Publications and Accepted Papers
Publications
Capacity Design in School Choice (with Oguz Afacan and Martin Van der Linden) accepted Games and Economic Behavior. (Older Version)
Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools (with Tommy Andersson, Sinan Ertemel, and Onur Kesten) accepted Social Choice and Welfare
A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism in the School Choice Problem (with Scott Paiment) forthcoming Mathematical Social Sciences
Increasing the Representation of a Targeted Group in a Reserve System (with Abdullah Almeer, Will Harris, Greg Hauser, William Phan, and Yanning Zhang) forthcoming Mathematical Social Sciences
Fairness under Affirmative Action Policies with Overlapping Reserves (with Yanning Zhang) Journal of Mathematical Economics, 109 (2023)
Size Improvement: Is it Possible? (with Oguz Afacan) The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 125 (2023)
Responsiveness to Priority-Based Affirmative Action Policy in School Choice (with Yifan Xie) Journal of Public Economic Theory, 25 (2023)
Family Ties: School Assignment With Siblings (with Thayer Morrill and William Phan) Theoretical Economics, 17 (2022)
Deduction Dilemmas:The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism (with Parag Pathak, Fei Song and Tayfun Sönmez) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (2022)
School Choice with Hybrid Schedules (with Oguz Afacan and William Harris) GAMES: Special Issue on School Choice (2021)
Sequential School Choice:Theory and Evidence from the Field and Lab (with Robert Hammond and Onur Kesten) Journal of Economic Theory, 198 (2021)
Explicit vs. Statistical Targeting in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago’s Exam Schools (with Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez) Journal of Economic Theory, 187 (2020)
What You Don't Know Can Help You in School Assignment (with Thayer Morrill) Games and Economic Behavior, 120 (2020): 246-256
Constrained Stability in Two-Sided Matching Markets (with Oguz Afacan) Social Choice and Welfare, 55 (2020): 477-494
Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange (with Utku Ünver) Journal of Political Economy, 127 (2019): 1156-1177
School Choice with Partial Fairness (with Arda Gitmez and Ozgur Yilmaz) Extended Web Version Theoretical Economics, 14 (2019): 1309-1346
Sequential versus Simultaneous Assignment Processes and Two Applications (with Onur Kesten) Economic Theory, 68 (2019): 251-283
School Choice with Neighbors (Older Version) (with Thomas Wiseman) Journal of Mathematical Economics, 83 (2019): 101-109
The Modified Boston Mechanism Mathematical Social Sciences 101 (2019): 31-40
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and The Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones (with Scott Kominers, Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez) Journal of Political Economy, 126 (2018): 2457-2479
The Secure Mechanism: Theory and Experiments (with Robert Hammond and Thayer Morrill) Supplemental Appendix Experimental Economics, 22 (2018): 918-953
Competitive Equilibria in School Assignment (with Thayer Morrill) Games and Economic Behavior, 108 (2018):269-274
Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms (with Robert Hammond and Thayer Morrill) American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10(1) (2018):187-213
First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms (with Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken) EC'18 Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, (2018):251-268
Incompatibility of Stability and Consistency (with Oguz Afacan) Economics Letters, 150 (2017):135-137
When Preference Misreporting is Harm[less]ful? (with Oguz Afacan) Journal of Mathematical Economics, 72 (2017):16-24
Many-to-one Matchings without Substitutability (with Devrim Ikizler) Economics Letters, 144 (2016):123-126
Accepted Papers
The Impossibility of Restricting Tradeable Priorities in School Assignment (with Thayer Morrill) accepted with minor revision Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Working Papers
Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools (with Julien Combe, Olivier Tercieux, Camille Terrier and Utku Unver), revise and resubmit American Economic Review
The Attraction of Magnet Schools: Evidence from Embedded Lotteries in School Assignment (with Robert Hammond, Matthew Lenard, Melinda Morrill, Thayer Morrill, and Collen Paeplow)
Rematching with Contracts under Labor Mobility Restrictions: Theory and Application (with Robert Hammond and Utku Unver)
Allocating Medical Resources During a Pandemic (with Thayer Morrill and William Phan)
Improving the Deferred Acceptance with Minimal Compromise (with Oguz Afacan, Arda Gitmez and Ozgur Yilmaz)
College Admission with Complementarities (with Azar Abizada)
School Choice with Match Quality (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Aram Grigoryan)
Seat Allocation Problem in Public Transportation (with Oguz Afacan and Ayse Dur)
Retired Papers
The Dynamic School Choice Problem