Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money, with Masahiro Kawasaki and Ryosuke Sakai, Economic Theory, accepted.
Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: Decreasing incremental valuations with income effects, with Hiroki Shinozaki and Shigehiro Serizawa, Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasiliner preferences, with Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa, Journal of Economic Theory, 188, 2020.
Mechanism design without quasilinearity, with Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa, Theoretical Economics, 15, 511-544, 2020.
Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects, with Tomoya Tajika, International Journal of Game Theory, 48, 543-569, 2019.
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences, with Shigehiro Serizawa, Social Choice and Welfare, 47, 633-663, October 2016.
Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited, with Keisuke Bando and Kenzo Imamura, The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24)
Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: The necessity of gross substitutes with Keisuke Bando and Kenzo Imamura
Version: July 2025
When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems? Discussion paper No. E-21-008, Kyoto University.
Version: February 2022
An earlier version with more figures