**Research Interests:**Micro Theory, Mechanism Design, and IO.

Publications:Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement (with Felix Jarman), Journal of Economic Theory 171, 2017, pp. 35--63 [SSRN profile]Working Papers:Competing for strategic buyers [ PDF to be updated ]Although revenue-management markets are rarely monopolistic, this assumption is typically made in the literature. In contrast, I consider multiple sellers who in total offer K identical goods to n>K buyers with private persistent valuations. Goods are traded in continuous time before some deadline. All buyers enter the market simultaneously, are fully forward-looking and do not discount. I find an equilibrium in which allocations, prices and payoffs are equivalent under monopoly and oligopoly, if a monopolist optimally sells all goods with probability one: All sellers set identical prices that jump after each sale and otherwise descend continuously. There is no incentive to undercut competitors' prices, because each seller anticipates that, by letting her rivals sell out, she will become a monopolist. However, in environments such that a monopolist prefers to withhold capacity, prices and industry profits under monopoly are higher compared to oligopoly. From a methodological perspective, I contribute a hands-on approach to solving this continuous-time stochastic game with individual player histories. Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints with Felix Jarman [ PDF accepted at Economics Letters ] This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: Any payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can at least be matched with a feasible deterministic direct mechanism that induces truthful revelation. Work in progress:Oligopolistic revenue management with myopic buyers Presentations:Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement10th SFB Young Researchers Workshop, Berlin, by Felix Jarman 1st ENTER MaCCI-TSE Workshop, Mannheim, by Vincent Meisner UECE Lisbon Meetings 2014, Lisbon, by Vincent Meisner 9th BiGSEM Doctoral Workshop on Economic Theory, Bielefeld, by Felix Jarman TSE Brown Bag Seminar, Toulouse, by Vincent Meisner UCL ENTER Seminar, London, by Felix Jarman Jahrestagung Verein für Socialpolitik 2015, Münster, by Felix Jarman EEA 2015, Mannheim, poster by Vincent Meisner SAEe 2015, Girona, presentation by Vincent Meisner European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society 2015, Milan, presentation by Vincent Meisner Competing for strategic buyers11th SFB Young Researchers Workshop, Bonn Internal Department Seminar, Mannheim 12th SFB Young Researchers Workshop, Munich MaCCI Annual Conference 2016, Mannheim EARIE 2016, Lisbon Verein für Socialpolitik 2016, Augsburg European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society 2016, Edinburgh Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2017, Halle (Saale) CRC TRR 190, Berlin BCCP Forum, Berlin Conference on Economic Design 2017, York ZEW Summer Workshop 2017, Mannheim EEA-ESEM 2017, Lisbon |