Eric Wiland
Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Missouri-St. Louis
551 Lucas Hall
(314) 516-5495
wiland@gmail.com
I work primarily on topics in ethics and practical reason.
My work falls into several overlapping categories: advice and moral testimony, reasons for action, objective and indirect moral theories:
Advice and moral testimony (and related matters)
Guided by Voices: Moral Testimony, Advice, and the Forging of a "We" , Oxford University Press (2021)
"(En)joining others", Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2019)
"Peer Disagreement: Special Cases", Logos & Episteme (2018)
"Moral Advice and Joint Agency" Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Oxford University Press (2018).
"Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive", Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12 (2017), 51-75.
"Peer Disagreement and the Dunning-Kruger Effect", Episteme (2016), 1–18. doi:10.1017/epi.2016.18.
"Rossian Deontology and the Possibility of Moral Expertise", Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (2014).
"Trusting Advice and Weakness of Will," Social Theory and Practice 80 (2004), 371-89.
"Stories, Autobiographies, and Moral Inquiry," Journal of Social Philosophy 34:2 (2003), 188-98.
"Some Advice for Moral Psychologists," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003), 299-310.
"Advice and Moral Objectivity," Philosophical Papers 29 (2000), 1-19.
"Good Advice and Rational Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, (2000), 561-9.
"Advice, Life-Experience, and Moral Objectivity", Dissertation, University of Chicago (1997).
Reasons for Action
"Irrationality, Charity, and Ambivalence", The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence, eds. B. Brogaard & D. E. Gatzia, Routledge (2020), 66-74.
"Psychologism and Non-Psychologism about Motivating Reasons", The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (2018).
"In the Beginning was the Doing", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2013), 303-321.
"Williams on Thick Concepts and Reasons for Action", Thick Concepts, ed. S. Kirchin, OUP (2013).
Reasons, Continuum Press (2012).
"Intentional Action and 'In order to' ", Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (2007), 113-18.
"Psychologism, Practical Reason, and the Possibility of Error," Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003), 68-78.
"On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden," Analysis 62:4 (2002), 296-9.
"Theories of Practical Reason," Metaphilosophy 33:4 (2002), 450-67."
"Good Advice and Rational Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, (2000), 561-9.
Objective and indirect moral theories
"The Incoherence Objection to Moral Theory", Acta Analytica 25 (2010), 279-284.
"The Limits of Maximization: Actions, Decision Procedures, and Meta-Decision Procedures", The Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (2010).
"Monkeys, Typewriters, and Objective Consequentialism," Ratio 18, (2005), 352-60.
One-off articles
(with Julia Driver), "Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2022), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
"What is Group Well-Being?" Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2021).
"Should Children Have the Right to Vote?", Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, ed. D. Boonin, Palgrave MacMillan (2018), 215-224.
"The Problem of Evil and the Grammar of Goodness", Religions 9 (2018).
"The Ethics of Terror and Torture", Review Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (2008), 139-52.
"Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument," Journal of Medical Ethics 26:6 (2000), 466-8.
"A Fallacy in Korsgaard’s Argument for Moral Obligation," The Journal of Value Inquiry 34:1 (2000), 103-4.
"Personal Identity and Quasi-Responsibility," in Moral Responsibility and Ontology, ed. Ton van den Beld, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000), 77-87.
"Is there Ethical Knowledge?" Southwestern Philosophical Review 14:1 (1998), 63-8.
If you want copies of any of this stuff, just email me.