Chapter 1
|1214a1| A poet separated what is good, what is fine, and what is pleasant, supposing that they do not all belong to the same thing. He declared his opinion with an inscription on the entrance of Leto’s shrine next to the god’s temple on Delos, writing, |a5| “Finest is that which is most just; best is being healthy. But most pleasant of all is getting what one passionately desires.” We should not agree with him, though, for happiness (eudaimonia), being the finest and the best of all things, is the most pleasant.
In many fields, what each thing is—what its nature is—raises questions and requires investigation. |a10| Some fields aim at gaining knowledge alone; others are also about acquiring things and about practical results. We will occasionally add remarks on matters pertaining to purely theoretical philosophy when they are relevant to our investigation, but first we must consider what living well consists in and how it is acquired. |a15|
Do all those called “happy” become happy by nature, as with differences in height or skin color? Or do they become happy through instruction, so that happiness is a kind of knowledge? Or do they become happy through a kind of training, for humans possess many qualities neither by nature nor by instruction but by habituation |a20| (people habituated badly have bad qualities, but people habituated well have good qualities)? Or do they become happy in none of these ways, but either, like people possessed by nymphs or gods, through the influence of some divinity, like inspired people, or through luck, |a25| for many people say that happiness and good luck are the same thing?
Clearly, then, it is through all, some, or one of these ways that happiness comes to be present in humans. For nearly all changes begin from these sources (for we can group all actions arising from thought with actions arising from knowledge). |a30|
Being happy and living a blessed and fine life would seem to consist in three things above all, the three things that people seem to choose the most. For some people say that the greatest good is wisdom, others that it is virtue, and still others that it is pleasure. Some people disagree about the size of the contribution that each of these makes to happiness, |1214b1| saying that one of them contributes more to happiness than another. Some people, thinking wisdom to be a greater good, say that wisdom’s contribution is greater than virtue’s, others that virtue’s contribution is greater than wisdom’s, and still others that pleasure’s contribution is greater than that of both wisdom and virtue. Also, some people think that living happily comes from all three of them, |b5| others that it comes from two of them, and still others that it consists in just one of them.
Chapter 2
Now that we have focused on these matters, it would seem that anyone who is able to live according to his own deliberate choice should establish some target (skopos) of the finely-lived life—whether honor, good reputation, wealth, or education—a target at which he looks when performing all his actions, |b10| since not organizing one’s life in relation to some goal (telos) is a sign of great imprudence. Most of all, then, he must first determine within himself neither rashly nor frivolously the feature of our lives in which living well consists and the conditions necessary for humans to live well. For being healthy and the conditions necessary for being healthy are not the same. |b15| This holds in a similar way for many other things too. Hence, living finely and the conditions necessary for living finely are not the same.
Some of these necessary conditions do not pertain only to health or life; they are common to everything, so to speak, both states of character and actions. For example, without being able to breathe, be awake, or move, |b20| we would not have anything either good or bad. We should not forget, though, that other necessary conditions are more specific to individual natures, for the conditions just mentioned are not as proper to the promotion of good physical health as eating meat and taking after-dinner walks are.
These are the causes of disagreement about being happy |b25|—what happiness is and by what means it comes about. For some people believe that the conditions necessary for being happy are happiness’ parts.
Chapter 3
To review all the opinions that different people have about happiness would be pointless, for many ideas occur to little children, |b30| the sick, and the insane that no intelligent person would consider seriously. Such people do not need reasoned arguments, but some of them need time for their thoughts to mature, and others need medical or civic correction, for medication is no less a corrective than beatings are. Similarly, we need not examine the opinions of the multitude, |1215a1| for they talk at random about almost everything, especially about happiness. On this topic at least, we should consider only the opinions of the wise, for it is improper to reason with people who need not argument but suffering.
However, since each subject has its own puzzles, it is clear that there also are puzzles concerning the greatest life and the best way to live. |a5| It would be a good idea, then, to examine these opinions, for refutations of differing opinions are proofs of the arguments opposed to them.
