O-3 Loses a Patrol - Ambush on Hill 689, 27 June, 1967

(The following summary account is taken from statements from then SGT [later WO] Larry Bosworth, the O-3 NCOIC, and several of the survivors including Earl B. Grissom, William Pennock, Richard Moison and Raymond Strehlow [all of O-3] and from statements by the late SGT Ray Gray, and others who participated or witnessed the events, and from the 3/26 Command Chronology)

On 27 June, 1967, CAP O-3 was ordered by the Marine command at Khe Sanh to send a patrol to investigate suspected launch sites (spotted earlier by an aerial observer) of an NVA rocket and mortar attack on the Khe Sanh base which had occurred just after midnight of the night before. A 1 / 13 and elements of 3 / 26 (including the Battalion Aid Station) had been hit hard in the attack, incurring a number of casualties. Although key A 1 / 13 personnel were injured and killed, but they managed to mount an effective counter-battery fire and silenced the enemy fire.

All those at unit level (including the NCOIC of O-3 and the leader of the patrol) deemed this patrol a bad idea, as CAP units were not intended for, nor were they manned, armed or supported for heavy combat operations. However, unlike SOG, Marines didn't have the option of refusing missions, and went out despite their foreboding.

At approximately 0830 on 27 June, 1967, they launched the patrol which included several men relatively new to Oscar (though all had prior experience in other units). Among the patrol's objectives was Hill 689 (coordinates XD 802 409, 4 kilometers west of the combat base

The O-3 patrol included the following men CPL Dennis Alfred O'Connor (newly arrived at Oscar Co. after an extension leave, KIA), CPL James Merrill Shepard, Jr. (patrol leader, KIA), LCPL Francisco Alberto Mazariegos (KIA), LCPL Earl Grissom (also newly arrived at Oscar Co.), LCPL William Pennock, LCPL Raymond E. Strehlow (WIA), LCPL Richard Moison, and the unit Corpsman, Doc John Fisher, all of Oscar-3, and LCPL Charles Aaron Lynch of Oscar-1, who was visiting friends at O-3, as well as Popular Force militia from the Bru tribe, and ultimately involved losses from India and Lima Companies, 3 / 26, who were sent in support of the Oscar Company patrol. (See In Memoriam )

The patrol could see that 689 was under heavy attack by air assaults, but continued on, during the course of which they made contact with the arial observer, who was astounded to see them there. Nevertheless, he called off the assaults and the patrol continued up the hill.

According to the 3/26 Command Chronology, by approximately 1230, the patrol had reached the top of Hill 689 As they reached the crest, they encountered a much larger enemy force set up in ambush, and began receiving heavy enemy fire, including rockets and automatic weapons. They immediately sustained several casualties KIA and WIA.

An artillery mission was called in, but landed nearly on top of their position. After the artillery fire, two men attempted to sweep the hill for friendly WIA and KIA, but were driven back. The survivors were unable to reach the KIA and wounded, except for one WIA they had already recovered who died en route. The survivors were forced to retreat, leaving two CAP Marines and one Bru PF on the hill. The survivors fell back, while elements of the other CAPs were mustering a relief force.

A relief column was dispatched from Oscar Company, but they were unable to gain the hill, being driven off by heavy fire and hampered by the (understandable) reluctance of the Bru to ascend the hill. (The Bru usually knew when things were going to be very bad - their senses were much finer tuned than those of most Americans.)

Meanwhile, India 3/26, which had been returning from an overnight patrol, had been re-routed to Hill 689 to assist the Oscar Marines.

According to LCOL (then LT) "Tony" Anthony, a participant, CPT Coulter, India's CO, quickly deployed two platoons in the attack, both executing frontal assaults. 1st platoon was on the left portion of the hill, separated by a small saddle, and 2nd platoon assaulted the right hand portion of the hill. LTC Anthony's 2nd platoon assaulted their portion of the hill with the classic "two up, one back" - i.e., two squads on line and one in reserve.

Both the leading platoons were soon engaged in heavy fire-fights, including some literal hand-to-hand fighting, and sustained heavy casualties. The remainder of India 3/26 was soon deployed to assist.

Meanwhile, elements of Lima 3/26 were air-lifted into the area by helicopter and soon deployed. They too encountered heavy fighting, and also soon began sustaining casualties.

According to the 3/26 CC, by approximately 1935, the crest of Hill 689 had been cleared of NVA and the survivors of India and Lima companies joined to form a consolidated position.

The MIAs from CAC Oscar were found dead, and 3/26 lost 14 men KIA in the engagement, for a total of 18 Americans killed in the actions on the hill. LCpl Charles M. Gattis, WIA, later died from wounds received on Hill 689, raising the toll to 19.

Judging from first-hand accounts, there is little doubt that some of the casualties were the result of "friendly fire."

There were also several men of H&S 3/26, A 1/13, and other units KIA on KSCB as a result of incoming fire.

In addition to the KIA, the men of 3/26 sustained a number of WIAs, among them Frank McCarthy, 3rd Plt. Commander of L 3/26.

For a detailed personal account of the ambush written by Earl B. Grissom and information and pictures by Richard Moison, William Pennock, other survivors I have been able to locate, and personal accounts of the subsequent assault by some of the officers and men of 3/26, see CAP Oscar history.

(For more information on this battalion's history, see the 3/26 website.)

The following is a first-hand account from Earl B. Grissom, written on 1/13/09. This account was sent to me as an E-mail and I have added some notes from telephone conversations with Earl and other sources which vary slightly from his account, though overall they agree regarding the main facts.

Account of Earl B. Grissom

"I can’t remember if it was late night of June 26th or early morning of June 27th when Khe Sanh started getting hammered by mortars followed by rockets. It was a bad rocket and mortar attack. I’m not sure how many rounds of each, but the attack went on for awhile.

(Ed. Note: It was just after midnight on the morning of the 27th.)

