An experiment on cooperation in ongoing organizations (with Jan Potters), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2018(147), 28-40.

Abstract: We study experimentally whether an overlapping membership structure affects the incentives of short-lived organizational members. We compare organizations in which one member is replaced per time period to organizations in which both members are replaced at the same time. We find little support for the hypothesis that an overlapping membership structure is conducive to cooperation in ongoing organizations. Incoming members are sensitive to the organizational history when membership is overlapping, as they should according to the cooperative equilibrium, but this is not enough to substantially increase cooperation levels in the organization.

Working Papers

Centralized management and peer punishment in groups (available upon request) Submitted

Previously circulated under the title "The effect of decentralized punishment on centralized sanctioning institutions: an experimental study"

Abstract: Previous experimental studies have shown that centralized management a legitimate enforcer implements is effective in improving cooperation in social dilemmas. The current study examines whether the presence of peer punishment opportunities, especially the chance of retaliating the enforcer, affects centralized management and group cooperation. In particular, I study two types of enforcers, corruptible and non-corruptible. The results indicate that with a non-corruptible enforcer cooperation does not decrease saliently in the presence of peer punishment opportunities, though centralized sanctions are weakened; while the presence of peer punishment opportunities significantly erodes cooperation in the case with a corruptible enforcer.

Cooperative versus competitive interactions and in-group bias (with Jan Potters and Sigrid Suetens, available upon request) Revise and Resubmit at JEBO

Abstract: We study the effect of interpersonal but impersonal interactions on in-group bias in allocational choices. Before the elicitation of social preferences with respect to an in- or out-group other, individuals either engage in a cooperative or competitive interaction, or in no interaction at all. We find that a cooperative interaction eliminates any in-group bias as compared to the case where there is no interaction, and even introduces relatively more pro-sociality with respect to out-group. A competitive interaction reduces pro-sociality in general, irrespective of whether others are in- or out-group.

Work in Progress

The effect of eye cues and its sensitivity to the framing of dictator games: an experimental study (with Luuk Perik and Sigrid Suetens)

Group identity and social learning ( with Wenbo Zou)

Imperfect private monitoring in infinitely repeated games