research

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Working Papers

• • Performance Feedback in Long-Run Relationships: A Rate of Convergence Approach. (with Alexander Wolitzky)

  • Moral Hazard and Repeated Games with Many Agents (with Alexander Wolitzky), Revise and Resubmit at American Economic Review.

  • On the MinmaxPayoff in Dynamic Games with Hidden Information (with Yuichi Yamamoto), a preliminary draft is available upon request

  • The following three papers will be subsumed into a new project with Johannes Hörner:

    • The Limit Communication Equilibrium Payoff Set with General Monitoring

    • The Characterization of the Limit Communication Equilibrium Payoff Set with General Monitoring: Observable Realized Own Payoff Case

    • When do Communication Equilibrium and Correlated Equilibrium Coincide?

Published or Accepted Papers

• • Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests (with Avidit Acharya, Edoardo Grillo, and Eray Turkel), Accepted at Journal of the European Economic Association.

  • Mediated Collusion (with Juan Ortner and Alex Wolitzky), Accepted at Journal of Political Economy.

  • The Dynamics of a Policy Outcome: Market Response and Bureaucratic Enforcement of a Policy Change (with Steven Callander and Dana Foarta), Accepted at American Journal of Political Science. 

  • Bad Apples in Symmetric Repeated Games (with Alexander Wolitzky), Accepted at Theoretical Economics.

  • Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games (with Alexander Wolitzky), Econometrica, 2023, 91, 1727-1761.

  • Market Competition and Political Influence: An Integrated Approach (with Steven Callander and Dana Foarta), Econometrica, 2022, 99, 2723-2753.

  • Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring, Review of Economic Studies, 2022, 89, 2201-2256.

  • Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990-1999 (with Mitsuru Igami), Review of Economic Studies, 2022, 89, 1460-1494. 

  • Communication and Community Enforcement (with Alexander Wolitzky), Journal of Political Economy, 2021, 129, 2595-2628.

  • The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games (with Alexander Wolitzky), Review of Economic Studies, 2021, 88, 1503–1540.

  • Wait-and-See or Step In? Dynamics of Interventions (with Dana Foarta), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, 13, 399-425.

    • Online Appendix

  • The Management of Talent: Optimal Contracting for Selection and Incentives (with Dana Foarta), Rand Journal of Economics, 2021, 52, 49–77.

  • Do a Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel?: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (with Alexander Wolitzky), American Economic Review, 2020, 110, 3817-3835.

  • The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Anonymous Random Matching (with Joyee Deb and Alexander Wolitzky), Econometrica, 2020, 88, 917-964.

  • Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns (with Yuichiro Kamada), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2020, 135, 1725–1797.

    • Online Appendix

    • Working Paper Version with Additional Results

    • This paper was previously circulated with the title Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Platforms in Policy Announcement Game

  • Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games (with Yuichi Yamamoto), Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15, 1175-1219.

    • Working Paper Version with Additional Results

  • Keeping Privacy in Cartels (with Alexander Wolitzky), Journal of Political Economy, 2018, 126, 2569-2607.

  • Bounding Payoffs in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: n-Player Games (with Alexander Wolitzky), Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 175, 58-87.

  • Bounding Equilibrium Payoffs in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (with Alexander Wolitzky), Theoretical Economics, 2017, 12, 691–729.

  • Characterizing the Limit Set of PPE Payoffs with Unequal Discounting, Theoretical Economics, 2015, 10, 691–717.

  • Asynchronicity and Coordination in Common and Opposing Interest Games (with Riccardo Calcagno, Yuichiro Kamada and Stefano Lovo), Theoretical Economics, 2014, 9, 409–434.

This paper stems from two independent papers:

• • • Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games by Yuichiro Kamada and Takuo Sugaya

    • Preopening and Equilibrium Selection by Stefano Lovo and Riccardo Calcagno

• • Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (with Satoru Takahashi), Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148, 1891–1928.

  • Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ → 1 and a Folk Theorem (with Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi and Nicolas Vieille), Econometrica, 2011, 79, 1277-1318.