Publications
Derderyan, Svet. 2013. “Corruption on the Ropes? The effectiveness of EU leverage in fighting corruption in Eastern Europe,” in EU Enlargement: Current Challenges and Strategic Choices, edited by Finn Laursen. P.I.E. Peter Lang.
Abstract
This article evaluates whether the EU pre-accession process and post-accession pressures have been effective in the fight against corruption in the CEE countries. In other words, were corruption levels curbed during the pre-accession period and more importantly were any such gains sustained after that, when EU leverage diminished? I hypothesize that despite the prediction that gains during the pre-accession period would be modest and perhaps backsliding would take place after the membership is attained, the 10 post-communist countries have, on average, performed well both before and after accession. I test this hypothesis by employing time series analysis and tracing the dependent variable, change in the levels of corruption (operationalized through the Control of Corruption index of the World Bank), between 1996 and 2010. The results refute the skepticism about these countries' success in trying to contain corruption and show that both before and after membership, CEE countries made substantial absolute gains in curbing corruption levels. In unpacking the causal mechanisms behind this discovery, I use historical process tracing and show that corruption received a lot of visibility during the pre-accession process through the Commission Regular Reports, in which the EU demanded reforms that served to decrease corruption levels. After accession gains in the fight against corruption were not negated as the relative loss of leverage in this time period was compensated by the combined effect of three causal mechanisms. First, there were positive pressures coming from continued leverage - conditional Structural and Cohesion Funds and Cooperation and Verification Mechanism reports (in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania). Second, there is evidence of increased linkage - socialization effects leading to higher demands for accountability of public officials. Third, there are substantial spillover effects from implementing the acquis in other areas - the reduction of the role of the state in the economy, increasing bureaucratic capacity and improvements in the legal system.
Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. 2017. Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Abstract
This book sets out a measure of authority for seventy-six international organizations (IOs) from 1950, or the time of their establishment, to 2010 which can allow researchers to test expectations about the character, sources, and consequences of international governance. The international organizations considered are regional (e.g. the EU, Andean Community, NAFTA), crossregional (e.g. Commonwealth of Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), and global (e.g. the UN, World Bank, WTO). First, we introduce carefully constructed estimates for the scope and depth of authority exercised by international governments. The estimates are unique in their comparative scope, their specificity, and time span. Second, we describe broad trends in IO authority by comparing delegation and pooling, over time, across IOs, and across decision areas. Third, we present the evidence that we have gathered to estimate international authority by carefully discussing forty-seven international organizations, and showing how their bodies are composed, what decisions each body makes, and how they make decisions.
Table of Contents:Table of contents Vol III
Data set: International Authority
Work in Progress
"A curse or a blessing? The differential impact of the financial crisis on FDI in the developing and developed countries the world"
Abstract
Do global financial crisis affect FDI in the developed and developing countries in the world uniformly? Do they change the way investors think about the factors that affect their decisions to invest or not to?
With these questions in mind, this article examines the differential effect of quality of governance factors and economic variables on FDI inflows in the developing and developed world before and after the global financial crisis. The article contributes to the debate on the effects of the different determinants of FDI on inflows by demonstrating that the crisis raised the bar on investment decisions to include quality of governance factors in addition to the more traditional economic ones in many parts of the developing world, but did not necessarily lead to the same effect in the developed countries. Even still, depending on how certain sub-groups within the developed world, such as the EU Eastern European members, and within the developing world, such as the BRICS, were perceived by the international investment community, quality of governance factors in the context of the crisis tend to matter (as in Eastern Europe) or not (as in the BRICS).
In unveiling these dynamics, we employ time-series analyses and historical process tracing and reach three specific conclusions. First, as noted above, within the developing world the crisis made investors more sensitive to quality of governance factors in addition to economic ones raising the bar on whether an investment will be made or not. Second, we determine that this trend was even more pronounced in the subset of fuel-exporting developing countries. Third, we suggest that the formal differentiation between developing and developed countries (by the UN) is somewhat simplistic as there are sub-groups within each of these categories that are regarded differently, particularly in the context of the crisis, due their perceived macroeconomic resilience and potential.
"Do increases in RIO’s authority in Africa vis-à-vis their member states improve these members’ attractiveness for FDI?"
