Awaya, Y. , V. Krishna and E. Osipov (2026): "Informational Content of Auction Prices" (Slides)
Abstract: We study auctions of k identical objects to n bidders, each of whom wants at most one. The objects have a common but unknown value and the bidders receive private signals about this value. The discriminatory price auction and the uniform-price auction are compared in terms of how informative the resulting auction prices (not bids) are in conveying the true value to an outside observer/investor. Since both auctions have symmetric, monotone equilibria, the problem reduces to comparing the informativeness of the highest order statistic of a sample to the (k+1)st highest. We find sufficient conditions under which the highest order statistic is superior---in the sense of Lehmann---in this regard. The sufficient conditions involve the informativeness of high versus low signals and the ratio k/n of objects to bidders.
Awaya, Y. and V. Krishna (2025): "Social Learning with Correlated Information" (Slides)
Abstract: We study a standard binary social learning model where agents' information is serially correlated---it is generated by a Markov process. There is a unique equilibrium in which a herd, sometimes incorrect, always forms. In the long run, does greater persistence increase the likelihood that an incorrect herd forms? In the medium run (prior to the formation of a herd), does a greater similarity information---higher persistence---lead to a greater similarity of actions? The answer to both questions is no.
Awaya, Y. and V. Krishna (2024): "Spreading Information via Social Networks: An Irrelevance Result" Slides
Abstract: An informed planner wishes to spread information among a group of agents in order to induce efficient coordination---say the adoption of a new technology with positive externalities. The agents are connected via a social network. The planner informs a seed and then the information spreads via the network. While the structure of the network affects the rate of diffusion, we show that the rate of adoption is the same for all acyclic networks.
Awaya, Y. and V. Krishna (2020): "On Fundamental versus Strategic Uncertainty"
Abstract: In global games in which one player has better information than his rival, it may be that in the unique equilibrium, the better informed player has a lower payoff than the poorly informed player. The reason is that while the better informed player faces less (or even no) uncertainty about economic fundamentals he may face greater strategic uncertainty.
Benoît, J-P. and V. Krishna (1998): "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis"
Abstract: We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a consequence. Our result encompasses theorems involving epsilon equilibria and incomplete information.
Krishna, V. and M. Perry (1998): "Efficient Mechanism Design"
Abstract: We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents' information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planner's "revenue" among all efficient mechanisms. The result is then used to study multiple object auctions in situations where the bidders have privately known "demand curves" and extended to include situations with complementarities across objects or externalities across bidders. We also illustrate how the main result may be used to analyze the possibility of allocating both private and public goods when budget balance considerations are important. The generalized VCG mechanism, therefore, serves to unify many results in mechanism design theory.