Early that morning, June 27th, we were informed that we were going on a patrol to look for the mortar sites from the attack the night before. I can remember looking at the overlay. I noticed that one of the checkpoints was the top of a hill numbered 689 that at that time was being hammered by Phantoms. I found it strange that this patrol was going that far to a hill that was getting hit by an air strike - just to find some mortar sites. I remember me and Dennis (CPL O’Connor) said as much and were told to shut up.

(Ed. Note: In fairness, their NCOIC, the late SGT (later WO4) Lawrence Bosworth (see In Memoriam ) told me in a phone conversation some years before his death that he had already protested the assignment on the same grounds, but had been ordered by higher command to run it, so he was compelled to order the patrol against his better judgement. Unlike the Special Forces SOG, Marines generally had no say in accepting or refusing assignments.)

Things went along pretty good. We got to the top of a hill (I think the number was 521 or 561). Anyway, that is not important. It was about the third checkpoint and that’s when we found the mortar sites. The pits were freshly dug, aiming stakes still in place. Some 82 mm rounds laying around. We knew that the NVA weren’t far away. They were still air striking 689 and we started realizing we were in some deep shit.

Two views of 689 as the patrol approaches. Note air strikes in progress in both photos.

(This picture and the one above were taken by radioman William ["Peanut"] Pennock on the patrol. (Photos & information courtesy of William Pennock)

We started off towards 689 when a spotter plane saw our patrol. I’ll never forget his call sign. It was CAT KILLER 2-6. Anyway, he flew low and dropped a canister out with his radio frequency and his exact words were……”What in the hell are you doing?” We explained and he called off the Phantoms and we started up 689.

(Ed. Note: In telephone conversation and E-mails, William Pennock stated that he was carrying the radio that day and remembers the call sign of the FAC from the 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company [aka Catkillers] as being Cat Killer 3-4. On the other hand, one of the 220th Squadron pilots, Dick Tobiason, flew as Cat-Killer 2-6 on the 17th, 18th and 27th of June, according to Tobiason and Gary Wilson, the 220th's unit historian, so the call-sign may have been Cat Killer 2-6 as Earl reports.)

O’Connor was walking point, followed by I think Maz (Francisco Mazariegos), then I think me, and behind me were Shep (James Shepard) and Doc (O-3's medic). I just know that us five were the first ones to top the hill. We came up on a spider trap and looking in we saw an ammo dump with mortar rounds. Cases of AK-47 rounds, RPG rounds, or B-40, whatever you like to call them. Just a lot of shit and that’s when we knew we were definitely in trouble.

O-3 patrol approaches crest of 689. Leading two figures (top left) are probably CPL O'Connor and a Bru RF, followed by LCPL Mazariegos and another Bru RF, Earl Grissom, CPL Shepard, "Doc "John Fisher, "Red" Strehlow, and their Bru RF counterparts.
This photo was taken only minutes before the ambush was initiated. In a few minutes, O'Connor, Mazariegos and several Bru RFs would lie dead, Shepard mortally wounded, and Strehlow seriously wounded in the chest and shoulder and left for dead in a shell-hole, with the few uninjured survivors scrambling down the hill in an attempt to evade the searing fire of the heavily entrenched NVA force (later estimated at a Bn.) and the incoming artillery fire called in by William Pennock, the radio man. (This picture and the two above, and information about them courtesy of William "Peanut" Pennock of O-3.)

(Ed. Note: In a telephone conversation of May 31, 2015, William Pennock said that CPL Shepard had told them to fix bayonets just before the ambush. However, Grissom did not recall this.)

O’Connor had seen another spider trap and said he was going to go over and check it out. I guess Maz had seen something else and took off. I turned around to say something to Shep and I saw O’Connor look down into a hole and a machine gun opened up on him and it seemed like the whole hill erupted.

(Ed. Note: In a telephone conversation in January 2009, Grissom informed me that O'Connor had started to point his rifle at something, when the MG opened up. He said O'Connor was "stitched up" by the MG, and was probably dead when he hit the ground.)

I turned around and dove into a bomb crater. I crawled up to the top of the crater and was doing what I could with my blooper (M-79) and I saw Maz fighting his way back towards me taking out one gook just before he got to the crater. A few minutes later he caught an AK-47 round in the temple and he was dead before he hit the ground.

(Ed. Note: In a telephone conversation in January 2009, Grissom informed me that he was often firing almost straight up, because the enemy was so close. He said the rounds were striking so near him and Mazariegos that he feared they might be hit by them. He also informed me that Mazariegos had jumped into the crater laughing and saying; "I got two of the mother-f****rs! I got two of them!" Grissom also commented that Mazariegos had displayed great courage in his fighting retreat to the crater, his face to the enemy and delivering accurate fire on them, resulting in at least one enemy casualty.

Grissom also said that he had warned Mazariegos against looking over the top, but Mazariegos had responded by pointing out that if they didn't, the enemy could sneak up on them. It was on his second look that he was shot. After Mazariegos had been hit, the Navy Corpsman, "Doc" John Fisher, came over under fire to try to render aid, despite Grissom telling him that Mazariegos was dead. He also stated that CPL Shepard [below] was lying beside the crater rather than in it. The corpsman rendered first aid to Shepard, and assisted Grissom in hauling him down the hill.)

I turned to Shep and said…”we’ve gotta get outta here” and he said…”We can’t - I’ve been hit!” I reached down and grabbed Maz’s 16 and his magazines and got out of the crater. I couldn’t see where Shep got hit. There was no blood. Then I saw where the round had gone in right next to his neck in the soft area by the collar bone. At this time he was still alive so we tried dragging him down the hill. Doc was trying to keep him awake and alive by talking to him, however, Shep was at this point no longer responding, other than an occasional groan. After a hundred yards or so he died. We had to leave his body, because the fire was still so heavy.

(Ed. Note: According to Pennock, Shepard said; "Fix bayonets!" shortly before he was shot. Grissom does not recall this, but that is the nature of recollection, especially so long after the events.

