Working Papers
Addessi W., Brandano M.G., and B. Biagi (2018) “The Effect of the euro on tourist flows”, CRENOS, Working Paper n. 2018/04.
Addessi W., Pulina M. (2017) “Sectoral Composition of Consumption Expenditure: A Regional Analysis”, CRENOS, Working Paper n. 2017/03.
Sallusti F., Addessi W. (2010) “Heterogeneity and Specificity of Knowledge: a Model of Governance Choice”, WP in Evolutionary Political Economy, working papers series of EAEPE.
In this paper, we explore the role of the heterogeneity of knowledge sets involved in the production in determining the governance choice of firms. Drawing on Williamson's 1991 model, we extend his analysis by including the effects of the interaction between different sets of knowledge on the learning processes enabled by the interaction between firms under different institutional arrangements. This allows us to highlight how non-opportunism-based concerns may affect the choice between market, integration and alliances. We develop a model that shows how the discrete choice between the different institutional alternatives changes as the levels of specificity and heterogeneity of the knowledge sets vary. Therefore, we study how the inclusion of knowledge-based concerns as a determinant of the governance form leads to conclusions about the convenience of the institutional alternatives that are different from, and complete, those put forward by Williamson. This way, the paper has the aim of concurring to the building-up of schemes that consider the understanding of the complementarities between the transaction-cost economics and the knowledge-based approach as a new challenge for industrial economists and managerial scholars
Addessi William (2009), “A note on firms’ investment under tax benefits of debt and exogenous debt constraint”, Mimeo.
This paper questions the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always a good policy instrument in order to spur investment. In particular, it analyzes the investment choice in a "financing hierarchy" framework with an exogenous constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can contract. We show that if the interest rate on the debt is decreasing in the capital accumulation and another financial resource (as equity) which is more expensive than the debt (at least for initial levels of debt) is available, then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce the firm's investment. This theoretical contribution should be considered when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a fixed threshold but firms have access to the stock market.
Addessi W., Busato F. (2010) “Business Cycle, Bargaining Power and Real Wages”, Mimeo.
This paper suggests a possible explanation for the low correlation between real wages and output (and employment) that has characterized the U.S. post-war time series. It introduces in a DSGE model a wage setting process based on the following hypotheses. First, in each firm wages are set by a bargaining process between firm and workforce. Second, the relative bargaining power depends on the state of labor market. Third, dividend is used as indicator of the firm's gain during the bargaining process. Changes in employment and firm liquidity along the business cycle push wages in opposite directions, so that the cyclical behavior of wages depends on the relative strength of these forces. Particularly, the paper investigates how the responsiveness of the relative bargaining power to the state of labor market affects business cycle comovements and volatilities. The benchmark version of the model replicates quite well some U.S. business cycle regularities, including the low pro-cyclicality of real wages. Finally, it is worth noting that the volatilities of endogenous variables rely on small volatility of exogenous shocks.