Research
Research
Abstract: States sometimes back rebellions abroad to signal resolve. We study this reputation-building logic in international relations, focusing on co-ethnic links between countries as an objective source of variation in a state's incentives to demonstrate resolve. We formally derive two interconnected predictions from the mechanism: (a) a state is more likely to endorse the uprising of a foreign group when facing a larger audience, resulting in (b) greater political inclusion for the group. We build a comprehensive panel dataset of co-ethnic rebellion sponsorship, and find evidence consistent with both predictions. [link]
Seminar Presentations at: Stanford Political Economy Theory Lunch, TSE, Namur, AMSE, CY Cergy Paris, Clermont Auvergne, Paris-Saclay, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, DIAL, Paris Nanterre, Padova, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
Conference Presentations at: APSA 2025, ISA-West 2025, NOVAfrica, AFEDEV International Conference on Development Economics, Royal Holloway/Queen Mary Workshop on the Political Economy of Conflict, West Point Academy's International Security Conference, ISSS-IS 2024, Canadian Public Economics Group 2024.
Abstract: I develop a theory in which the distribution of cultural traits and institutions co-evolve through a political multiplier: as more individuals adopt a trait, they support policies aligned with it, incentivizing others to adopt the trait, and leading politicians to propose even more aligned policies. This feedback loop can generate multiple stable equilibria, and the stronger the multiplier, the further apart they are. Several standard mechanisms from political and social economics amplify the multiplier. Information is aggregated through the political process and diffused via public signals rather than through decentralized social networks, allowing a temporary shock to trigger a rapid, long-lasting shift from one stable equilibrium to another. The model sheds light on Quebec’s sudden secularization, the “Quiet Revolution.” Combining 58 historical polls, I document that Quebec went from Canada’s most to least religious province in under two decades after 1960, and show that existing theories cannot account for this striking pattern. I argue that Quebec’s distinctive integration of church and state gave public institutions substantial influence over religiosity, producing a strong multiplier and multiple equilibria there—but not in the rest of Canada—thus leaving it susceptible to an equilibrium shift. I find support for three additional predictions of the model, and argue that a similar mechanism drove rapid secularization in the Netherlands and Ireland. [link]
Seminar Presentations at: Caltech 2026 (upcoming), New York U 2026, George Mason U 2026 (upcoming), University of Montreal 2025, LSE Graduate Economic History Seminar 2024, Stanford Political Economy Theory Lunch 2023.
Conference Presentations at: MPSA 2026, Canadian Public Economics Group Conference 2025, Comparative Politics and Formal Theory Conference 2025, APSA 2025, Arthur Lewis Lab Advanced Graduate Workshop 2024 (University of Manchester), Cultural Evolution and Economic Policy Workshop 2024 (Stellenbosch University), Toronto-Montreal Political Behavior Conference 2024, SIOE 2024, IRES Advanced Graduate Workshop 2024 (Chapman University), San Francisco Bay Area Economic History Graduate Workshop 2024, ASREC US 2024.
Abstract: I develop a general continuous-time dynamic model to examine how economic and identity-based motivations shape the long-run distribution of cultural traits in a population. In contrast with other models in the literature, mine yields non-empty basins of attraction for two monomorphic (single-trait) and one polymorphic (multi-trait) equilibrium under simple and credible conditions. I argue that this structure mirrors real-world cultural dynamics and provides new insights into these processes. In particular, my analysis of the comparative statics on the basin of attraction for the polymorphic equilibrium reveals that it expands with 1) increased cultural attachment and 2) reduced economic incentives to join the majority group, for example, through a smaller cultural distance or more interconnected ethnic economic networks. [link]
Conference Presentations at: ASREC US 2026, ASREC Europe 2025.
Mercier, M., Silve, A., & Tremblay-Auger, B. (2026). Building Reputation: State-Sponsored Rebellions and Transnational Identities. Journal of the European Economic Association, jvag023. [link]
Morin, J. F., Tremblay-Auger, B., & Peacock, C. (2022). Design Trade-Offs Under Power Asymmetry: COPs and Flexibility Clauses. Global Environmental Politics, 22(1), 19-43. [link]
Mercier, M., Silve, A., Tremblay-Auger, B. (2022) Guerres indirectes : pourquoi les États soutiennent-ils des rébellions à l’étranger ? (Indirect Wars: Why States Finance Foreign Rebellions?). Revue d’économie du développement, 31(2), 191-196. Short paper. [link]
Tremblay-Auger, B. (2021). Financer la discorde : le soutien international aux groupes rebelles comme contre-force à la résolution des conflits civils (Financiers of Discord: International Support to Rebel Organizations in Civil Wars as a Counterforce to Institutional Solutions). Études internationales, 52(3), 241-271. [link]
Beyond Co-nationality: Cultural Proximity and Immigrant Settlement Patterns in Canada (with Jeremy Ferwerda and the Immigration Policy Lab).