Abstract
This paper examines whether the internal structural transformation of the major RIOs in Africa (member states 1. delegating more issue areas to the authority to the IO (delegation) and/or 2. accepting more majoritarian decisions making procedures within the IO that cannot be derailed by a national veto (pooling) and/or 3. the IO developing a more elaborate dispute settlement mechanism with binding adjudication (international dispute settlement) affect the decision calculus of FDI actors whether to invest more or less in a given member state. Using the MIA (Hooghe and Marks 2017) dataset on international authority, this paper utilizes time series analysis, traces the evolution of 7 major RIOs (AU, CEMAC, COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD) and finds that as the authority of these RIOs (its power vis-à-vis its members) increases, FDI in their member states increases as well. Supplementing the quantitative analysis with process tracing and case studies, the paper proposes two causal explanations of why increasing international authority of RIOs is good for their member states’ investment profile. First, as the issue area jurisdictions of an RIO increase (delegation), expert- or science-based, as opposed to domestic politically-driven decision making results into greater legitimacy for policy initiatives, which is rewarded by FDI actors. More elaborate dispute sentiment procedures also enhance legitimacy as the capacity of an RIO to legally sanction non-compliance increases. Second, as the RIOs’ capacity to increase and even compel coordination increases (pooling), it experiences efficiency gains in pursuing its mandate which decreases uncertainty and allows FDI actors to plan their investments in a more predictable fashion.
“The Rise of Supranational Courts in International Organizations,” co-authored article with Liesbet Hooghe, Jeanine Bezuijen, and Emanuel Coman. (R&R, Review of International Organizations)
Abstract
This paper asks how we can explain the rise in judicialization in the past few decades. The most widely accepted explanation theorizes variation in problem structure. This undergirds the prediction that trade requires strong dispute settlement in order to minimize moral hazard. In this paper we set out a theoretical argument that embeds the link between trade and third party dispute settlement in a broader argument—the pressures for dispute settlement that arise in the context of general purpose governance. Trade is one source for third party dispute settlement, but the causally prior driver is the demands and opportunities that present themselves in an incipient political community. Supranational dispute settlement has been prompted by the rise of general purpose IOs that combine a highly incomplete contract with strong political community. Supranational courts can play a vital role in strengthening credible commitments because they are well suited to explicate rules, expose moral hazard, and punish defectors which reduces the ambiguity that is the bane of highly incomplete contracts.
Derderyan. Svet. “Incapacitated? The adverse effects of EU accession on anti-corruption NGOs’ capacities to affect corruption control in Eastern Europe,” Submitted to Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Abstract
This article argues that the EU pre-accession process first amplified the impact of civil society on corruption but then, paradoxically, EU membership undermined their significance. Looking at the 10 post-communist states that joined the EU in 2004-07 I first employ time-series analysis to establish the positive influence of NGOs on corruption control before accession as well as the lack thereof post-accession. I then focus on the qualitative case study of Bulgaria and apply historical process tracing and expert survey data analysis to test how exactly the EU affected the capacity of NGOs to shape domestic incentives before and after accession. I identify two causal logics behind the dynamic of pre-accession strengthening and post accession weakening of anti-corruption NGOs. Before accession, NGOs took advantage of empowerment opportunities, such as more funding and the EU’s encouragement of collaboration with governments. After membership, the withdrawal of other external donors from the area and the EU’s insistence that NGOs apply for EU funding through the various ministries of their own state made them vulnerable to the incompetency or corruption of the state’s administration and weakened their capacities.
Derderyan. Svet. “Beneath the veil of hope: The effects of EU signaling on foreign investors’ sensitivity to corruption in the context of the Eastern Enlargement,” Finished Draft for the Dissertation Defense
Abstract
This article raises the question of whether positive signaling during the EU’s 2004-07 enlargement trumped other important factors for FDI, such as corruption, which then resurfaced after membership was achieved and had the expected impact on investor confidence. Featuring a mixed-methods approach, I first use time-series analysis to establish that corruption did not have a significant impact on FDI before accession but did afterwards. Then, I present the results of an expert survey and a brief case study to demonstrate the specific psychological mechanisms that allowed signaling to cause investors to be less risk avert prior to EU membership. There are two main contributions that this article makes. First, I show that corruption matters for FDI differently in different contexts and while it has a clear negative effect when rational guidebook principles dominate decision-making, its significance could be muted by positive signaling from international institutions. Second, I suggest that cognitive shortcuts, such as the availability heuristic, help explain behavior when investors operate in information-scarce environments as they tend to assign disproportionate weight to signals perceived as legitimate.
On-going data projects
ERC Project: Causes and Consequences of Multilevel Governance “Coding the authority and policy scope of international governmental organizations (1950-2010),” with Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Besir Ceka, Jeanine Bezuijen, and Tobias Lenz.
Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III Data-set, with Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Besir Ceka, Jeanine Bezuijen, and Tobias Lenz.