Research
Working papers Journal articles Conference proceedings Book chapters
Working papers Journal articles Conference proceedings Book chapters
Working papers
Full implementation via information design in nonatomic games, with Frédéric Koessler and Marco Scarsini.
Mediated communication with coarse messages, joint with Maël Le Treust
Belief Based Approach to Signaling, joint with Frédéric Koessler and Marie Laclau, accepted at the twenty-fifth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) 2024, Yale
A Converse Bound on the Mismatched Distortion-Rate Function, joint with Maël Le Treust, IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Athens, 2024
Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder, joint with Maël le Treust, IEEE Information Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Melbourne, 2021
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games, joint with Stefano Lovo
Comparison of Ambiguous Experiments joint with Fabien Gensbittel and Ludovic Renou
The controlled biased coin problem, Cahier de recherche du CEREMADE, n° 0522/2005 (en coll. avec O. Gossner).
Journal articles
Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games, joint with Frédéric Koessler and Marco Scarsini, to appear in Mathematics of Operations Research
Contracting over Persistent Information, joint with Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti and Ludovic Renou, Theoretical Economics, 19, 917-974, 2024.
Splitting games over finite sets, joint with Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau and Jérôme Renault, Mathematical Programming, 2022.
Social Learning in Nonatomic Routing Games, joint with Emilien Macault and Marco Scarsini, Games and Economic Behavior 2022, 132, 221-233.
Long Information Design, joint with Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau and Jérôme Renault, Theoretical Economics, 2022, 17(2), 883-927.
Interactive Information Design joint with Frédéric Koessler and Marie Laclau, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022, 47(1), 153-175.
Optimality and fairness of partisan Gerrymandering, joint with Antoine Lagarde, Mathematical Programming 2021.
''Persuasion with limited communication capacity'' joint with Maël Le Treust. Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, 184. Journal version
"Zero-Sum Revision Games” joint with Fabien Gensbittel, Stefano Lovo and Jérôme Renault. Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, 108, 504-522.
“Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows”, joint with Marco Scarsini and Marc Schröder. Operations Research, 2018, 66(2), 327-339.
''Belief-free Price Formation” joint with Johannes Hörner and Stefano Lovo. Journal of Financial Economics, 2018, 127 (2), 342-365.
''Repeated Games with Public Deterministic Monitoring'' joint with Marie Laclau. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 169, May 2017, 400-424.
''Approximate Implementation In Markovian Environments'' joint with Ludovic Renou, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 159, Part A, September 2015, 401-442.
''Secure message transmission on directed networks'', joint with Ludovic Renou and Jérôme Renault, Games and Economic Behavior, May 2014, vol. 85 (1), 1-18.
''Belief-free Communication Equilibria'', Mathematics of Operations Research, November 2013, Vol. 38 (4), 617-637
''Mechanism design and communication networks'' (en coll. avec L. Renou), Theoretical Economics, September 2012, vol. 7 (3), 489-533
''The Efficiency of Selfish Routing in Repeated Congestion Games'' (en coll. avec M. Scarsini), International Journal of Game Theory, August 2012, vol. 41 (3), 651-669.
''Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information'' (en coll. avec Y. Heller et E. Solan), Games and Economic Behavior, January 2012, vol. 74 (1), 222-234.
''General properties of long run supergames'' (en coll. avec J. Renault), Dynamic Games and Applications, June 2011, vol. 1 (2), 319-350.
''Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence'' (en coll. avec J. Hörner et S. Lovo), Journal of Economic Theory, september 2011, vol. 146 (5), 1770-1795.
"Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems", Operations Research vol. 59 (3), 754-763, 2011.
"Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring", janvier 2011 (en coll. avec P. Contou-Carrère), Journal of Mathematical Economics 47 (2011), pp. 14-21.
"Informationaly optimal correlation", Mathematical Programming B, Janvier 2009, vol. 116, n° 1-2, pp. 147-172 (en coll. avec O. Gossner, R. Laraki).
"Playing off-line games with bounded rationality", Mathematical Social Sciences, septembre 2008, vol. 56, n° 2, pp. 207-223 (en coll. avec J. Renault, M. Scarsini).
«The emergence of complex social networks, a discussion», Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2008, n° 86.
«Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks», Journal of Cryptology, avril 2008, vol. 21, n° 2, pp. 250-279 (en coll. avec J. Renault).
«Entropy bounds on Bayesian Learning», Journal of Mathematical Economics, janvier 2008, vol. 44, n° 1, pp. 24-32 (en coll. avec O. Gossner)
«Repeated Games with Public Signal and Bounded Recall», Mathematics of Operations Research, novembre 2007, vol. 32, n° 4, pp. 873-889 (en coll. avec J. Renault, M. Scarsini).
«Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring», Mathematics of Operations Research, mai 2007, vol. 32, n° 2 (en coll. avec O. Gossner).
«Empirical Distributions of beliefs under imperfect monitoring», Mathematics of Operations Research, février 2006, vol. 31, n° 1, pp. 13-31 (en coll. avec O. Gossner).
«Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring», Games and Economic Behavior, novembre 2004, vol. 49, n° 2, pp. 313-344 (en coll. avec J. Renault).
«Learning the state of nature in repeated game with incomplete information and signals», Games and Economic Behavior, avril 2004, vol. 47, n° 1, pp. 124-156 (en coll. avec J. Renault).
«Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors», Games and Economic Behavior, août 1999, vol. 28, n° 2, pp. 310-324
«Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation», International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, n° 1, pp. 93-109.
«Repeated proximity games», International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, n° 4, pp. 539-559 (en coll. avec J. Renault).
Conference proceedings
Le Treust, M. and Tomala, T., Strategic Communication with Decoder Side Information, IEEE Information Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Melbourne, Australia, 2021.
Le Treust, M. and Tomala, T., Point-to-Point Strategic Communication, IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), Riva del Garda, Italy, 2020.
Macault, E., Scarsini, M. and Tomala, T., Learning in Routing Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information, WINE 2020.
Book chapters
“Repeated Games”, with Olivier Gossner, in Meyers, Robert (Ed.). Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Vol LXXX, Springer New York, 2009.
Théorie des jeux, Introduction à la théorie des jeux répétés, Editions de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 2006 (en coll. avec Rida Laraki, Jérôme Renault). In French. Chapitre 1: Jeux sous forme normale. Chapitre 2: Jeux répétés.