1) Global Consensus and its Limits under Monotone Sampling Dynamics (SSRN, download, presentation). Joint with Srinivas Arigapudi.
Idea: The paper unifies many models of social learning, showing when independent sampling and monotone decision rules lead to consensus and how heterogeneity or additional actions can sustain coexistence.
2) Strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma: A cluster analysis (download, GitHub data and code). Joint with Itay Tubul. Revision requested at Games & Economic Beahvior.
Idea: We apply a new technique of cluster analysis to study which strategies are used in experiments of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.
3) The Hidden advantage of loss: Evidence from chess (SSRN, download). Joint with Itay Tubul.
Idea: Chess players play better after losing, suggesting setbacks can sharpen performance.
4) Miscoordination under sample-based learning (SSRN, download). Joint with Srinivas Arigapudi.
Idea: Small-sample learning can trap groups in mismatch, especially when experience levels differ or people care a lot about what others do.