Further, it would be appropriate not to neglect such matters, especially considering the objects that our entire investigation should be striving for—the conditions that make it possible to share in living well and finely |a10| (if saying “blessedly” is too provocative)—and the hope that decent people have of attaining any of them. For if living finely depends on conditions that arise due to luck or nature, living finely would be a hopeless pursuit for many people, for possessing it would not be up to them and would not be due to their own care and effort. |a15| But if living well depends on the kind of person one is and on one’s actions, then the good would be more common and more divine—more common because it would be possible for more people to share in it, and more divine because happiness would depend on people making themselves and their actions to be of a certain kind.
Chapter 4
|a20| Most of the disagreements and puzzles will be cleared up if what happiness should be thought to be is defined properly, whether it consists merely in the soul’s being of a certain kind, as some of our wise elders thought, or whether a person must be of a certain kind and, even more importantly, the person’s actions must be of a certain kind. |a25|
Let us distinguish different ways of life. Some of them make no claim to be lives of flourishing but are pursued for the sake of life’s necessities, for example, those concerned with the vulgar professions, with money-making, or with the servile trades. I call “vulgar” the professions done only for reputation, |a30| “servile” the sedentary and wage-earning crafts, and “money-making” the trades concerned with buying and selling.
Since there are three things that are assigned to be conducive to happiness—the three goods mentioned earlier as being the greatest for humans: virtue, wisdom, and pleasure |a35|—we see that there are also three lives that all those with sufficient resources deliberately choose to live: the civic, the philosophical, and the pleasure-seeking. |1215b1| Of these, the philosopher wishes to concern himself with wisdom and the contemplation of truth; the statesman with fine actions, that is, with actions arising from virtue; and the pleasure-seeker with bodily pleasures. |b5| That is why each of them calls a different person “happy,” as was said before. When Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was asked who is happiest, he said, “None of those you suppose, but someone that would appear strange to you.” He answered in this manner because he saw that the questioner thought that someone could not be called “happy” who was not tall and beautiful or rich. |b11| But Anaxagoras himself probably thought that the person who lives without pain and without blemish with respect to justice, or who participates in some divine contemplation, is the one who is as blessed (makarios) as a human can be said to be.
Chapter 5
|b15| There are many other topics about which it is not easy to render a fine judgment. This is especially true of a topic that everyone thinks is easy and understood by all, namely, what thing in life should be chosen and when obtained would satisfy one’s desire. For many of the things that happen in life are such that they cause people to forsake being alive, for example, diseases, extreme pains, and winter storms. |b20| Hence, it is clear that, because of these things, a person would have chosen at the beginning not to have been born if someone had given him a choice. In addition to these circumstances, there is the way of life that people have when they are still children, for no one of sound mind would tolerate going back to that kind of life. Moreover, many things that involve no pleasure or pain, |b25| and those that involve pleasure that is not fine, are such as to make non-existence better than being alive. In general, if someone were to bring together all of the things that all people do and suffer, but none of which voluntarily, because there is nothing in those things that is chosen for its own sake, and were to add an unlimited amount of time, he would not for the sake of those things choose living over not living. |b30|
Surely no one who is not completely slavish would prefer to be alive only for the pleasure of eating or the pleasure of sex if the other pleasures that knowing, seeing, or another sense provides to humans have been taken away. |b35| For clearly it would make no difference to someone making that choice whether he was born a beast or a human. |1216a1| Certainly the bull in Egypt, whom they honor as the god Apis, enjoys access to more such things than many monarchs. Similarly, no one would prefer to be alive only for the pleasure of being asleep. What is the difference between sleeping uninterruptedly from one’s first day to one’s last, for ten thousand years or more, and living as a plant? |a5| At least that is the kind of life that plants seem to share in, as do babies. For babies continue to develop from the moment they first come into being within the mother but are asleep the entire time. It is apparent from these considerations, then, that what well-being is and what the good in being alive is eludes inquirers. |a10|
They say that Anaxagoras replied to someone who was puzzling over such matters and asking for the sake of what should one choose to be born rather than not to be born. Anaxagoras is reported to have said, “For the sake of contemplating the heaven and the order of the entire universe.” |a15| So he thought that the choice to be alive was valuable for the sake of some knowledge. But those who consider Sardanapallus to be blessed, or Smindyrides the Sybarite, or some of the others who live the pleasure-seeking life, these people all appear to relegate happiness to being pleased. Some others, though, would choose actions arising from virtue over any wisdom or bodily pleasures. |a21| Indeed, some people choose such actions not just for the sake of reputation, but even when they will not get credit. But most statesmen do not truly deserve the name, for they are not true statesmen. For the statesman deliberately chooses fine actions for their own sake, |a26| but most people engage in the civic life for the sake of money and to gain more than what is properly theirs.
