Takeharu Sogo (十河丈晴)

Associate professor, SKEMA Business School, France.
(Research Fellow, RIEB, Kobe University, Japan)

Research Interests: Auction Theory, Mergers and Acquisitions, Information Economics

Optimal Contracts Under Interpersonal Projection (with Kimiyuki Morita and Akitoshi Muramoto). 2025. Games and Economic Behavior, 150: 356-364. (Accepted Working Paper version)
Costly Auction Entry, Royalty Payments, and the Optimality of Asymmetric Designs (with Dan Bernhardt and Tingjun Liu). 2020.
Journal of Economic Theory, 188: 105041. (Accepted Working Paper version)
Competition among Procrastinators. 2019. Theory and Decision, 86(3): 325-337. (Accepted Working Paper version)
- - Part of an earlier version appears as conference proceedings in Journal of Behavioral Economics and Finance. Proceedings, the 9th Annual Meeting. Vol. 8 (2015) p.62-65.
Effects of Seller's Information Disclosure in Equity Auctions Requiring Post-Auction Investment. 2017.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 55(C): 166-181. (Accepted Working Paper version)
Optimal Product Placement (with Chia-Ling Hsu, Rafael Matta, and Sergey Popov). 2017. Review of Industrial Organization, 51(1): 127-145.
Endogenous Entry To Security-Bid Auctions (with Dan Bernhardt and Tingjun Liu). 2016. American Economic Review, 106(11): 3577-89.

Transparency and Innovation in Organizations (with Osamu Hayashida and Kimiyuki Morita) (Updated in October 2023), SSRN, R&R
- See here for the Online Appendix.
Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders (with Akitoshi Muramoto) (Updated in June 2024), SSRN, R&R
- See here for the proof of Theorem 1. It shows why restricting to symmetric mechanisms is without loss of generality when bidders are ex-ante identical and expected-utility maximizers. We just rewrote Footnote 11 of Maskin and Riley (1984) in a rigorous style.
Changing Tastes, Projection Bias, and Consumer Search (with Akitoshi Muramoto and Cong Pan), in preparation.
Attractivity, Rentability: The Strategy of the Lead Lender in the Syndicated Loan Market (with Aurore Burietz and Paolo Mazza), in preparation.
Planned Opaqueness in Securitization (with Keiichi Kawai) (2016), SSRN

PhD in Economics, University of Illinois

Takeharu Sogo

十河丈晴

Email: sogotakeharu[at]gmail.com