Two other Marines had survived from the back half of the patrol and to save my life I can’t remember their names. (Ed. Note: Moison and Pennock)

Anyway, we got back to our C.P. and we had to go over to the main C.P. at Khe Sanh and give all the brass the run down about what happened and gave them the coordinates of the ammo bunker, etc.

I’m sure that there is more to this than what I have written. As time goes on I’m sure more will be revealed to me but what I have written down here is a true and accurate statement from a survivor of the ambush on Hill 689 at Khe Sanh – So Help Me God."

Semper Fi,

Earl Grissom

Account of William Pennock

We were mortared once at night and Khe Sahn was too, and the next day our Captain ordered 3rd squad to go out and inspect the hilly areas they believed it came from. We humped up the hills and found fresh mortar pits, aiming stakes and mortar rounds lying around, I believe it was hill 552 and after that we were ordered to go farther on then originally thought, we had no M-60's or mortars with us but made our way up hill 689 after an air strike was just called off, no one informed them we were coming up!

I was about in the middle of the patrol and we were spread out, when the lead elements reached the top I could hear a lot of automatic fire from enemy AK-47’s.

The point man was killed instantly and Cpl. James Merrill Shepard was mortally hit and the Doc and another man dragged him back next to the bomb crater I had backed into as the bullets were flying by, I remember, so close I felt the wind part next to my left ear, if I would have sneezed it would have been curtains!

Cpl Shepard was dying then I remember I got on my radio and called in artillery and said, “Let’s get out of here!” I recall Earl Grissom came up behind me and dialed in the right radio frequency for me, he was also taking cover in the bomb crater. Everything happened so fast that June day and at that point we didn't know where L/Cpl Strelow was and presumed he was dead.

I heard our Captain was reprimanded over incident for sending us further on that day. Dick Moisen was tail end Charlie for the first time he said because he usually took point position. He said he had "good instincts” when on point and always volunteered for it. However, another man took the point that day so it was a trade off that saved Dick’s life! I email Dick from time to time and we talk that way. Dick lives in Rhode Island. I could go on and on but will close for now.

(Ed. Note: The original order to scout the area came from Marine HQ at Khe Sanh Combat Base. Neither the CAC OIC nor SGT Bosworth thought it wise, but orders are orders.)

The survivors were unable to reach the KIA and wounded, except for one WIA who died en route to the camp. (I am unsure if this was Shepard, Lynch, or a Bru RF.) After the artillery fire, two men attempted to sweep the hill for our WIA and KIA, but were driven back. The remnants of the patrol were forced to retreat, leaving two Marines and one Bru PF on the hill, status MIA. The survivors fell back toward their compound, where elements of the other CAPs were mustering a relief column.

The relief column from O-1 and O-2 was dispatched, but they were unable to gain the hill, being driven off by heavy fire and hampered by the refusal of the Bru RFs [native militia] to ascend the hill. The Bru usually knew when things were going to be bad - their senses were much finer tuned than those of most of the Americans. It is my opinion that even had they gone up the hill, the enemy, who were numerous and well dug in, would have killed them as well.

Earl Grissom left Oscar Co. shortly after this action. In a telephone interview with Grissom in January 2009, he said that when the survivors got off the hill, he heard that Lynch and another man he knew only as "Red" had been KIA also. Aside from Lynch, I had found no record of any other Oscar KIAs than those given.

However, that problem was solved when I located and re-connected in 2015 with some of the other survivors, William Pennock, Richard Moison, and Raymond E. ["Red"] Strehlow, who filled in some of the rest of the story, and are in the process of hashing out their respective recollections, which will be published here as soon as they become available. In general, their stories agree with Grissom's.

Pennock and Moison were the Marines at the back of the patrol who had survived the initial slaughter. Raymond ("Red") Strehlow, who Grissom had long believed was KIA, had survived, but was seriously wounded (shot in the chest and shoulder) and dropped into a shell-hole where he lay alone, wounded and bleeding, all night. He had to use dirt to stanch his wounds.

Once, he woke to see an NVA soldier taking his rifle and other gear, but he was too weak to fight, and instead kept his eyes closed and played dead - not difficult considering how much bllod he had lost.

"Red" was not recovered until the assaults of India and Lima companies (3/26) cleared the hill on the following day, having survived his serious wounds, the NVA, repeated and heavy air strikes and artillery shellings, and the subsequent assaults by India and Lima 3/26. l. It must have been an intensely lonely and terrible ordeal. He was eventually med-evaced to the USS Sanctuary (a hospital ship) and then transferred to medical facilities in the Phillipines, Memphis and the Great Lakes.

"Doc" Fisher also survived.

Later, according to Grissom, a CPT named Hall from Hotel Co. (A CAC near Hue) came to Khe Sanh and investigate, speaking to the survivors. He asked them why they left the radio frequency with Oscar, and was of the opinion that the disaster was entirely due to leaving the frequency. They explained about the spotter, but were ignored by CPT Hall, who apparently sought to lay the entire blame for the disaster at the door of the men who had been ordered to perform it against their collective better judgement - a not untypical response from some in command when things go awry. It seems clear he was there to assign blame to the survivors, who had done their best under extremely difficult circumstances and great odds.

In my professional opinion, that officer (and those who sent him) were fools or ignorant of the realities of combat, because no amount of "radio contact" could have offset what was essentially an ill-conceived, unnecessary, and in essence a suicidal mission - sending a small, lightly armed CAP unit patrol, with no supporting arms, against a numerically and tactically superior, heavily-armed, well-entrenched and obviously determined enemy force that was not dislodged until two full rifle companies with weapons platoons and supporting arms were sent up the hill - and even then, losing many KIA and WIA in the process.

