Research
PUBLICATIONS
On the Manipulability of Equitable Voting Rules, Games and Economic Behavior, September 2023, 141, pp. 286-302.
Idea: Among "equitable" voting rules, anonymity is equivalent to (three types of) group non-manipulability for the case of two alternatives.
Robust Group Strategy-Proofness (with Norovsambuu Tumennasan), Theoretical Economics, November 2021, 16, pp. 1351-1389.
Idea: The standard notion of group strategy-proofness is applied after types are revealed. We define a notion that is applied before agents know each others' types and find some rules that satisfy it.
Consensus in Social Networks: Revisited (with Norovsambuu Tumennasan), Journal of Mathematical Economics, August 2019, 83, pp. 11-18. (Working Paper Version)
Idea: For a general class of of updating rules, agents will converge to agreement when they listen to moderate views sufficiently often. See inside for a more precise statement.
Polarization in Strategic Networks, Economics Letters, May 2017, 154, pp. 81-83. (Working Paper Version)
Idea: Agents simultaneously form networks and learn (naively). There is a stable network in which small increases in "information" increase the dispersion of beliefs.
WORKING PAPERS
Ordering Data to Persuade (with Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova)
Idea: A sender chooses an order to disclose a string of data. Front-loading favourable data can be dominated by a more balanced disclosure policy.
Group Manipulation with Indifference
Idea: It's not immediately clear how one should define belief-free versions of strong group strategy-proofness. We propose two ways and get positive results for public goods.
Idea: When do weak notions of equity imply equal treatment of equals? If they don't, how unequally are equals treated? We provide some answers.
Equitable, Neutral, and Efficient Voting Rules
Idea: Fair and efficient voting rules are even less common than we thought.
Equitable Voting with Many Alternatives
Idea: We describe equitable, strategy-proof voting rules, which include "median of the median voter" rules. Some of these rules choose policies far from the median voter's ideal.
Core-Periphery Networks and (Limited) Farsightedness (with Kemal Kivanc Akoz) (New Draft Coming Soon)
Idea: Core-periphery networks can be stable even without heterogeneity or strategic complements if agents are farsighted (but not too far).
WORKS IN PROGRESS
RGSP in Reallocation Problems (with Norovsambuu Tumennasan)
Persuasion in Elections (with Norovsambuu Tumennasan)
Trading Networks (with Runjie Geng)
DORMANT WORKING PAPERS
A Comment on "An Alternative Characterization of the Uniform Rule"
Idea: "Weak equal treatment of equals" is too weak to characterize the uniform rule.
Unemployment Volatility and Networks
The Most Sincere Form of Flattery: Aggregate Price Dynamics with Imitation
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
"Substitution between Labour and Capital: Application to the Royal Canadian Navy," (with Ugurhan Berkok and Jeffery Penney), Defence Research and Development Canada, 2013, PA12022. (Copy Available Upon Request)