My research interests are centered on questions of macroeconomic policy design. One topic of interest is monetary and fiscal policy interactions: the design of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool and strategic interactions between the two policy makers. My recent research was on how inflexible and irresponsible fiscal policy can restrict the stabilisation effectiveness of monetary policy. I looked at whether delegation of monetary policy to an inflation-conservative central bank can improve social welfare if the fiscal policymaker acts strategically. I also studied the role of the leadership structure of policy interactions.
My second topic of interest is the design of time-consistent (monetary) policy. Such policy is inherently credible, and arguably most realistic description of what central banks actually do, but it can lead to multiple equilibria or expectations traps. A failure of agents to coordinate may result in a bad outcome with high volatility of economic variables. In my research, I am investigating how an economy may arrive at a bad equilibrium and suggest changes in the institutional structure that can help to prevent such outcomes. My research is predominantly theoretical, but I do some empirical work, using the Bayesian estimation technique for DSGE models.
More details about my research and also some related topics I am interested in can be found on my Research page.
I am interested in supervising PhD dissertations which focus would be reasonably close to these topics.