Account of HN "Doc" John Fisher

On the morning of June 27 1967 our CAC patrol waited on a hill next to hill 689. Jets were bombing hill 689. We were given the green light to proceed to 689. As we got near the top of 689 we heard our point man yell “ I found an ammo cache“. Then gun fire. The first half of the patrol jumped into a large bomb crater the rest of the patrol spread out behind us in the thick grass. I started climbing out of the crater going to the point man. Someone grabbed my ankle and pulled me back into the crater. They said, “He doesn’t need you, but we might. “I didn’t know that the patrol was leaving the crater one man at a time. Soon it was just Frank and myself. We took turns jumping up and down firing our M16’s (I carried a M16 that day instead instead of my shotgun). As Frank was going up and i was going down, Frank was shot in the head. The inside of his head filled my hands. I then heard Cpl James Sheppard holler out “come on Doc, we are leaving “. I climbed out of the crater and headed down the hill. Gun fire was all around me. I saw Sheppard lying prone giving me cover fire. I dove over Sheppard and gun fire that was meant for me struck Sheppard. I went to work on Sheppard and told him that he would be ok. He died in my arms. I then saw a NVA soldier running towards me firings from his hip. I put a fresh magazine in my rifle and unloaded the whole clip into him with short bursts of fire. He died less than 10 yards from me. I tried to pull Sheppard down the hill, but he was about 80 pounds heavier than me. I could not. I made it back to the patrol and realized that 5 of my guys and possibly 2 to 4 PF’s had died. I still suffer today wondering why did Sheppard have to die and I didn’t. He came back for me and gave his life so I might live. This has been very hard to write as I don’t talk much about Vietnam. - John Fisher

Account of SGT Raymond Gray

At this point, CAP 1 & 2, who had been on separate patrols, had finished their patrols and were on their way home. They had come together and linked up approximately 1600. The Marines, hearing of their comrades’ peril, immediately took off at a run, ignoring the danger of another ambush in their haste to relieve their friends.

The late SGT Ray Gray told me in a telephone conversation shortly before he died;

"Tempers flared from the heat and tension and worry about our friends' fate. We got to the CAP 3 village (Ta Con) on the access road to KS. We gathered the Bru to go up the hill, and HQ called and said not to go up, because they were going to shoot up the hill with air and arty. From what I remember, it took them about 5 days to clear the hill.”

(Ed. Note: Acc. to LTCOL "Tony" Anthony and the other members of I & L companies of 3/26 who were involved, they had actually cleared the hill by the 27th.)

Ray then went on R & R to Hawaii, catching the last flight out of KS for about a week. He came back afterwards and resumed doing what he had been - patrolling, ambushing, LPs, civic action, etc. He had one more tight encounter.

We got hit about last part of August, right before I left. Suddenly, every flare in our line went off, and the wire was full of gooks. I had the machine gun (a Browning .30 AC), and opened up. Everyone fired their "mad moment" and finally the enemy withdrew. They didn't leave a single body! The rush from a firefight is almost sexual."

(Ed. Note: Ray passed away in March 2005 from illnesses probably related to his exposure to Agent Orange, but was unable to get recognition from the VA for this condition. See: In Memoriam )

Assault on Hill 689 by India, Lima, and elements of H&S Companies, 3 / 26

Assault on Hill 689 by 3/26

(Photo by and used courtesy of Ray Palmer of D 1/26)

Meantime, India 3/26, commanded by CPT M. E. Coulter, was returning to KSCB from a patrol, when it was ordered instead to Hill 689 to assist the CAP patrol. It was later joined by Lima 3/26, elements of which had been air-lifted in by chopper. Despite being well-equipped and manned line infantry companies with supporting arms capabilities, they incurred heavy casualties KIA and WIA from the well-entrenched enemy forces (later estimated at two reinforced NVA companies). These losses included two officers and a SNCO KIA at the hill fight, and other casualties at the unit HQ at KSCB from incoming mortar fire.

At the end of the fighting, CAP O-3 had suffered 4 KIA, and 3/26 had lost 14. In addition, one of the WIA, LCPL Charles M. Gattis died of wounds on July 5th, raising the toll to 19.

According to the 3/26 Command Chronology, the enemy had sustained an estimated 91 KIAs. (I do not have figures for their WIA or POWs, though some are listed in the accounts below.)

There are also first-hand reports of the action and related events in LCDR Ray W. Stubbe's "Battalion of Kings" (2nd ed. pp. 85-88).

Below are first-hand accounts of the action by participants of the assault forces from India and Lima 3/26.

(Ed. Note: In the following accounts, the term Platoon Leader and Platoon Commander are used interchangeably. This reflects both a change in the official terminology at the time and two styles of leadership. Due to the high casualty rates among officers assigned to platoons, their title was changed from "Platoon Leader" to "Platoon Commander." This seemingly insignificant change reflected the concept that if officers "led from the front" in the ancient warrior tradition, they were more subject to being wounded or killed, thus fracturing the command structure, and jeopardizing the success of the mission. The idea was that the officer would "command" the troops as opposed to "leading" them. However, some officers had the "lead from the front" mind-set and personality, and found it difficult to assume the role of "commander.")

Account of LTCOL "Tony" Anthony (then serving as 2nd Platoon Leader, India Company, 3 / 26)

In an E-mail dtd. February 10, 2009 12:05:05 PM PST, LTCOL Anthony wrote:

"The following account is of my involvement with Hill Battle 689, located in the Khe Sanh area of Vietnam, on June 27, 1967. Everything is from memory as I have no written correspondence on which to rely for names etc. All rosters etc. were lost at some point in one of my many moves while making a career of the Marine Corps and at this point in my life, at 72, memory is not what it used to be." -- C. T. Anthony, LtCol USMC (Ret)

My name is LtCol. C.T. ("Tony") Anthony, USMC (Ret) and on June 27, 1967 I was a 2nd Lt. assigned as Platoon Leader for the 2nd Platoon, India, 3/26. I joined "I" 3/26 sometime in May while the Battalion was operating in the Phu Bai TAOR. The CO of the Company at that time was Capt. Mallard. I was assigned as Platoon Leader for the 2nd Platoon relieving 1st LT. Bob Stimson who I believe became the Company XO. Prior to joining 3/26, I had been a SSgt. Platoon Sergeant and Platoon Leader with Delta 1/26 from December 66 and after being commissioned on April 17, 1967 worked with the 15th Counter Intelligence Team in Dong Ha for approximately 30 days before joining 3/26.

