PUBLICATIONS
Robust Group Manipulation with Indifferences, conditionally accepted at Games and Economic Behavior.
Idea: It's not immediately clear how one should define belief-free versions of strong group strategy-proofness. We propose two ways and get some positive results.
Equitable, Neutral, and Efficient Voting Rules, Journal of Mathematical Economics, December 2024, 115, Article 103061.
Idea: Fair and efficient voting rules are even less common than we thought.
On the Manipulability of Equitable Voting Rules, Games and Economic Behavior, September 2023, 141, pp. 286-302.
Idea: Among "equitable" voting rules, anonymity is equivalent to (three types of) group non-manipulability for the case of two alternatives.
Robust Group Strategy-Proofness (with Norovsambuu Tumennasan), Theoretical Economics, November 2021, 16, pp. 1351-1389.
Idea: The standard notion of group strategy-proofness is applied after types are revealed. We define a notion that is applied before agents know each others' types and find some rules that satisfy it.
Consensus in Social Networks: Revisited (with Norovsambuu Tumennasan), Journal of Mathematical Economics, August 2019, 83, pp. 11-18. (Working Paper Version)
Idea: For a general class of of updating rules, agents will converge to agreement when they listen to moderate views sufficiently often. See inside for a more precise statement.
Polarization in Strategic Networks, Economics Letters, May 2017, 154, pp. 81-83. (Working Paper Version)
Idea: Agents simultaneously form networks and learn (naively). There is a stable network in which small increases in "information" increase the dispersion of beliefs.
WORKING PAPERS
Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk (with Christoph Kuzmics)
Idea: Can repeated interaction induce full disclosure? Yes, sometimes, but the Receiver cannot fully benefit.
Ordering Data to Persuade (with Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova)
Idea: A sender chooses an order to disclose a string of data. Front-loading favourable data can be dominated by a more balanced disclosure policy.
Idea: Procedural fairness can be consistent with equal treatment of equals or group envy-freeness, but not both.
Equitable Voting with Many Alternatives
Idea: We describe strategy-proof, equitable voting rules, which include "median of the median voter" rules. Some of these rules admit small winning coalitions, and so can choose outcomes far from the median voter's ideal.
Core-Periphery Networks and (Limited) Farsightedness (with Kemal Kivanc Akoz) (New Draft Coming Soon)
Idea: Core-periphery networks can be stable even without heterogeneity or strategic complements if agents are farsighted (but not too far).
WORKS IN PROGRESS
Robust Group Strategy-Proof Public Good Provision (with Norovsambuu Tumennasan)
Coalition-Proof Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
Symmetry in Random Assignment (preliminary draft available on request)
Trading Networks (with Runjie Geng)
DORMANT WORKING PAPERS
A Comment on "An Alternative Characterization of the Uniform Rule"
Idea: "Weak equal treatment of equals" is too weak to characterize the uniform rule.
Unemployment Volatility and Networks
The Most Sincere Form of Flattery: Aggregate Price Dynamics with Imitation
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
"Substitution between Labour and Capital: Application to the Royal Canadian Navy," (with Ugurhan Berkok and Jeffery Penney), Defence Research and Development Canada, 2013, PA12022. (Copy Available Upon Request)