Research
Publications
Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasiliner preferences, with Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa, Journal of Economic Theory, 188, 2020.
Mechanism design without quasilinearity, with Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa, Theoretical Economics, 15, 511-544, 2020.
Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects, with Tomoya Tajika, International Journal of Game Theory, 48, 543-569, 2019.
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences, with Shigehiro Serizawa, Social Choice and Welfare, 47, 633-663, October 2016.
Working papers
Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited, with Keisuke Bando and Kenzo Imamura ( EC 2024)
When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems? Discussion paper No. E-21-008, Kyoto University.
Version: February 2022
An earlier version with more figures
Multi-unit object allocation problems with money for (non)decreasing incremental valuations: Impossibility and characterization theorems, with Hiroki Shinozaki and Shigehiro Serizawa, ISER Discussion paper No. 1097.
Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money, with Masahiro Kawasaki and Ryosuke Sakai, Discussion Paper No. E-23-007, Kyoto University.