Publications
17. Comparative Statics of Uncertainty Attitude for Rank-Dependent Subjective Expected Utility (with Hiroyuki Ozaki)
Economics Letters, forthcoming
16. Robust Voting under Uncertainty (with Shmuel Nitzan and Takashi Ui)
Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming
15. The Roles of Subjective/Objective Probabilities in Representation of Preferences under Uncertainty (with Hiroyuki Ozaki)
Theory and Decision, 2025, Vol. 99, 151-171.Volume 99, pages 151–171,
14. The Permission-Owen Value: Axiomatization and Application to Liability Situations (with Takaaki Abe, David Lowing, and Kevin Techer)
International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, Vol. 54, Article 25.
13. Fair Allocation in Hierarchies: A Compromise between Marginalism and Egalitarianism (with Takaaki Abe and David Lowing)
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2025, Vol. 119, 103128.
12. Stable Core Partitions in a Cartel Formation Game with Licensing (with Ryo Shirakawa)
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2025, Vol. 137, 102413.
11. Nullified-game Consistency and Axiomatizations of the Core of TU-games with a Fixed Player Set (with Takuto Kaneko)
Economics Letters, 2025, Vol. 250, 112274.
10. On the Core of a Patent Licensing Game (with Ryo Shirakawa)
Economics Letters, 2023, Vol. 233, 111374.
9. The In-group Egalitarian Owen Values (with Takaaki Abe)
Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, Vol.142, 1-16.
8. Potentials and Solutions of Cooperative Games with a Fixed Player Set (with Takaaki Abe)
International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, Vol.52, Issue 3, 757-774.
7. Core Stability of the Shapley Value for Cooperative Games (with Takaaki Abe)
Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, Vol.60, Issue 4, 523-543.
The previous version received the Kanematsu Fellowship Prize 2017.
6. On the Unique Core Partition of Coalition Formation Games: Correction to Inal (2015) (with Ryo Shirakawa)
Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, Vol.60, Issue 3, 517-521.
5. The Weighted-Egalitarian Shapley Values (with Takaaki Abe)
Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, Vol.52, Issue 2, 197–213.
4. Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Money and Externalities
Economics Bulletin, 2018, Vol. 38, Issue 1, 52–59.
3. A Shapley Value Representation of Network Potentials
International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, Vol.47, Issue 4, 1151-1157.
This working paper version includes some additional results.
2. Evolutionary Implementation of Efficient Networks (with Yoshimasa Katayama and Taishi Sassano)
Economics Bulletin, 2017, Vol. 37, Issue 3, 2149-2161.
1. Monotonic Redistribution: Reconciling Performance-based Allocation and Weighted Division (with Takaaki Abe)
International Game Theory Review, 2017, Vol. 19, Issue 04.
Working Papers
10. A Myerson Value for Multi-choice Games with a Communication Network (with David Lowing, Serge Bertrand Nlend Oum, and Philippe Solal), November 2025, R&R, Annals of Operations Research
9. Characterizations of Proportional Division Value in TU-Games via Fixed-Population Consistency (with Yukihiko Funaki, Yukio Koriyama, and Yuki Tamura), revised February 2026, Submitted
8. Characterizing the ELS Values with Fixed-Population Invariance Axioms (with Yukihiko Funaki, Yukio Koriyama, and Yuki Tamura), November 2025, Submitted
7. The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions (with Kensei Nakamura), revised December 2025, Submitted
6. k-Boundedness and an Extension of the Myerson Value on Feasible Communication Structures (with Takuto Kaneko and David Lowing), revised January 2026, R&R, Journal of Mathematical Economics
5. Sub-game order preservation and values for TU-games (with David Lowing and Florian Navarro), revised February 2026, R&R, International Journal of Game Theory
4. A Characterization of Egalitarian and Proportional Sharing Principles: An Efficient Extension Operator Approach (with Yukihiko Funaki and Yukio Koriyama), revised February 2026, Submitted
3. The Multi-Threshold Generalized Sufficientarianism and Level-Origarchy (with Norihito Sakamoto), revised January 2025
2. Shapley Meets Debreu: A Decision-theoretic Foundation for Monotonic Solutions of TU-games, revised May 2024
1. On the Possibility of Strategic Ignorance in Sequential Persuasion (with Wataru Kitano), revised December 2025, Submitted
This is a revised version of the previous working paper: A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: Intentional Disregard under Sequential Persuasion (revised October 2024)
In progress
4. Fair allocations of joint and sequential team production (with Wataru Kitano and David Lowing)
3. A Myerson Value for Weakest Link Cooperative Games (with David Lowing, Serge Bertrand Nlend Oum, and Philippe Solal)
2. Peak-Robust Voting Rules: Median, Quantiles, and Their Generalizations (with Toshiya Yoshimura)
1. Iterative Elimination of Borda Losers: Axiomatizations of Baldwin and Nanson Rules (with Leo Goto)