Awaya, Y. and V. Krishna (2025): "Social Learning with Markovian Information"
Abstract: We study a standard binary-state, binary-signal, binary-action social learning model but allow agents' information to be serially correlated. Specifically, agents' signals are generated by a Markov process. As usual, there is a unique equilibrium. The induced public beliefs are also Markovian. We study how the probability of an incorrect herd is affected by an increase in the persistence of signals. The relation is highly non-monotonic. The probability of an incorrect herd is a locally increasing function of persistence with a countable number of downward jumps. It is also possible that the probability of an incorrect herd is lower when signals are serially correlated signals than when they are conditionally independent.
Awaya, Y. and V. Krishna (2024): "Spreading Information via Social Networks: An Irrelevance Result" Slides
Abstract: An informed planner wishes to spread information among a group of agents in order to induce efficient coordination---say the adoption of a new technology with positive externalities. The agents are connected via a social network. The planner informs a seed and then the information spreads via the network. While the structure of the network affects the rate of diffusion, we show that the rate of adoption is the same for all acyclic networks.
Awaya, Y. and V. Krishna (2020): "On Fundamental versus Strategic Uncertainty"
Abstract: In global games in which one player has better information than his rival, it may be that in the unique equilibrium, the better informed player has a lower payoff than the poorly informed player. The reason is that while the better informed player faces less (or even no) uncertainty about economic fundamentals he may face greater strategic uncertainty.
Benoît, J-P. and V. Krishna (1998): "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis"
Abstract: We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a consequence. Our result encompasses theorems involving epsilon equilibria and incomplete information.
Krishna, V. and M. Perry (1998): "Efficient Mechanism Design"
Abstract: We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents' information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planner's "revenue" among all efficient mechanisms. The result is then used to study multiple object auctions in situations where the bidders have privately known "demand curves" and extended to include situations with complementarities across objects or externalities across bidders. We also illustrate how the main result may be used to analyze the possibility of allocating both private and public goods when budget balance considerations are important. The generalized VCG mechanism, therefore, serves to unify many results in mechanism design theory.