It is clear from what has been said that everyone relates happiness to three lives: the civic, the philosophical, and the pleasure-seeking. Of these lives, the pleasure that concerns bodily and sensual enjoyments on the one hand |a30|—what is it, what kind it is, and what its sources are—is not unclear. So we needn’t investigate what these pleasures are, but if they contribute something to happiness or not, how they contribute, and whether, if one must attach some pleasures to living finely, one must attach these pleasures, or whether bodily pleasures must indeed take part in these lives in some other way. |a35| On the other hand, there are other pleasures on account of which people reasonably suppose that happiness is living pleasantly and not just painlessly. But we should examine these matters later.
Let us first consider virtue and wisdom, what the nature of each of them is and whether they are parts of the good life, either they or the actions arising from them, |1216b1| since even if not everyone links them to happiness, all people worth taking into account do.
Now the elder Socrates thought that the goal (telos) is to know virtue, and he searched for what justice is, what courage is, and each of the parts of virtue. |b5| He did this with good reason, for he thought that all the virtues are sciences (epistēmai) and therefore that knowing justice and being just happen simultaneously. For it is at the same time that we have mastered geometry and architecture that we are geometers and architects. That is why he sought what virtue is, |b10| but not how and from what sources it comes about. This is what happens in the theoretical sciences, for there is nothing else to astronomy, physics, or geometry except knowing and contemplating the nature of the subject matter of the sciences. |b15| Of course, nothing prevents theoretical sciences from being useful to us for many of life’s necessities, but that is coincidental.
The goal of the productive sciences is different from knowledge and understanding. For example, health is different from medical science, and law and order (or some such goal) is different from the art of governing a state. It is a fine thing to know each fine thing, |b20| but of course, the most valuable thing about virtue is not understanding what it is, but knowing the sources from which it arises. For we wish not to understand what courage is, but to be courageous, nor to understand what justice is, but to be just, just as we wish to be healthy rather than to know what health is and to be physically fit rather than to understand what physical fitness is. |b25|
Chapter 6
We should try to seek what is trustworthy in all these matters by means of reasoned arguments, using as witnesses and examples what seems true to people (ta phainomena). For the best situation is that in which all people seem to agree with what we shall say, but if they do not, then the best situation will be that in which all people forge an agreement of some kind, at least, as their minds are changed. |b30| For each person has some truth that is his own. From these truths we must somehow prove our case concerning these issues, since from things said truly but not clearly, clarity will be ours as we advance and keep obtaining more intelligible thoughts in place of a mixture of platitudes. |b35|
In every field of inquiry, the arguments made philosophically differ from those made non-philosophically. That is why even in civic matters we must not think superfluous the kind of study through which not only is the fact apparent, but also the explanation of the fact. For that is the philosopher’s method in each field of inquiry. But one must be careful. |1217a1| Because a philosopher seems to say nothing without purpose and speaks with a reasoned argument, there are some people who often go undetected when they make arguments that are beside the point and empty. They do this sometimes because of ignorance, sometimes because of posturing. When stating their empty arguments, |a5| it happens that even people of experience and practical ability are caught by those who neither have nor are capable of systematic or practical thought. They get caught because of their lack of education, for the inability to distinguish the arguments proper to a subject from those beside the point is what defines lack of education about each subject. |a10|
It is a good idea also to judge separately the conclusion and the account of its explanation. This is first because of what was just said, namely, that we should not turn everything over to people because of their arguments, but often rather to what seems true to people. (As things are, though, whenever people are unable to analyze an argument, they are compelled to trust what has been said.) This is also because what seems to have been demonstrated by the account is often true, |a15| but not because of the explanation given in the account. For it is possible to prove a truth by means of a falsehood, as is clear from the Analytics.