For India Company, 3rd Battalion 26th Marines, events leading up to that battle began on the evening of June 26, 1967. The Company had been in the field and returned to the Base Camp and had been assigned a defensive sector for Khe Sanh Combat Base. This was standard operating procedure in that when not in the field, units would be assigned a sector of the Combat Base to defend. That evening of the 26th, the 1st platoon was assigned to send out a squad size security ambush. The squad moved to their ambush site and later that evening, the Combat Base received some incoming rockets and our artillery returned fire to suspected NVA rocket sites. At some point, we learned that the squad from 1st Platoon had taken incoming fire and had casualties to include one very seriously wounded and needed an emergency medevac to try and save his life. A helicopter attempted to make the medevac but was shot down. We later learned that the seriously wounded Marine died.

At first light, our Commanding Officer, Captain Coulter, informed me that the other two squads from 1st platoon and my platoon would be going out to the ambush site and from there would continue to look for sites from which the NVA rockets had ben fired. He and his Command Group would be with us. 2ndLt. Dale Allen was Platoon Leader for the 1st Platoon and had recently had a cyst removed from his upper back. He was on light duty and was not supposed to go back in the field until the wound had healed as infections were always a serious problem but he insisted on going with the platoon. He wanted to be with his Marines.

We departed the Base and while en route to the ambush site, I was told that our mission had changed and that we would be going to Hill 689 where Marines from the CAC Company in Khe Sanh Village had run into trouble and were taking heavy casualties. We changed our route of march and moved toward Hill 689.

India 3/26 en route to Hill 689

(Photo courtesy of Steve Greene of India 3/26)

Once we reached the base of the hill we encountered heavy elephant grass with its razor sharp edges and that, combined with it being very hot, made movement very difficult. We were in a column and in order to move through the grass the point man had to use a machete to cut through the razor like grass. My platoon was in the point, so because of the heat and heavy grass, we had to change the point man with great frequency.

We continued up the hill through jungle like terrain and although we couldn't see it, we could hear a plane circling above the Hill and the AO was giving Capt. Coulter updates on enemy activity on the hill as we moved up the objective.

Sometime after noon, we finally reached a point near the top of the hill where we were halted. No artillery or air support could be used as no one was sure of the status of the CAC Marines on the hill.

Still under cover of the jungle canopy, Capt. Coulter called Dale and I back to where he was located in the column. He issued us a quick frag order and assigned the right hand portion of the hill to my platoon and the left side of the hill to the 1st Platoon. There was a saddle separating the two parts of the Hill. He further indicated that he had received reports of numerous NVA troops on the hill.

CPT Coulter briefing LT Anthony, SSGT Burton and others.

(Photo may have been taken after the assault.)(Courtesy of Steve Greene of India 3/26)

I went back to my platoon and called the squad leaders together and issued them a frag order. Because this was the first time during my time in Vietnam in which we were going to be able to assault an objective using normal Marine tactics, I had the Marines drop their packs and fix bayonets with instructions to assault as they had been taught, walk up the hill firing from the hip even if not receiving any fire and when near the crest, continue firing and double time over the crest and set in a hasty defense. Looking back at that day now, I think that the dropping of the packs and allowing the 2nd platoon Marines to assault as they had been taught in ITR were both very helpful in our eventual success in accomplishing our assigned mission.

We moved out of our covered positions and using the V formation with two squads on line and one bringing up the rear we started advancing up the hill. At the same time Dale moved his platoon to our left and started moving up the hill on that side.

As 2nd Platoon moved up the hill we didn't initially receive any resistance but nearer the top, spider holes started opening and soon we were taking heavy fire and Marines began getting wounded. The Marines of 2nd Platoon never stopped but responded with heavy return fire and continued their advance until they had taken our portion of the objective.

During the assault, lots of stuff was happening with several being wounded and one later became a KIA. I recall an instance where a spider hole opened and a grenade was thrown out wounding my radio operator and slightly wounding me. I directed the nearest Marine to throw a grenade into the hole which eliminated that threat. At that time I had LCpl Peavey become my radio operator. All these actions were taking place as we tried to secure our portion of the hill. To say it was confusing would be putting it mildly!

The wounded Marine who later died was, I believe, LCpl Alejandro R. Godinez. He wasn't killed immediately but died while being treated. He had been shot in the leg and the bullet had hit the artery and the bleeding couldn't be stopped. I saw the Corpsman treating him and tried to encourage him but he appeared to pass out as I talked to him.

While consolidating our position and attempting to redistribute ammo, get casualty reports etc., I learned over the radio that the 1st platoon had run into serious trouble and was pinned down with several casualties and unable to advance to secure their portion of the Hill. I then got one of my machine gun teams to move to the left flank of our position where they could support the 1st platoon by fire. This was done but 1st platoon still remained pinned down. About that same time, I learned that Lima Company was coming in by choppers and would be landing to our front and would be advancing from the other direction to secure 1st platoon's portion of the Hill. As soon as they landed, they too started taking heavy fire. During all of this time, there was a lot of confusion and firing going on but the Marines of 2nd platoon performed superbly under the leadership of outstanding NCOs.

Lima Company eventually took the other portion of Hill 689 but suffered several casualties to include the Company Commander being killed and one of the platoon leaders being seriously wounded. 1st platoon took heavy casualties including the death of my friend, Dale Allen. Dale had not been in country very long and this was probably his first real fire fight. Of course, that probably could have been said about many Marines who were there that day.

