I'm a philosopher with interests in epistemology, mind and language. Recently, I've been exploring what it means to be reasonable, and the role of reasonableness in knowledge. I've also written about self-knowledge, belief, ordinary language philosophy, and confusion.
Check out my entry on PhilPapers.
“Impersonal epistemic standards” (in Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered)
Knowledge, self-knowledge, belief
“Modest foundations for perceptual knowledge” forthcoming in New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure
“Moore’s paradox” (with John Perry) Australasian Journal of Philosophy
“Knowing what one wants” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
“Self-knowledge of belief: seeking causes” American Imago
“Exploring the stability of belief: resiliency and temptation” Inquiry
Commonsense and ordinary language: Wittgenstein and Austin
in The Cambridge Companion to Commonsense Philosophy
“Austin on perception, knowledge and meaning” in Interpreting Austin
“Ordinary language philosophy needs situation semantics (Or, why Grice needs Austin)” in Context, Truth and Objectivity: Essays on Radical Contextualism
“Varieties of Coreference” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
“Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation” The Philosophical Quarterly
“A Notional Worlds Approach to Confusion” Mind and Language
Oxford University Press, 2013
Review of Knowledge First? by Aidan McGlynn Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
“Telling as joint action” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research symposium on Richard Moran’s Exchange of Words
Review of What is the Point of Knowledge? by Michael Hannon Analysis
klawlor at stanford.edu
450 Jane Stanford Way
Main Quad, Building 90
Stanford, CA 94305-2029
