shot" meet those criteria?
3. Symbolic Communication vs. Thought: Descartes claimed that the inability to use human-like speech proves animals lack reason entirely. Based on Savage-Rumbaugh's observations, does Kanzi's ability to combine symbols (e.g., "Apple chase") demonstrate internal reasoning, or is it simply a functional tool for requesting rewards?
4. Testing and Researcher Bias: In her interview, Savage-Rumbaugh points to Kanzi's playful actions (picking up an apple and running away) as proof of understanding. How reliable is using an ape's behavioral response as validation for language comprehension, and how might researchers guard against over-interpreting these actions?
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Donald, Merlin. 2001. A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness. New York: W.W. Norton. pp. 120–121, 144.
The concept of truth has been intensively studied by logicians during the twentieth century. In fact, the vigorous attempts that logicians and mathematicians have made to clarify the notion of truth have led to some of the greatest and most far-reaching mathematical discoveries of this century. Much of this work has been inspired by the realization that the very notion of truth seems to give rise to troublesome paradoxes and contradictions.
One of the earliest examples of the troublesome contradictions that the notion of truth can create is attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Eubulides, who wrote, “A man says that he is not telling the truth. Is what he says true or false?” If what the man says is true, then the man is not telling the truth, so what he says must be false! But if what the man says is false, then it is false that he is not telling the truth, so what he says must be true! Thus, assuming what the man says is true leads us to a contradiction, and assuming what the man says is not true also leads us to a contradiction. In either case, the very notion of truth seems to generate a contradiction.
The same kinds of contradictions are generated by much simpler statements, such as “This statement is not true” or But why should it matter that the very concept of truth generates contradictions? Because, unfortunately, once a single contradiction like... [ The sentence between the brackets on this page is false. ] ...is allowed, it is easy to prove with rigorous logic that any statement whatsoever is true. That is, anything can be proved once you accept a contradiction. This is fairly easy to show.
Let the letter Q stand for any statement you want, such as “Unicorns exist.” Now suppose that you accept as true the statement “God is good.” Call this statement P. And suppose you also accept as true the contradictory statement “God is not good.” Call this statement not-P. Now consider the following statement:
1. Either P is true or Q is true.
You must accept that statement 1 is true because you previously accepted that P is true. However, because you also accepted not-P, this means that P is not true. That is, you must also accept statement 2:
2. P is not true.
Now you have accepted statements 1 and 2. But from statements 1 and 2, of course, it logically follows that
3. Q is true.
And so you must accept that Q is true—that is, that uni- corns exist! By accepting the contradiction that P is true and that not-P is also true, we can logically prove that unicorns exist. In fact, anything at all can be proved with rigorous logic once a contradiction is accepted.
The terrible consequences that would follow should the concept of truth involve contradictions were what led twentieth-century logicians and mathematicians to invest considerable energy in trying to come up with ways to avoid contradictions. Unfortunately, this work has not yet come to any firm conclusions. The possibility that our notion of truth may be contradictory still lurks.
QUESTIONS:
1. The Scope of Logical Explosions: The author demonstrates the Principle of Explosion by showing how accepting a contradiction ($P \text{ and } \neg P$) allows one to logically prove that unicorns exist. Does this mathematical vulnerability apply equally to human everyday reasoning, or do people successfully navigate contradictory beliefs without their entire worldview collapsing?
2. Solving the Liar Paradox: The sentence "This statement is not true" forces a self-referential loop that generates a contradiction. What potential rules or limits could we place on how we construct language or define "truth" to prevent self-referential statements from breaking logical systems?
3. Real-World Consequences of Unresolved Paradoxes: Twentieth-century logicians invested immense energy into resolving paradoxes of truth, yet the author notes that "the possibility that our notion of truth may be contradictory still lurks." If truth itself is fundamentally contradictory, what impact does that have on fields that rely on absolute logic, such as computer science, mathematics, or the legal system?
