Research

Publications: 

Searching to Avoid Regret in Charitable Giving. Journal of the Economic Science Association. Volume 9, pages 207–226, (2023).

Searching to Avoid Regret: An Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Volume 189. September 2021, Pages 298-319. 

 Working Papers:

Communication in Delegation of Authority (new version coming soon)

Abstract: Effective delegation is considered to be a hallmark of successful leadership in the corporate world. Yet, the experimental literature shows that individuals have a robust preference for power which dissuades them from delegating decision rights to subordinates. An important element absent from these prior studies on delegation is communication between the principal and the agent. Communication builds trust and fosters cooperation between parties which can impact delegation rates in such settings. Thus, I incorporate this margin in the classic principal-agent framework (where delegation is the optimal choice for both parties) in the form of anonymous, pre-play communication. While communication does not increase overall delegation rates, it leads to increasing delegation rates over time. Communication also increases generosity of principals in power towards agents, as revealed through their choice of project. Consequentially, conditional on non-delegation of rights, agents earn more in the presence of communication. Additionally, along with the presence of adamant non-delegators, chat data reveals that more agents communicate their intended effort level over time, explaining the observed increasing delegation rates over time.

Legislative Bargaining over the Distribution of Costs versus Gains with Nels Christiansen, and John Kagel  (Submitted)

Abstract: The Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model is investigated with bargaining over Gains and Costs with equilibrium outcomes the same for risk neutral expected utility (EU) maximizers. Initial sessions showed less proposer power and higher rejection rates under Gains, contrary to EU maximization and prospect theory.  Additional sessions increased agents’ initial endowments, to allay voter’s concerns about losing their entire endowment under Costs. In these additional sessions, a null hypothesis that proposer power and rejection rates were the same for Costs and Gains cannot be rejected.  These changes resulted from increased proposer power and lower rejection rates under Gains, attributable to Weber’s law.    

When Is Inequality Fair? with Catherine Eckel, Haley Harwell, and Nicholas Lafferty 

Abstract: We conduct a lab experiment to investigate how preferences for income redistribution change as the source of income inequality changes. Subjects participate in six different tasks that determine their source of income, and one of these is selected at random to determine payoffs. The degree of inequality is held constant across sources, with half of the subjects in a group earning a low income of $20, and half earning a high income of $100. The sources of income are divided into three types – chance based, effort based, and merit (ability) based. Subjects are asked the highest amount of redistribution that they'd support from high to low earners for each task, before being informed about whether they are high or low earners. For each task, the highest redistribution amount supported by majority of subjects in a group is the implemented redistribution amount for that group.  Prior studies have shown that participants support less redistribution in general when inequality is “deserved.”  However, we are able to fine-tune that result based on subjects’ expectations about their own position in the earnings hierarchy. We elicit individual’s beliefs about their performance in the tasks, so as to be able to identify self-serving redistribution.  Elicited beliefs of individuals reveal that those who expect to be in the high-income category in effort and merit based tasks redistribute significantly less than under the chance condition, whereas those who expect to be in the low income category demand higher redistribution in these tasks. Thus, in our study confidence in being a high earner versus a low earner seems to be the key factor impacting redistribution amounts across tasks.