Takeharu Sogo :
Associate professor, SKEMA Business School, France.
(Research Fellow, RIEB, Kobe University, Japan)
Research Interests: Auction Theory, Mergers and Acquisitions, Information Economics
Associate professor, SKEMA Business School, France.
(Research Fellow, RIEB, Kobe University, Japan)
Research Interests: Auction Theory, Mergers and Acquisitions, Information Economics
Transparency and Innovation in Organizations with Osamu Hayashida and Kimiyuki Morita
Journal of Industrial Economics, Forthcoming
Accepted Working Paper version
Optimal Contracts Under Interpersonal Projection with Kimiyuki Morita and Akitoshi Muramoto
Games and Economic Behavior 2025
Accepted Working Paper version
Costly Auction Entry, Royalty Payments, and the Optimality of Asymmetric Designs with Dan Bernhardt and Tingjun Liu
Journal of Economic Theory 2020
Accepted Working Paper version
Competition among Procrastinators
Theory and Decision 2019
Accepted Working Paper version
Part of an earlier version appears as conference proceedings in Journal of Behavioral Economics and Finance. Proceedings, the 9th Annual Meeting. Vol. 8 (2015) p.62-65.
Effects of Seller's Information Disclosure in Equity Auctions Requiring Post-Auction Investment
International Journal of Industrial Organization 2017
Accepted Working Paper version
Optimal Product Placement with Chia-Ling Hsu, Rafael Matta, and Sergey Popov
Review of Industrial Organization 2017
Endogenous Entry To Security-Bid Auctions with Dan Bernhardt and Tingjun Liu
American Economic Review 2016
Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders with Akitoshi Muramoto
2nd R&R at Journal of Economic Theory
See here for the proof of Theorem 1. It shows why restricting to symmetric mechanisms is without loss of generality when bidders are ex-ante identical and expected-utility maximizers. We just rewrote Footnote 11 of Maskin and Riley (1984) in a rigorous style.
Consumer Search under Changing Tastes with Akitoshi Muramoto and Cong Pan
In preparation.
Attractivity, Rentability: The Strategy of the Lead Lender in the Syndicated Loan Market with Aurore Burietz and Paolo Mazza
In preparation.
Planned Opaqueness in Securitization (with Keiichi Kawai) (2016), SSRN
PhD in Economics, University of Illinois
Takeharu Sogo
十河丈晴
Email: sogotakeharu[at]gmail.com