Chapter 7
Having made these preliminary remarks, let us, as we seek to discover clearly what happiness is, first begin from the initial opinions that, as we said, are not stated clearly. |a21| Now it is agreed that this is the greatest and the best of the human goods. We say “human” because there may perhaps be a happiness of some other being superior to humans, for example, the happiness of a god. None of the other living beings whose nature is inferior to humans can claim this title. |a26| For a horse is not happy, nor is a bird, a fish, or any other of the beings that does not, as the name suggests, partake of something divine in its nature. Rather, one of them lives better, another worse, according to its participation in some other good.
That this is the case must be examined later. |a30| Let us now say that some goods are achieved by human action, but other goods are not achieved by human action. We state it this way because some beings do not participate in change at all and so neither do some goods. These perhaps are beings whose nature is the best. Other things are achieved by action, but achieved by the action of beings superior to us. |a35| Since we speak in two ways about what is achieved by action (for there are things for the sake of which we act and things that share in action for the sake of these; for example, we hold both that health and wealth are achieved by action and that things done for the sake of these are achieved by action—things that are health-producing and money-producing), clearly we should hold that happiness is the best good of those achieved by human action. |a40|
Chapter 8
|1217b1| We therefore should look into what the best good is and into the variety of ways it is spoken of. There appear to be three main opinions about this. For they say that the good itself is the best good of all; that the good itself has the property of being both the first among goods and, by its presence in the other goods, the cause of their being goods; |b5| and that both of these features belong to the Form of the Good. (By “both” I mean both being the first among goods and being, by its presence in the other goods, the cause of their being goods.) For they say that goodness is most truly said of the Form of the Good, for the other things are good by participating in and being similar to the Form of the Good, |b10| and that it is first among the goods. For they say that if that which is participated in is destroyed, the things that participate in the Form are destroyed too—things that are called what they are in virtue of their participation in the Form. They say that this is the manner in which the primary relates to the secondary. Hence, they say that the good itself is the Form of the Good, for the Form is also separate from the things that participate in it, |b15| as the other Forms too are separate from the things that participate in them.
The examination of this opinion belongs to another study, one that in many respects is, from necessity, more suited to dialectic, for dialectic is the only science dealing with arguments that are both destructive and general. If we must speak concisely about them, though, |b20| let us say first that the existence of a Form not only of good but of anything else whatsoever is discussed dialectically and in vain. We have reflected upon this in many ways both in our popular discourses and in our philosophical works. Second, even if one were to grant that the Forms, including a Form of Good, really exist, it would never be useful for a good life or for actions. |b25|
For “what is good” is spoken of in many ways, even in as many as “what is” is. For “what is,” as has been differentiated in other works, indicates what something is, what sort it is, how much it is, and when it is. In addition to these, it indicates what is being changed and what is causing change. “What is good” is in each of these categories too. |b30| In the substance (ousia) category are intellect and God. In the “what sort” category is what is just. In the “how much” category is the proportionate amount. In the “when” category is the right moment. With respect to change, there are what teaches and what is taught. Hence, just as “what is” is not one thing in all the categories mentioned, so “what is good” is not one thing, nor is there one science of “what is” or of “what is good.” |b35|
Nor is it the job of a single science to contemplate the things called “good” of the same category, for example, the right moment or the proportionate amount. Rather, different sciences contemplate different right moments and different proportionate amounts. For example, medical science and exercise science contemplate the right moment and the proportionate amount in nutrition, but military science contemplates them in armed conflicts, and so there are different sciences for different actions. Hence, it is hardly the job of a single science to contemplate the good itself. |1218a1|
Furthermore, among those things that have what is prior and posterior, there is no common good over and above them, no separate good. For something would then be prior to what is first. For what is common and separate is prior because what is first is removed when what is common is removed. |a5| For example, if the double is first of the multiples, it is not possible that the multiple that is predicated in common of all multiples is separate, for it will be prior to the double.