4. Eubulides vs. Modern Semantics: Eubulides framed his paradox around a person stating, "I am not telling the truth." How does framing a paradox through human speech differ from framing it as an abstract proposition like "Statement X is false," and does human intent or context change whether a paradox is truly a contradiction?
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Source: Velasquez, Manuel. Philosophy: A Text with Reflection readings, 9th ed. Thomson Wadsworth, 2010
Viewing: What Is Truth? Part 1 & 2 videos and answer the following video questions...
Part 1
1. What is the first thing that these 2 philosophers will try to account for in relation to truth?
2. What is the 2nd thing they will try to account for in relation to truth?
3. What 2 things does Strawson say, that Ramsey said, makes belief true?
4. According to Strawson, how does the current investigation of semantics attack this problem?
5. According to Evans, what is the application of truth?
6. According to Strawson, what does truth transcend?
Part 2
7. According to Strawson, what would truth account for, if were not for language?
8. According to Evans, what is a more substantial interpretation?
9. According to Strawson, what are philosophers sensitive to?
10. How does Strawson extend truth?
11. According to Strawson, how do mathematical formulae have a certain utility?
12. According to Evans, what does the undifferentiated notion of truth lead to?
Reading: Russell, On Denoting, p.1-10
Reading: Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, p.1-12
What is the difference between Strawson's extend definition of truth and Evans' undifferentiated definition of truth?
What Is Truth? Part 1
What Is Truth? Part 2
What Is Truth Transcript
Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear
Russell, On Denoting
Culminating Evaluation: Unit 2 Test
Brightspace online quiz
Available from the beginning of class to the end of class
1 attempt for each question, so be careful
25 multiple choice questions, 1 mark each
May be, but not only, based on the following...
Friedrich Kekulé’s dream
Priori Knowledge
Posteriori knowledge
Rationalist philosophers
Empiricist philosophers
Descartes’ method of doubt
Rationalism
Theories of Truth
Theories of Scientific Truth
esse est percipi
George Berkeley & divine mind
David Hume’s ideas from impressions
Immanuel Kant
Solipsism
John Locke
Innate Ideas
Descartes’ clear & distinct ideas
Tarsky
Kant’s noumenal world
Kant's categorical imperative
Bundle of perceptions
Constant conjunction
Gestalt
Leibniz
Wittgenstein
Empiricism
Answer one of the Unit 2 review questions above, chosen by in 200-300 words, 10 marks
The teacher will choose the review question
(Incomplete 0)
Incomplete response, with inconsistent structure of intro, body & conclusion
Uncommunicated response, using very little philosophical language & style, with some formatting issues
(Needs Improvement 5)
Weak organization of response, with some structure of intro, body & conclusion
Unclearly communicated response, using some philosophical language & style, with some formatting issues
(Satisfactory 6 or 7)
Somewhat organization of response, including clear structure & some evidence of previous thought & inquiry
Somewhat organization of response, including clear structure intro, body & conclusion
(Good 8 or 9)
Logical organization of response, including clear structure & clear evidence of previous thought & inquiry
Clearly communicated response, using philosophical language & style
(Excellent 9.5 or 10)
Skillful organization of response, including clear & strong structure & strong evidence of previous thought & inquiry
Skillful organization of response, including clear & strong structure intro, body & conclusion
Answer following provided question, in 200-300 words, 10 marks
How does Descartes’ mediations on wax illustrate his epistemological scepticism?
(Incomplete 0)
Incomplete response, with inconsistent structure and no evidence of previous thought & inquiry
(Needs Improvement 5)
Weak organization of response, with some structure & little evidence of previous thought & inquiry
(Satisfactory 6 or 7)
Somewhat organization of response, including clear structure & some evidence of previous thought & inquiry
(Good 8 or 9)
Logical organization of response, including clear structure & clear evidence of previous thought & inquiry
(Excellent 9.5 or 10)
Skillful organization of response, including clear & strong structure & strong evidence of previous thought & inquiry