I work primarily on topics in ethics and practical reason.

My work falls into several overlapping categories: advice and moral testimony, reasons for action, objective and indirect moral theories:

Advice and moral testimony (and related matters)

• Guided by Voices: Moral Testimony, Advice, and the Forging of a "We" , Oxford University Press (2021)

• "(En)joining others", Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2019)

• "Peer Disagreement: Special Cases", Logos & Episteme (2018)

• "Moral Advice and Joint Agency" Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Oxford University Press (2018).

• "Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive", Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12 (2017), 51-75.

• "Peer Disagreement and the Dunning-Kruger Effect", Episteme (2016), 1–18. doi:10.1017/epi.2016.18.

• "Rossian Deontology and the Possibility of Moral Expertise", Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (2014).

• "Trusting Advice and Weakness of Will," Social Theory and Practice 80 (2004), 371-89.

• "Stories, Autobiographies, and Moral Inquiry," Journal of Social Philosophy 34:2 (2003), 188-98.

• "Some Advice for Moral Psychologists," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003), 299-310.

• "Advice and Moral Objectivity," Philosophical Papers 29 (2000), 1-19.

• "Good Advice and Rational Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, (2000), 561-9.

• "Advice, Life-Experience, and Moral Objectivity", Dissertation, University of Chicago (1997).

Reasons for Action

• "Irrationality, Charity, and Ambivalence", The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence, eds. B. Brogaard & D. E. Gatzia, Routledge (2020), 66-74.

• "Psychologism and Non-Psychologism about Motivating Reasons", The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (2018).

• "In the Beginning was the Doing", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2013), 303-321.

• "Williams on Thick Concepts and Reasons for Action", Thick Concepts, ed. S. Kirchin, OUP (2013).

• Reasons, Continuum Press (2012).

• "Intentional Action and 'In order to' ", Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (2007), 113-18.

• "Psychologism, Practical Reason, and the Possibility of Error," Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003), 68-78.

• "On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden," Analysis 62:4 (2002), 296-9.

• "Theories of Practical Reason," Metaphilosophy 33:4 (2002), 450-67."

• "Good Advice and Rational Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, (2000), 561-9.

Objective and indirect moral theories

• "The Incoherence Objection to Moral Theory", Acta Analytica 25 (2010), 279-284.

• "The Limits of Maximization: Actions, Decision Procedures, and Meta-Decision Procedures", The Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (2010).

• "Monkeys, Typewriters, and Objective Consequentialism," Ratio 18, (2005), 352-60.

One-off articles

• (with Julia Driver), "Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2022), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

• "What is Group Well-Being?" Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2021).

• "Should Children Have the Right to Vote?", Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, ed. D. Boonin, Palgrave MacMillan (2018), 215-224.

• "The Problem of Evil and the Grammar of Goodness", Religions 9 (2018).

• "The Ethics of Terror and Torture", Review Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (2008), 139-52.

• "Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument," Journal of Medical Ethics 26:6 (2000), 466-8.

• "A Fallacy in Korsgaard’s Argument for Moral Obligation," The Journal of Value Inquiry 34:1 (2000), 103-4.

• "Personal Identity and Quasi-Responsibility," in Moral Responsibility and Ontology, ed. Ton van den Beld, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000), 77-87.

• "Is there Ethical Knowledge?" Southwestern Philosophical Review 14:1 (1998), 63-8.

If you want copies of any of this stuff, just email me.