Once Lima Company had secured their portion of the objective, medevacs were made with the most serious going out first and for some of us who had suffered slighter wounds, flown back to the Aid Station at the Combat Base, treated and then returned to the Hill.

Top of Hill 689 after the Fight

(Photo courtesy of Steve Greene of India 3/26)

Upon my return to the Hill I noted that more units from the Battalion to include the Battalion Command Group had arrived on the Hill. That evening, Mike Company, as I recall, moved through our lines and assumed defensive positions. Also that evening, a General from 3rd Marine Division, I believe it was the Assistant Division Commander, flew out to the Hill and complimented the Marines on an outstanding job. Of course, because of the many casualties, not many of us were thinking about it as being an outstanding job. All we could think about was those who had been killed or wounded and wondered who of the wounded who been lifted out would make it. That was one of the strange anomalies of that War in that most times you didn't have time to dwell on the casualties as they were medevaced out so quickly, you didn't know who lived or who died. We always wanted to believe that most of them had survived. But in retrospect, yes it had been an outstanding job on the part of the Marines who fought that day, many of whom fought their last battle. They fought as Marines have always fought with mission accomplishment in mind and for each other as brother Marines. They have the right to be proud of what they did that day.

Chopper Carrying Bn. Command Group

(Photo courtesy of Steve Greene of India 3/26)

CPT Coulter briefs 3 / 26 Bn. Command Group on Hill 689 after the assault.

(Photo courtesy of Steve Greene of India 3/26)

The next day, as I remember, we mopped up the area and found several NVA bodies but also found one living wounded who was brought back to me. He smelled horribly and was high on self medicated pain meds and had to be carried. When he saw me, he spit in my face. We then turned him over to the Company who in turn turned him over to the Battalion S-2. We then stayed in the field operating until returning to the Combat Base around the 4th of July. After June 27, no significant contact was made that I can recall.

Wounded NVA

(Photo courtesy of Steve Greene of India 3/26)

Clean-up after fighting on 689

(Photo courtesy of Steve Greene of India 3/26)

No awards were issued to Marines from India Company that I know of for actions that day but many Marines performed over and above that which would normally be expected under those conditions. I heard later that of the recommendations for awards which had been submitted , they were rejected on the basis that these Marines were just doing what was expected of a grunt Marine. Maybe they were right but I saw Marines decorated for far less than what I saw Marines do that day. As was said about the fighting on Iwo Jima, "Uncommon Valor was a Common Virtue". That too was true of those Marines who fought on Hill 689, June 27, 1967.

Account of Robert E. Stimson, XO, India Company 3/26 on Hill 689

Bob Stimson was India CO. XO, and replaced Dale Allen as 1st Plt. commander when Allen was KIA on Hill 689. In an E-mail dated 1/10/2009. PST, Stimson wrote:

Good morning Tony. Appears accurate and complete, as far as I can remember. Well done. The little bit I can add follows:

As company XO, I was at the rear of the column coming up the hill. When I reached the top, both 1st and 2nd Platoons were heavily engaged on their respective portions of the Hill 689 saddle. Immediately upon arriving at Captain Coulter's position, he told me 2nd Lt. Allen was "down" (extent not clear at that point) and that he wanted me to take over command of the 1st platoon.

It was about a 20 meter run across the crest of the hill to the 1st Platoon; very difficult, up, down, run some more, zig zag but LCpl Schaeffer (radio man) and I finally made it. The situation I found when I got there was chaotic, i.e. Platoon Commander 2nd Lt. Allen KIA, Platoon Guide Sgt. Bailey severely wounded, Squad Leader Corporal DiCesare KIA, other KIA/WIA as well, no tactical integrity to speak of (too many casualties), heavy, very accurate fire from the NVA. After some time, I found the Platoon Sgt. (can't remember his name) but he appeared to be injured as well so I moved on.

We didn't have much to work with. I was finally able to get the remaining men into more or less of a skirmish line and as best we could began engaging the NVA with rifle fire and hand grenades (LCpl Lindsay, later KIA on 10 Sept., displaying exceptional fortitude in partially standing and kneeling throwing his grenades with great accuracy and effect). 2nd Platoon on the other part of the hill also began supporting us with machine gun fire which was welcome to be certain.

At that point I was beginning to request mortar/artillery fire from the Captain, the intention being to follow with an assault on the NVA positions. He told me rather to maintain our position as relief (I believe Lima Co.) would be coming up the hill on our left flank. This we did.

You've covered the rest of it in your recollections so I will leave it at this point. Hill 689 was a violent affair to be sure. The NVA were as tough as I had ever seen them and their fire as intense as anything I'd experienced. The 1st Platoon Marines did their jobs under very difficult circumstances in a highly professional and exemplary manner.

Let me know if you have any questions or comments.

Best regards,

Bob

Account of Frank McCarthy, commander of 3rd platoon, Lima Company 3/26, wounded on Hill 689

On the night of 26 June, Lima Company was in the field on a search and destroy operation; I believe, south of Rt. 9. By the morning of the 27th we had been in the field for more than a week and were looking forward to our return to the base for a hot meal and showers. On the morning of 27 June we were to rendezvous with a truck convoy on Rt. 9 for transportation back to the Khe Sanh combat base. During the early morning hours of the 27th the base had been pounded by a persistent NVA mortar attack.

Immediately upon our arrival back at Khe Sanh we received orders to have the troops report to the LZ and officers and staff NCO’s to report to the Battalion S3 to receive a briefing and operation order. During the briefing, we were informed that a Combined Action Unit had been ambushed on hill 689 and that four Marines were MIA. The CAP unit believed they knew where the mortars came from that hit the base that morning. Also, India Company, who was in the immediate area to the north of 689, was attempting to reach the crest of the hill but was taking very heavy fire from the NVA unit dug in on the crest. We were told that India Company was taking heavy casualties. The OP order had Lima Company land by helicopter on the opposite side of 689 and assault from the south in order to relieve the pressure on India Company. Artillery and/or air strikes were out of the question due to the fact that we did not know the location of the four missing Marines.

