Current Position
Professor of Economics,
Department of Economics and Graduate School of International Social Sciences,
CV
Contact
kumano-taro-sp [at] ynu.ac.jp
tkumano2008 [at] gmail.com
Research
Fields of Interest
Market Design, Microeconomic Theory
Publications/Accepted papers:
Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties (2019) link
with Aytek Erdil, Journal of Economic Theory, 184, 104950.
An earlier version was circulated with the title "Prioritizing Diversity in School Choice"
Extended Abstract of an earliest version is in Proceedings of the Second Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA 2011), LNICST 80, pp.60-61. Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (2012).
Corrigendum to "Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties" [J. Econ. Theory 184 (2019) 104950] (2022) link
with Aytek Erdil, Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura, Journal of Economic Theory, 203, 105470.
Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities (2017) link
Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 230-240.
Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: an almost impossibility result (2013) link
Journal of Public Economics, 105, 23-29.
Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules (2012) link
with Masahiro Watabe, Games and Economic Behavior, 75(1), 428-434.
Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm (2011) link
with Masahiro Watabe, Economics Letters, 112(2), 135-137.
Working Papers:
Efficient and (or) fair allocations for market-wise admissible sets (2024), [joint with Wataru Ishida and Yusuke Iwase] available upon request
Fertility decline and school choice: implications for policy (2023), [joint with Kyohei Marutani and Seiji Takanashi]
Stability and Local Substitutability (2022), [joint with Kyohei Marutani]
An earlier version was circulated with the title "Matching with interdependent choices"
Quota Adjustment Process (2022), [joint with Morimitsu Kurino] Revise and Resubmit at American Economic Review
Dominant strategy implementation of the doctor-optimal stable rule with bilateral contracts (2022), [joint with Wataru Ishida] Revise and Resubmit at International Journal of Game Theory
Designing the Market Structure in Matching Problems (2019), [joint with Morimitsu Kurino and Kyohei Marutani]
Old papers:
Acyclicity, Robust Stability and Nash Implementation (2010), [joint with Masahiro Watabe]
Efficient Resource Allocation under Acceptant Substitutable Priorities (2009), SSRN
Teaching
2024 - 2025:
Public Economics (Grad) April - July
Public Economics (Undergrad) April - July
Undergrad Research Seminar:
Kumano Seminar (in Japanese)
Risk Loving students ( * main advisor)
Kyohei Marutani* (BA 2015 @ YNU)
Bachelor thesis "Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted," published! link
Currently, a lecturer @ Kwansei Gakuin University
Yusuke Iwase (BA 2017 @ YNU)
Bachelor thesis "Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts," published! link
Currently, a senior lecturer @ Nihon University
Wataru Ishida* (BA 2017 @ YNU)
Bachelor thesis "How to find a stable and efficient matching: the Top Trading cycles mechanism for weak priorities"
Currently, a senior lecturer @ Yokohama National University
Akina Yoshimura* (BA 2020 @ YNU)
Shoya Tsuruta (BA 2020 @ YNU)
Currently, @ Japan Finance Corporation
Asuka Hirano* (BA 2022 @YNU)
Bachelor thesis "A strategy-proof and ex post efficient probabilistic assignment mechanism on the full preference domain"
Currently, a grad student @ Penn State University
Ryoken Nagashima* (BA 2022@YNU)
Bachelor thesis "Nash implementation of weakly stable matchings with distributional constraints"
Currently, a grad student @ Kyoto University
Yuki Adachi* (BA 2025@YNU)
Currently, a grad student @ University of Tokyo
Taiyo Inamura* (BA 2025@YNU)
Bachelor thesis "Pareto-dominant stable matchings under distributional constraints and indifferent priorities"
Currently, a free man!!!
Yuji Matsutani* (BA 2028@YNU expected)
Last Update: Aug. 21, 2025