Axiomatizations of a simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four and Final Five elections
2025. Under review.
A simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four elections
Forthcoming in Representation. Publisher's version.
with Eric Pacuit
2023. Constitutional Political Economy. Publisher's version. Associated website at StableVoting.org.
Split Cycle: A New Condorcet-Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers
with Eric Pacuit
2023. Public Choice. Publisher's version.
pref_voting: The Preferential Voting Tools package for Python
with Eric Pacuit
2025. Journal of Open Source Software.
Characterizations of voting rules based on majority margins
with Yifeng Ding and Eric Pacuit
2025.
An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle
with Yifeng Ding and Eric Pacuit
2024. Social Choice and Welfare. Publisher's version.
An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
with Eric Pacuit
Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare.
Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model
with Mikayla Kelley
2024. Theory and Decision. Publisher's version.
Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections
with Eric Pacuit
2021. Journal of Theoretical Politics. Publisher's version.
An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
2024. Economics Letters. Publisher's version.
Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
with Chase Norman, Eric Pacuit, and Saam Zahedian
2024. Mathematical Analyses of Decisions, Voting and Games, Contemporary Mathematics series, American Mathematical Society, edited by Michael A. Jones, David McCune, and Jennifer Wilson. Publisher's version.
with Eric Pacuit
2020. In the special issue of Social Choice and Welfare in Memory of Kenneth J. Arrow, edited by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura. Publisher's version.
A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
with Mikayla Kelley
2020. Social Choice and Welfare. Publisher's version.
Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback
with Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig, Bob M. Jacobs, Nathan Lambert, Milan Mossé, Eric Pacuit, Stuart Russell, Hailey Schoelkopf, Emanuel Tewolde, and William S. Zwicker
2024. International Conference on Machine Learning.
Voting Theory in the Lean Theorem Prover
with Chase Norman and Eric Pacuit
2021. Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI-VIII).
with Eric Pacuit
2020. In the special issue of Social Choice and Welfare in Memory of Kenneth J. Arrow, edited by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura. Publisher's version.
Learning to Manipulate under Limited Information
with Alexander Kristoffersen and Eric Pacuit
Proceedings of the 39th Annual AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2025). Publisher's version.
Accepted for the 1st Workshop on Social Choice and Learning Algorithms (SCaLA 2024) held at AAMS 2024.
Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method
with Eric Pacuit
2019. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XVII).
The Social Utility of Voting Revisited
with Eric Pacuit
2024.
The irrationality of the California gubernatorial recall system
with Eric Pacuit
2026. The Mathematics Enthusiast.
Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting
with Eric Pacuit
2021. Proceedings of the Eigthteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XVIII).