My platoon was assigned as the assault platoon. Upon arrival it was determined, due to the steepness of the hillside, that there was no suitable landing area. We were forced to jump from the helicopters while they hovered above the elephant grass growing on the slopes of 689. Not knowing how deep the elephant grass was made the jump a problem. We were only several feet above the top of the grass but did not know if the grass was four feet high or one foot high...needless to say the landing drove a few knees into a few stomachs. While in the air I made a mental note of the terrain...Also, we had been on that very same hill just a week or so earlier. There was a high point to the left as one faced the ridge...I wanted to use it to set up a base of fire with one squad plus machine guns and assault with the remaining two squads. I was, instead, ordered by the CO to make a frontal assault immediately with all three squads. It took few minutes to cross a gully and maneuver the platoon into position to assault. While doing that I changed the frequency on my radio and called the India Company Commander. I asked if he had a 3.5 rocket launcher handy...He answered “affirmative.” I asked him to fire a white phosphorous round at the NVA strong point. In just a few seconds when the round went off I asked if it was a good hit. The answer again was in the affirmative. I requested that India Company cease fire and immediately began the assault.

It seemed, at the time, that the actual assault took only a few minutes. As we reached the top of the ridge and made our way to the far side, the silence became deafening. I immediately began to establish a defensive perimeter. As we crossed the ridge we found two of the missing Marines on the crest...they were both KIA.

I began to follow a wire up the ridge...soon I was face to face with a Chinese Claymore mine. I turned and traced the wire the other way. It soon disappeared into a spider hole. I fired two rounds from my 12 gauge into the hole and pulled the cover off only to find a dead NVA soldier with the trigger to the claymore in his hands. Within a short time the Company Command group arrived on the hill. Soon after a Marine fired a pistol into a hole in the ground believing that the green at the bottom was a NVA uniform. The hole exploded with a roar...the Marine who fired the shots was very seriously wounded. I believe the Claymore was supposed to be the signal, however, when the hole exploded it was mistaken to be the signal and the NVA came out of their spider holes and began firing which soon, due to the close proximity, in many cases, turned into hand-to-hand combat. Within seconds I was informed that my Company Commander (Captain Bynum) was wounded. I began to make my way to Captain Bynum but was wounded myself within the first fifty meters. Again, within just a short span, the top of the hill fell silent again. A search of the area soon found the remaining two MIA Marines. Again, they were both KIA. In fact, the NVA who shot me in the back from his spider hole, and was soon thereafter killed, had two M-16s in his hole with him. I believe they must have belonged to the CAP Marines. It was dark before we were finally evacuated to Khe Sanh. Captain Bynum died soon after arrival there...I was evacuated to Danang and then to the Hospital Ship USS Sanctuary where I remained for more than two months.

Also...The missing KIA mentioned was Lima Company’s artillery forward observer. The two Marines...PFC Brent and Williams were members of my platoon killed during the assault and subsequent hand to hand combat. Finally, I do not believe that the photograph representing Captain Bynum is, in fact, Captain Bynum. I could be wrong...but it does not look anything like what I remember Captain Bynum looking like.

I hope this sheds some light on the assault of hill 689.

Semper Fi

Frank McCarthy

Maj. USMC Ret.

(Ed. Note: CPT Bynum's picture on In Memoriam was verified by at least one of his men. It is possible that MAJ McCarthy's memory of him is as he was in Vietnam, whereas the picture shown on the In Memoriam page looks like one taken at OCS. I submit that most of us changed considerably after a short time in country.

Account of LCPL Michael J. Padula, 2nd Platoon, I Company 3/26

(Submitted to LTCOL "Tony" Anthony, edited by F. J. Taylor)

I really don’t remember the night that preceded our patrol to 689. I didn’t know where we were going or why.

I do remember seeing gooks running on top of a hill. However, I didn’t realize it was the hill we were about to assault. As such, I had no fear or apprehensions. My lack of knowledge created a false impression so that I was unfazed by the coming assault.

2nd platoon was in the lead as we started up the hill. It was Molina, Heller, you, then me. I remember clearly shrapnel blowing through the canopy the closer we got to the top. Molina had difficulty in pulling the pin on the smoke grenade which would mark our position.

You gave the order to fix bayonets. The clasp on my bayonet was pretty much rusted shut. I had to open it with my teeth. Once I placed the bayonet on my rifle I totally grasped the situation.

As we crested the hill, 2nd platoon turned right and the 1st turned left. Almost immediately, Heller & Molina were wounded by a hand grenade thrown from a spider hole. You spotted the hole and told Corky Dill and myself to eliminate the gook. I covered Dill who I believe shot through the top of closed spider hole, then rolled a grenade into the hole. If we had any other casualties at this time, I do not remember.

It appeared that we were being attacked from our immediate front and right flank. You ordered one squad forward and one to right. I and the rest of my squad stayed adjacent to you and the radio. It is probably at that time I learned that Lima Company was coming to join the fight.

Within minutes one of the men sent to front position came running back. He was wounded in the arm and advised you that all the other Marines were either dead or wounded.

You then ordered me and a 3 man machine gun section to that position. I believe the gunners name was Ellis or Ellison. If I remember correctly he had crooked teeth. I used to call him Snaggle Tooth. We got into position and just waited.

In short order I remember men coming through the high elephant grass. They were waving at us. Initially we thought it was Lima Company. As they got closer, we realized it was an assault. It seemed like a million, but it was probably closer to 20 or 30.

For some odd reason I remember being in the sitting position and shooting at the gooks. I was sweating so profusely that my glasses slipped off my head. I kept firing at figures not men. I changed magazines several times. During one of the changes my rifle jammed. I cleared my weapon and resumed firing. However, I was in an extreme panic state while un-jamming my rifle.

All of a sudden, it was quiet. We waited for a second assault that never came.

