Research
Research
Abstract: States sometimes back rebellions abroad to signal resolve. We study this reputation-building logic in international relations, focusing on co-ethnic links between countries as an objective source of variation in a state's incentives to demonstrate resolve. We formally derive two interconnected predictions from the mechanism: (a) a state is more likely to endorse the uprising of a foreign group when facing a larger audience, resulting in (b) greater political inclusion for the group. We build a comprehensive panel dataset of co-ethnic rebellion sponsorship, and find evidence consistent with both predictions. [link]
Seminar Presentations at: TSE, Namur, AMSE, CY Cergy Paris, Clermont Auvergne, Paris-Saclay, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris Nanterre, Padova, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
Conference Presentations at: APSA 2025, ISA-West 2025, NOVAfrica, AFEDEV International Conference on Development Economics, Royal Holloway/Queen Mary Workshop on the Political Economy of Conflict, West Point Academy's International Security Conference, ISSS-IS 2024, Canadian Public Economics Group 2024.
Abstract: I propose a theory in which the distribution of cultural types dynamically interacts with institutional change through a political multiplier mechanism: as more individuals adopt a type and support aligned policies, others are incentivized to follow, encouraging politicians to propose even more aligned policies. This feedback loop can generate multiple stable equilibria; the stronger the multiplier, the more polarized the equilibria. I show that several standard political economy and social mechanisms reinforce the political multiplier effect. Furthermore, a temporary shock can trigger a rapid and long-lasting transition between equilibria. I analyze Quebec's "Quiet Revolution," documenting via historical polls how Quebec shifted from Canada's most to least religious province in under two decades. I argue this corresponds to an equilibrium shift in the model driven by an institutional shock in the 1950s, with similar mechanisms driving rapid secularization in the Netherlands and Ireland. I derive four empirical predictions from the model for which I find support in the Canadian case. [link]
Seminar Presentations at: NYU 2026, University of Montreal 2025, LSE Graduate Economic History Seminar 2024.
Conference Presentations at: MPSA 2026 (upcoming), Canadian Public Economics Group Conference 2025, Comparative Politics and Formal Theory Conference 2025, APSA 2025, Arthur Lewis Lab Advanced Graduate Workshop 2024 (University of Manchester), Cultural Evolution and Economic Policy Workshop 2024 (Stellenbosch University), Toronto-Montreal Political Behavior Conference 2024, SIOE 2024, IRES Advanced Graduate Workshop 2024 (Chapman University), San Francisco Bay Area Economic History Graduate Workshop 2024, ASREC US 2024.
Abstract: I develop a general continuous-time dynamic model to examine how economic and identity-based motivations shape the long-run distribution of cultural traits in a population. In contrast with other models in the literature, mine yields non-empty basins of attraction for two monomorphic (single-trait) and one polymorphic (multi-trait) equilibrium under simple and credible conditions. I argue that this structure mirrors real-world cultural dynamics and provides new insights into these processes. In particular, my analysis of the comparative statics on the basin of attraction for the polymorphic equilibrium reveals that it expands with 1) increased cultural attachment and 2) reduced economic incentives to join the majority group, for example, through a smaller cultural distance or more interconnected ethnic economic networks. [link]
Conference Presentations at: ASREC Europe 2025, ASREC US 2026.
Morin, J. F., Tremblay-Auger, B., & Peacock, C. (2022). Design Trade-Offs Under Power Asymmetry: COPs and Flexibility Clauses. Global Environmental Politics, 22(1), 19-43. [link]
Mercier, M., Silve, A., Tremblay-Auger, B. (2022) Guerres indirectes : pourquoi les États soutiennent-ils des rébellions à l’étranger ? (Indirect Wars: Why States Finance Foreign Rebellions?). Revue d’économie du développement, 31(2), 191-196. Short paper. [link]
Tremblay-Auger, B. (2021). Financer la discorde : le soutien international aux groupes rebelles comme contre-force à la résolution des conflits civils (Financiers of Discord: International Support to Rebel Organizations in Civil Wars as a Counterforce to Institutional Solutions). Études internationales, 52(3), 241-271. [link]