Or it turns out that what is common is the Form if, for example, someone should make what is common separate. For if justice is a good and courage is a good, there is therefore, they say, some good itself. |a11| So “itself” is added to the common phrase. But what would this be except what is eternal and separate? However, what is white for many days is no whiter than what is white for one day. Hence, what is good is not more good by being eternal either. Nor indeed is the common good the same thing as the Form, |a15| for what is common exists in all things.
The good itself should be demonstrated in a way quite opposite to the one they now use. For as it is now, they demonstrate things agreed to be goods from things not agreed to possess goodness. Starting from numbers, they demonstrate that justice is a good and that health is a good, for they are structures and numbers, it being held that goodness belongs to numbers and units on grounds that the One is the good itself. |a21| However, starting from things agreed upon, for example, that health, strength, and temperance are goods, one ought to demonstrate that what is fine exists in unchanging things even more. For all of the things agreed to be good have structure and stability, so if the former are goods, then the latter are more so, for structure and stability belong more to unchanging things.
Misguided too is the proof that the One is the good itself on grounds that numbers aim at it. |a26| For they do not state clearly how numbers aim at it, but they make their assertion too simply. And how can one suppose that striving exists in things that do not have life? One must be careful about this: one should not accept without explanation any claim that is not easy to believe even with an explanation. |a30| Moreover, the claim that everything that exists aims at some one good is not true, for each thing strives for its own particular good: an eye for sight, a body for health, and so on.
On the one hand, such difficulties suggest that a certain Good Itself does not exist and that, if it did, it would not be useful for the art of governing a state. Rather, a particular good is useful, just as particular goods are useful for the other arts. |a35| For example, physical fitness is useful for exercise science. Furthermore, there is what has been written in the account. For either the Form Itself of the good is useful for no science or it is useful for all sciences in the same way. Furthermore, it is not something achieved by action. Similarly, the common good is neither the good itself, |1218b1| for it would then exist even in a small good, nor achieved by action. For medical science is not concerned to make just anything whatsoever exist, but to make health exist. So too for each of the other arts. However, “the good” is spoken of in many ways: |b5| something of it is fine, and there is the good achieved by action and the good not achieved by action. The good achieved by action is the kind of good for the sake of which an action is done, but the good achieved by action is not the kind that exists among changeless things.
Clearly, then, the good itself that we are seeking is neither the Form of the Good nor the common good, for the Form of the Good is unchanging and not achieved by action, and the common good is changing but not achieved by action. |b10| Rather, the good for the sake of which actions are done, in the sense of being a goal, is the best good, the cause of the things under it, and the first of all things. Hence, this would be the good itself, the goal of the things achieved by human action. This is the goal that falls under the art that is supreme over all arts. This supreme art is that of governing a state, as well as the art of managing a household and wisdom <for leading a life>, for these abilities are superior to the others in virtue of being their master. |b15| Whether the supreme arts are superior to each other in some respect should be addressed later.
On the other hand, instructional method makes clear that the goal is a cause for the things under it. For instructors, once they have defined the goal, demonstrate the other things, namely, that each of the other things is good. For that-for-the-sake-of-which is a cause. For example, they demonstrate that, since such-and-such is what being healthy is, it is necessary that this other thing is advantageous for health. |b20| Something healthy is a cause of health—the kind of cause that sets change in motion—and in that sense it is a cause of health coming into existence. But something healthy is not a cause of health’s being a good thing. Furthermore, just as no other first principle is demonstrated, no one demonstrates that health is a good thing, unless one is a sophist and not a doctor, for sophists use irrelevant considerations to play subtle tricks. |b24|
We should look into the variety of ways the best of all goods is spoken of—the good as a goal for a human being and the best of the goods achieved by action—since this good is best.