Research


Articles


Media coverage: Faculti 

Media coverage: Ideas for India

Data

Data

Media coverage: Ideas for India, VOX

Media coverage: Ideas for India, VOX

Data

Media coverage: NewsReach (May-June 2012)

Book chapter

Also Published in India and the Pandemic: The First Year, Essays from the India Forum. Orient Blackswan.

Media coverage: CEPR Policy Insight No. 102, Counterview, India Forum, VoxEU

Working Papers

In a field experiment in Uganda, mothers of young children are randomly offered a childcare subsidy, an equivalent cash grant, both or nothing. Childcare leads to a 44 percent increase in household income, which is at least as large as the impact of the cash grant and driven by an increase in mothers' business revenues and fathers' wage earnings. The childcare subsidy also improves child development while the cash grant does not. Overall, our findings demonstrate that childcare subsidies can be an effective policy to simultaneously promote child development and reduce poverty in a low-income context.

We argue that economic inequality harms social provision to the poor, but that higher political competition can mitigate this effect. We test this hypothesis using a large redistricting of electoral boundaries in India. Higher economic inequality leads to more post-neonatal infant deaths, but only in situations with a lack of political competition. We assert that the effect on mortality operates via changes in social provision at the local level. Indeed, inequality leads to worse performance of public health care and a weaker provision of the workfare program MGNREGA -- but only in situations with little political competition.

We show that inequality triggers social unrest in rural India. We develop a theoretical framework where social unrest is rationally used by civilians to oppose (unfair) surplus sharing by the elite. We predict that the probability of observing social unrest in a village increases with the sum of distances between the (log) average and the lowest incomes.  We bring our measure to the data using bank account details in 2,197 Indian villages. We document that a 10% increase in our inequality measure increases by 6.5% the unconditional probability of observing social unrest in a village in a given month.

Women are the primary recipients of many welfare programs around the world. This gendered targeting is backed by claims that women make better consumption choices than men, but the empirical evidence is scarce. We report from an experiment designed to study the effect of such gendered targeting: in each household, weekly cash transfers were randomly allocated to a man or a woman. We combine the randomized transfers with detailed financial diaries to measure the households’ economic decisions. Our precise estimates suggest no difference in consumption, saving or nutrition in households with female rather than male recipients.


Work in Progress


Field Projects (Ongoing)


Field Projects (Finalized)