I'm a philosopher with interests in epistemology, mind and language. Recently, I've been exploring what it means to be reasonable, and the role of reasonableness in knowledge. I've also written about self-knowledge, belief, ordinary language philosophy, and confusion.
Check out my entry on PhilPapers.
I'm a philosopher with interests in epistemology, mind and language. Recently, I've been exploring what it means to be reasonable, and the role of reasonableness in knowledge. I've also written about self-knowledge, belief, ordinary language philosophy, and confusion.
Check out my entry on PhilPapers.
selected papers
selected papers
Reasonableness
Reasonableness
“Impersonal epistemic standards” (in Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered)
“Impersonal epistemic standards” (in Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered)
Knowledge, self-knowledge, belief
Knowledge, self-knowledge, belief
“Modest foundations for perceptual knowledge” forthcoming in New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure
“Modest foundations for perceptual knowledge” forthcoming in New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure
“Moore’s paradox” (with John Perry) Australasian Journal of Philosophy
“Moore’s paradox” (with John Perry) Australasian Journal of Philosophy
“Knowing what one wants” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
“Knowing what one wants” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
“Self-knowledge of belief: seeking causes” American Imago
“Self-knowledge of belief: seeking causes” American Imago
“Exploring the stability of belief: resiliency and temptation” Inquiry
“Exploring the stability of belief: resiliency and temptation” Inquiry
Austin, metaphilosophy
Austin, metaphilosophy
Commonsense and ordinary language: Wittgenstein and Austin
in The Cambridge Companion to Commonsense Philosophy
Commonsense and ordinary language: Wittgenstein and Austin
in The Cambridge Companion to Commonsense Philosophy
“Austin on perception, knowledge and meaning” in Interpreting Austin
“Austin on perception, knowledge and meaning” in Interpreting Austin
“Ordinary language philosophy needs situation semantics (Or, why Grice needs Austin)” in Context, Truth and Objectivity: Essays on Radical Contextualism
“Ordinary language philosophy needs situation semantics (Or, why Grice needs Austin)” in Context, Truth and Objectivity: Essays on Radical Contextualism
Confusion, coreference
Confusion, coreference
“Varieties of Coreference” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
“Varieties of Coreference” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
“Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation” The Philosophical Quarterly
“Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation” The Philosophical Quarterly
“A Notional Worlds Approach to Confusion” Mind and Language
“A Notional Worlds Approach to Confusion” Mind and Language
books
books
New Thoughts about Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts in Studies in Philosophy, Robert Nozick, ed.. Garland Publishing, Inc. New York, NY, 2001
New Thoughts about Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts in Studies in Philosophy, Robert Nozick, ed.. Garland Publishing, Inc. New York, NY, 2001
Oxford University Press, 2013
Oxford University Press, 2013
selected reviews
selected reviews
Review of Knowledge First? by Aidan McGlynn Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Review of Knowledge First? by Aidan McGlynn Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
“Telling as joint action” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research symposium on Richard Moran’s Exchange of Words
“Telling as joint action” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research symposium on Richard Moran’s Exchange of Words
Review of What is the Point of Knowledge? by Michael Hannon Analysis
Review of What is the Point of Knowledge? by Michael Hannon Analysis
contact
contact
klawlor at stanford.edu
450 Jane Stanford Way
Main Quad, Building 90
Stanford, CA 94305-2029