Takuma Wakayama
Takuma Wakayama
Professor, Faculty of Economics, Ryukoku University
Email: wakayama[at]econ.ryukoku.ac.jp
Research Interests: Mechanism Design, Social Choice Theory.
Professor, Faculty of Economics, Ryukoku University
Email: wakayama[at]econ.ryukoku.ac.jp
Research Interests: Mechanism Design, Social Choice Theory.
Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation (with Takehiko Yamato), International Journal of Game Theory, 52, 517-553, June 2023.
Download the prepublication version.
The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction (with Takehito Masuda, Ryo Mikami, Toyotaka Sakai, and Shigehiro Serizawa), Experimental Economics, 25, 902-941, June 2022.
Download the working paper version (October 2021).
This is a substantially revised version of the paper entitled "A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction" (November 2019).
The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: An experimental comparison (with Tatsuki Homma, Ryosuke Iba, Junyi Shen, Hirofumi Yamamura, and Takehiko Yamato), Social Choice and Welfare, 58, 429-505, April 2022.
Download the working paper version (March 2021).
Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences (with Kazuhiko Hashimoto), International Journal of Game Theory, 50, 773-785, September 2021.
The 2020 working paper version provides an algorithmic description of the gross uniform reallocation rule and includes some examples that are not included in the published version.
Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions (with Hideki Mizukami), Mathematical Social Sciences, 104, 60-67, March 2020.
Download the working paper version (January 2020).
Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (with Yuji Fujinaka), Games and Economic Behavior, 111, 187-202, September 2018.
Download the working paper version (April 2018). The SSRN version includes Online Appendix.
This is a substantially revised version of the paper entitled "Pre-exchange-proof house allocation" (July 2017).
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: Characterizations and maximality-of-domains results, Social Choice and Welfare, 49, 357-385, August 2017.
Download the working paper version (June 2017).
New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation (with Hideki Mizukami), Economics Letters, 152, 76-78, March 2017.
Download the working paper version (August 2016).
Ex post self-implementation (with Hideki Mizukami), Economic Theory Bulletin, 3, 357-367, October 2015.
Download the working paper version (April 2014).
Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (with Yuji Fujinaka), Journal of Economic Theory, 158, 165-185, July 2015.
Download the working paper version (March 2015).
This is a substantially revised version of the paper entitled "Maximal manipulation in fair allocation" (May 2012). The 2011 working paper version of this paper is available here.
Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule (with Toyotaka Sakai), Theory and Decision, 72, 287-301, March 2012.
Download the working paper version (April 2011).
Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (with Yuji Fujinaka), Economic Theory, 48, 147-169, September 2011.
Download the supplementary note.
Download the working paper version (February 2009).
The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity (with Hideki Mizukami), Mathematical Social Sciences, 58, 256-264, September 2009.
Download the working paper version (July 2007).
Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money (with Yuji Fujinaka), Economics Letters, 100, 91-95, July 2008.
Download the supplementary note.
Download the prepublication version (October 2007).
Download the working paper version (October 2006).
Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments (with Hideki Mizukami), Games and Economic Behavior, 60, 307-325, August 2007.
Download the working paper version (August 2006).
Bossiness and implementability in pure exchange economies (with Hideki Mizukami), RIMS Kokyuroku, 1461, 126-140, December 2005.
Endowment manipulations involving population variations in object exchange problems (with Yuji Fujinaka), August 2025.
Endowments-swapping-proofness in house allocation problems with private and social endowments (with Yuji Fujinaka), March 2025 (UTMD-081).
Endowments-swapping-proofness in housing markets with exchange constraints (with Yuji Fujinaka), March 2025.
Download the 2024 working paper version (UTMD-064, June 2024).
Reallocation-proofness in object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences (with Yuji Fujinaka), September 2024 (UTMD-067).
Kidney exchange mechanism experiments: An experimental comparison of five top trading cycles and chains mechanisms (with Yuji Fujinaka, Takehito Masuda, and Ryo Mikami).
Coalitional manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (with Yuji Fujinaka).