Published Papers:
Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade with Matthew O Jackson SSRN Link arXiv Link PNAS paper
Strategic Disaggregation in Matching Markets with Bobak Pakzad-Hurson SSRN Link JET link
Trade-off Aversion and Indecisive Behaviours with Edwin Ip JEBO link
Works in Progress:
The Dynamics of Networks and Homophily [with Matthew O. Jackson, Erik Snowberg, and Leeat Yariv] SSRN link
A Hedonic Model of the Dynamic Formation of Networks and Homophily [with Matthew O. Jackson, Erik Snowberg, and Leeat Yariv] (Latest draft)
Social Context and Social Learning (Latest draft)
Herding with Costs to Observation SSRN Link
Incidental Homophily and Social Learning with Yunus Aybas and Matthew O Jackson
Preferences for Equality of Outcomes and Equality of Opportunities with Edwin Ip and Joseph Vecci
Short abstract: People often have preferences over how goods are distributed amongst others, even when the distribution does not directly affect them: policymakers implement policies that impact their constituents and voters have preferences over where foreign aid goes and which welfare programs are funded. We develop a series of questions that are easy to implement in a survey setting for measuring respondents' distributional preferences, particularly how a respondent values equality of outcomes versus equality of opportunities. Fitting a simple model of distributional preferences, we find that both types of (in)equality affect respondents' choices. Importantly, we also find a significant influence of "social risk"; respondents value at least one recipient receiving money.
Selection and Social Learning with Pauline Vorjohann
Short abstract: In the presence of communication frictions, individuals must draw inferences about the information they receive from others. Building on a simple theoretical model of information exchange in the presence of costly and coarse communication, we test the predictions of the model in both online and in-person laboratory settings. While we find support for the model's assumptions that individuals respond to the instrumental value of information when information gathering is costly, we fail to find consistent evidence that participants account for this behavior in others, in line with the literature on selection neglect and failures of contingent reasoning.
Racing to Interview with Andrew Ferdowsian
Short abstract: Hiring is often proceeded by lengthy interviews as firms seek to ensure a good match. We study the impact of competition between hiring firms on the interview process. In a continuous time model of interviewing and hiring with two firms and two workers, we find that when both workers are equally likely to be a good match for each firm, the unique equilibrium of the "interviewing allocation" game is for firms to interview both workers equally. However, even small differences in the perceived quality of the workers can lead to unbalanced outcomes for the workers. We interpret this finding as suggesting that even small amounts of stereotyping can lead to disproportionate differences in job market outcomes.
Firm Experimentation and Social Network Spread with Aidan Smith
Short abstract: In many industries, there is room for firms, particularly new firms, to experiment to better learn their clienteles' tastes. The upside of experimenting is finding a product with greater gains to trade for the firm to benefit from. The downside is that disappointed consumers may not return to the firm. This downside depends crucially on the way consumers share their experiences with each other; if one bad experience dissuades many would-be consumers, there is much risk to the firm experimenting. For a simple model of social information transmission, we characterize the social network structures that optimize the incentives of firms to experiment.
Algorithmic Analysis of Supply Chain Networks under advisor Sergey Norin. Undergraduate senior thesis. (Link to pdf)