The 171st meeting jointly organized with International Public Policy Seminar
Date Friday, October 17, 2025 13:30 to 15:00
Place Only in-person at Conference Room , 6th floor, Osaka School of International Public Policy Building, Toyonaka Campus. http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/en/about-osipp/where-we-are/
Presenter Ayumu Banzawa, Graduate School of Economics, The University of Osaka.
Title: “Was a ‘Reichsbahn’ before the First World War necessary? : A reassessment of railway integration and nationalization” (with Hidaka, Takuro)
Abstract:
We re-examine what may be termed a long-standing myth in the historiography of German railways—namely, the notion that the unification of the railway industry at the national level was the inevitable outcome of Germany’s railway development. We use quantitative analysis to assess whether the German Land (small and medium state)–owned railways in the 19th century required integration on the scale of a nation-state, as later realized under the German National Railway (Reichsbahn). For the period up to 1913, we apply Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and related indicators to trace the evolution of efficiency, which reveals improvements on the public side of operations. For each major variable under study (e.g., operating ratio and total factor productivity), we construct a “hypothetical national (-railway) series” aggregating the seven Land railways and employ a Bayesian Structural Time Series (BSTS) model to generate counterfactual forecasts for 1925–1930 under the continuation of pre-1913 trends. By comparing predictive distributions with actual outcomes, we estimate the probability that the forecasts would exceed the observed values. The analysis suggests that the postwar efficiency gains of the Reichsbahn were not the result of unification alone, but rather the product of large-scale organizational reforms and modernization undertaken under the conditions of defeat of the First World War. Thus, even if unification had occurred without the experience of defeat, it is unlikely that comparable rationalization effects would have been achieved.
The 170th meeting jointly organized with International Public Policy Seminar
Date Friday, July 18, 2025 13:30 to 15:00
Place Only in-person at Conference Room , 6th floor, Osaka School of International Public Policy Building, Toyonaka Campus. http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/en/about-osipp/where-we-are/
Presenter Ryuichi Tanaka, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo.
Title: "Was a ‘Reichsbahn’ before the First World War necessary? : A reassessment of railway integration and nationalization" (with Hidaka, Takuro)
Abstract:
This paper investigates the impact of a relaxation-oriented educational policy on the mental health of children and young adults. Exploiting Japan’s 2002 curriculum reform as an exogenous policy shock, we apply a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to examine how reduced instruction time affects student well-being. Our findings indicate that individuals exposed to more years of relaxed education experienced improved overall mental health outcomes. Mechanism analysis suggests that the mental health benefits stem from reductions in study hours and increased time for leisure and restorative activities. However, these effects are short-lived and tend to diminish as students progress into more competitive educational and labor market stages. The results highlight a potential health-wealth tradeoff, underscoring the need for carefully calibrated education reforms that balance short-term psychological relief with long-term academic and economic outcomes.
The 169th meeting jointly organized with International Public Policy Seminar
Date Friday, June 20, 2025 13:30 to 15:00
Place Held online
Presenter Junichi Yamasaki, Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University.
Title: "Where Does Regime Change Lead to Industrialization?" (with Masahiro Kubo, Ken Miura, and Michihiro Nakamura)
Abstract:
We examine how the Meiji Restoration, a major regime change, shaped urban growth in Japan. We focus on two channels: administrative
centralization and a shift in the geographic distribution of political elites—from samurai to high-asset taxpayers. Using digitized maps from
the 1900s and 1930s, we show that cities designated as new local capitals expanded in area, but distance to these capitals had no
effect on the growth of other cities. Public goods were also distributed evenly across space, reflecting the spatial distribution
of the high-asset taxpayers. Non-castle towns, deprioritized under the old regime due to having fewer samurai, grew more after the change.
Administrative and political transitions jointly shaped the economic geography of the non-agricultural sector.
The 168th meeting jointly organized with International Public Policy Seminar
Date Friday, May 16, 2025 13:30 to 15:00
Place Held online
Presenter Tadashi Sekiguchi, Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University.
Title: "Specialization vs. Rotation in Repeated Partnerships"
Abstract: In ongoing organizations, efficiency or total payoff maximization typically requires different members to make different types of efforts. The present paper studies how the organizations should allocate those different tasks to their members over time. We formulate a model of repeated partnerships consisting of homogeneous partners where efficiency is attained only by asymmetric stage action profiles. We focus on the efficient equilibrium behavior at the minimum discount factor under which an efficient repeated game equilibrium exists. A key feature which decides the equilibrium behavior is the relationship between the tasks and their associated degrees of moral hazard. In the case of two partners, we show that, depending on the relationship, any efficient equilibrium at the minimum discount factor exhibits random rotation, where the members switch their roles over time with a uniquely given probability. The probability can be either zero or one, so that the equilibrium exhibits pure rotation, where the role switching occurs every period on the path, or specialization, where the switching never occurs. This result explains both specialization and rotation, phenomena frequently observed in reality, from the viewpoint of incentives. We generalize those observations to the case of three or more partners.
The 167th meeting jointly organized with International Public Policy Seminar
Date Friday, April 18, 2025 13:30 to 15:00
Place Only in-person at Conference Room , 6th floor, Osaka School of International Public Policy Building, Toyonaka Campus. http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/en/about-osipp/where-we-are/
Presenter Toshihiro Matsumura, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo.
Title: "Optimal Energy-Saving Investments and Jevons Paradox in Duopoly Markets"
ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/121836.html
Abstract: This study theoretically investigates energy-saving investment incentives in duopolies.
First, we investigate a binary choice model in which each firm chooses whether to make an energy-saving investment and then they face Cournot competition.
We focus on the incentive to become the leading firm by the investment, when the rival does not engage in this project.
We find the private incentive to be insufficient for welfare (thereby requiring promotion through policies), if Pigouvian tax is imposed.
However, this incentive can be excessive when the emission tax rate is lower than the Pigouvian level.
Next, we investigate a model in which firms can choose energy-saving investment levels continuously.
We find that the equilibrium investment can be (is not) excessive for welfare when the emission tax rate is lower than (equal to) the Pigouvian.
These results suggest that policy formation combining a low emission tax and subsidies for promoting energy-saving investments may harm welfare.
Moreover, we find that drastic innovation rather than minor improvement of energy efficiency should be subsidized because the former less likely leads to Jevons paradox.