I crawled to of one of the Marines who had initially been sent to the position. He was wounded in the foot and ankle. Before I could do anything the Marine yelled that there was another gook running back towards the elephant grass. From the kneeling position I shot and hit the gook in the back just below his head with a tracer.

I was stunned. I remember that my mouth and eyes were wide open. I looked at the wounded Marine, who just shrugged his shoulders. This incident seemed to have taken place in slow motion. Ellis’ accuracy was the main reason for our success.

Almost immediately after this I was joined by Dill, a big Mohawk Indian named Brooks from upstate NY. I don’t remember the 3rd man.

For some unknown reason we counter-attacked. We captured a machine gun from a position, which had been knocked out by Snaggle Tooth. We kept firing at the gooks; however I honestly don’t believe we hit any of them.

We then observed Sgt Burton signal us to come back. While doing so we came upon a wounded gook. I placed my weapon on automatic and shot him from his crotch to the head, Dill did the same.

After returning to our position believe Frenchy (Marcel DeSaulnier) & I observed the 1st platoon in action on the opposite ridge.

I remember being hungry and shared pound cake with someone. I told this Marine that I felt bad that killing someone didn’t bother me. He told that is B.S. for the movies. To this day, it still doesn’t bother me.

As we were getting reorganized I remember you on the radio. The Medivac pilot was questioning you why the number of casualties had increased since the initial alert. You told him to come over and find out.

I don’t remember how many choppers came in. I don’t remember placing anyone on the choppers. I do remember all the dead begin collected in one area. I don’t know when they were removed, nor did I help place them on a chopper.

Marcel (Frenchy) was very upset that his best friend Tony DiCesare had been killed. He was a nice guy from Jersey.

That night I and another Marine were in a hole. The elephant grass was thick and there was a fog or haze. Periodically during the night some Marines would throw a grenade. I remember neither one of us slept. It was a long night.

I don’t know if the next incident occurred immediately after the firefight or the next day. Santana captured a big Chinese adviser, who had been wounded. I couldn’t believe how big the guy was.

The next morning there was brass coming in from every place. Due to their presence we had to policy the area. This just annoyed the hell out of me.

Don’t remember how we got off the hill or when. Do remember when we got back to Khe Sanh there was a memorial service. My two closes buddies, Heller and Molina had been medivac’d out.

Account of Thomas F. Peavey, 2nd Platoon, I Company 3/26

(Submitted by LCPL Peavey on 2/28/2008 to LTCOL "Tony" Anthony, edited by F. J. Taylor)

Dear Tony,

I remember the night before a few of us were singing and that is when the rockets started coming in to the air strip. I don't know for sure where they landed but it sure woke everyone up.

The next day they sent 1st and 2nd plts out toward 689 and 3rd plt went up to 918 and started to search that ridge line. I remember we were looking up toward the hill where we were heading and we saw the NVA running across the saddle from the right to the left, and everyone was getting excited. I also remember that we had to keep shooting off pop flares so the jet air craft would not bomb us.

I remember we came to the edge of the jungle and you told everyone to fix bayonets and that this is where we earned our combat pay. Then you said follow me and took off in a run up the last 25 to 30 meters and we followed you and then we hit the top we got on line there were only 5 of us then as far as I know. You, your radioman (name escapes me), Mo, Cpl Williams and myself we started to sweep forward and that's when Mo, Cpl Williams and your radioman were wounded and then the rest of the plt came up behind us. Then that NVA tried to run down the opposite side of the hill and everyone was yelling kill the bastard and they did. Then you gave me the radio and told me to watch the tree line over to the right and you took off with the rest of the plt. Then you came back got me and we went back toward where the plt was and came across that small fighting hole in the tall grass and you told me to frag it and I did, but got knocked down by the blast but was ok and you ran up and pulled me back to my feet and asked if I was ok. That is about all I can tell you, except you should have gotten a Medal that day you was everywhere. Thank God we had you for a PLT Leader.

Thomas F. Peavey

Account of Teruo ("Skosh") Yorita, H & S Company, 3/26

(From a series of E-mails from the late Teruo Yorita [see In Memoriam] of I 3/26, to F. J. Taylor.)

"I was assigned to India Company as a Bn. Radio Operator (2533), from 3/26 H&S, humping those hills and in this particular action, we had to climb a steep hill (one step up, two steps sliding down type) to get to the CAC unit, in trouble. I think Lima was helo lifted, but can't be sure. All I know is that India took number of casualties, including 6 or 7 KIA. I believe Lima 6 (Ed. Note: the CO) was KIA, as well.

One of the KIA from India Company happened to be a Hispanic Marine named Alejandro Godinez from L.A.

Alex is one of the few Marines I remember well, as a friend and a comrade in arms. We had some mutual acquaintances in East LA and I got to know him fairly well, although you don't want to make friends with too many people, as the loss is more than painful, to say the least. However, in case of Alex, we talked about the Roosevelt High, his religious upbringing and school. I believe he was a member of the "White Knight" (?)

His death has affected me to this day, though mostly my memories of him were pleasant, as he still lives in my heart and mind, until the day I depart this world.

He died in my arms, despite my very best efforts to revive him with CPR (Mouth to Mouth) while Doc worked on heart massage. He lost a lot of blood from his wound and he just went into shock. Based on the wound, I do not think he would have made it, unless he received transfusion, immediately. Alex's last word was a cry for his mother, as he was dying. I guess its true, when you are about to pass from this world, you do cry out for the loved one.

What I do remember is that when one of our guys flushed out the "sniper" who was getting to many of our guys, and was immediately "blasted" by many M-16s. I am very ashamed to admit, I cheered, like during a Football games, when we finally got him. I guess I have to live with that memory, for rest of my life.

So much for my war story. Although difficult, I finally was able to face my "Demons" and am now fairly active in Veteran's activities, including Marine Corps Support Unit, here in Seattle, Wa. area."