Research Interests: Micro Theory, Mechanism Design, and IO.


Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement (with Felix Jarman), Journal of Economic Theory 171, 2017, pp. 35--63

Working Papers: [SSRN profile]

Competing for strategic buyers  [ PDF to be updated ]
Although revenue-management markets are rarely monopolistic, this assumption is typically made in the literature. In contrast, I consider multiple sellers who in total offer K identical goods to n>K buyers with private persistent valuations. Goods are traded in continuous time before some deadline. All buyers enter the market simultaneously, are fully forward-looking and do not discount. I find an equilibrium in which allocations, prices and payoffs are equivalent under monopoly and oligopoly, if a monopolist optimally sells all goods with probability one: All sellers set identical prices that jump after each sale and otherwise descend continuously. There is no incentive to undercut competitors' prices, because each seller anticipates that, by letting her rivals sell out, she will become a monopolist. However, in environments such that a monopolist prefers to withhold capacity, prices and industry profits under monopoly are higher compared to oligopoly. From a methodological perspective, I contribute a hands-on approach to solving this continuous-time stochastic game with individual player histories.

Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints
with Felix Jarman [ PDF accepted at Economics Letters ]
This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: Any payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can at least be matched with a feasible deterministic direct mechanism that induces truthful revelation.

Work in progress:
(Re-)sale vs. rental
Oligopolistic revenue management with myopic buyers


Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
10th SFB Young Researchers Workshop, Berlin, by Felix Jarman
1st ENTER MaCCI-TSE Workshop, Mannheim, by Vincent Meisner
UECE Lisbon Meetings 2014, Lisbon, by Vincent Meisner
9th BiGSEM Doctoral Workshop on Economic Theory, Bielefeld, by Felix Jarman
TSE Brown Bag Seminar, Toulouse, by Vincent Meisner
UCL ENTER Seminar, London, by Felix Jarman
Jahrestagung Verein für Socialpolitik 2015, Münster, by Felix Jarman
EEA 2015, Mannheim, poster by Vincent Meisner
SAEe 2015, Girona, presentation by Vincent Meisner
European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society 2015, Milan, presentation by Vincent Meisner

Competing for strategic buyers
11th SFB Young Researchers Workshop, Bonn
Internal Department Seminar, Mannheim
12th SFB Young Researchers Workshop, Munich
MaCCI Annual Conference 2016, Mannheim
EARIE 2016, Lisbon
Verein für Socialpolitik 2016, Augsburg
European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society 2016, Edinburgh
Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2017, Halle (Saale)
CRC TRR 190, Berlin
BCCP Forum, Berlin
Conference on Economic Design 2017, York
ZEW Summer Workshop 2017, Mannheim
EEA-ESEM 2017, Lisbon