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Sloman, S. A., Barbey, A., & Patterson, R. (2021). Cognitive neuroscience meets the community of knowledge. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 21 October 2021, https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2021.675127.
Fullerton, M., Rabb, N., Mamidipaka, S., Ungar, Lyle, & Sloman, S. (2021). Evidence against risk as a motivating driver of COVID-19 preventive behaviors in the U.S. Journal of Health Psychology. 2021 Jun 18;13591053211024726. doi: 10.1177/13591053211024726.
Gronchi, G. & Sloman, S. A. (2021). Regular and random judgements are not two sides of the same coin: Both representativeness and encoding play a role in randomness perception. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 28, 1707-1714.
Waeber, P. O., Stoudmann, N., Langston, J. D., Ghazoul, J., WIlmé, L., Sayer, J., Nobre, C., Innes, J. L., Fernbach, P., Sloman, S. A., Garcia, C. A. (2021). Choices we make in times of crisis. Sustainability, 13(6), 3578.
Sloman, S. A. (2021). How do we believe? Topics in Cognitive Science. http://doi.org/10.1111/tops.
Geana, M. V., Rabb, N., & Sloman, S. (2021). Walking the party line: The growing role of political ideology in shaping health behavior in the United States. SSM-Population Health, 100950. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2021.100950
Amit, E., Han E., Poston, A., & Sloman, S. (2020). How people judge institutional corruption. University of Connecticut Law Review, 52:3.
Sloman, S. A. (2020). Do People Care About Evidence? Review of THE MISINFORMATION AGE: How False Beliefs Spread. Cailin O’Connor & James Owen Weatherall. American Scientist, Jan-Feb. Volume 108, Number 1
Sloman, S. A. & Rabb, N. (2019). Thought as a determinant of political opinion. Cognition, 188, 1-7.Rabb, N., Fernbach, P. M., & Sloman, S. A. (2019). Individual representation in a community of knowledge. Trends in cognitive sciences, 23(10), 891-902.
Sloman, S. A. & Fernbach, P. M., (2018). Reasoning as Collaboration. Review of The Enigma of Reason by Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber. American Journal of Psychology, 131, No. 4, 493-496.
Hemmatian, B., & Sloman, S.A. (in press). Two systems for thinking with a community: outsourcing versus collaboration. In S.Elqayam (Ed.), Festschrift for David Over. New York:Psychology Press.
Hemmatian, B., & Sloman, S. A. (in press). Think of the consequences: A decade of discourse about same-sex marriage. Behavior Research Methods.
Hemmatian, B. & Sloman, S. A. (2018). Community appeal:explanation without information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,147(11),1677-1712 .
Zemla, J. C., Sloman, S., Bechlivanidis, C., & Lagnado, D. A. (2017). Evaluating everyday explanations. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(5), 1488-1500.
Sloman, S.A., Lagnado D. (2015). Causality in Thought. Annual Review of Psychology, 66:3.1-3.25.
Sloman, S. A. (2014). Two systems of reasoning, an update. In Sherman, J., Gawronski, B., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). Dual process theories of the social mind. Guilford Press.
Hadjichristidis, C, Sloman, S. A., & Over, D. (2014). Categorical Induction from Uncertain Premises: Jeffrey's Doesn't Completely Rule. Thinking & Reasoning.
Sloman, S. A. (2014). Comments on Quantum Probability Theory. Topics in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 47-52.
Fernbach, P. M., Hagmayer, Y., & Sloman, S. a. (2014). Effort denial in self-deception. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 123(1), 1–8.
Park, J., & Sloman, S. (2013). Mechanistic beliefs determine adherence to the Markov property in causal reasoning. Cognitive psychology, 67, 186-216.
Goldin, G., van ’t Wout, M., Sloman, S. A., Evans, D. W., Greenberg, B. D., & Rasmussen, S. A. (2013). Risk judgment in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Testing a dual-systems account. Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders, 2(4), 406–411.
Hattori, M., Sloman, S., Orita, R. (2013). Effects of subliminal hints on insight problem solving. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.
Fernbach, P., Sloman, S., St. Louis, R., Shube, J. N. (2012). Explanation Fiends and Foes: How Mechanistic Detail Determines Understanding and Preference. Journal of Consumer Research, 39.
Bes, B., Sloman, S., Lucas, C. G., Raufaste, É. (2012). Non-Bayesian Inference: Causal Structure Trumps Correlation. Cognitive Science, 1-24.
Fernbach, P. M., Darlow, A., & Sloman, S. A. (in press). When good evidence goes bad: The weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making. Cognition.
Fernbach, P. M., Darlow, A., & Sloman, S. A. (in press). Asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
Walsh, C. R. & Sloman, S. A. (2011). The meaning of cause and prevent: The role of causal mechanism. Mind & Language, 26(1), pp. 21–52.
Fernbach, P. M., Darlow A. & Sloman, S. A. (2010). Neglect of alternative causes in predictive but not diagnostic reasoning. Psychological Science, 21(3), 329-336.
Sloman, S. A., Fernbach, P. M., & Hagmayer, Y. (2010). Self deception requires vagueness. Cognition, 115(2), 268-281.
Robinson, A. E., Sloman, S. A., Hagmayer, Y., & Hertzog, C. K. (2010). Causality in solving economic problems. Journal of Problem Solving, 3, 106-130.
Darlow, A. L., Sloman, S. A. (2010). Two systems of reasoning: architecture and relation to emotion. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1(1), 1-11.
Hagmayer, Y. & Sloman, S. A. (2009). Decision makers conceive of themselves as interveners, not observers. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138, 22-38.
Sloman, S.A., Barbey, A.K. & Hotaling, J. (2009). A causal model theory of the meaning of “cause,” “enable,” and “prevent.” Cognitive Science, 33, 21-50.
Fernbach, P. M. & Sloman, S. A. (2009). Causal learning with local computations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition.
Sloman, S. A., Fernbach, P. M. & Ewing, S. (2009). Causal models: The representational infrastructure for moral judgement. In D. Bartels, C. W. Bauman, L. J. Skitka, & D. Medin (Eds.) Moral judgment and decision making: The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol 50). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
Gronchi, G. & Sloman, S. A. (2008). Do causal beliefs influence the hot-hand and the gambler’s fallacy? Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Washington, DC.
Sloman, S. A. & Fernbach, P. M. (2008). The value of rational analysis: An assessment of causal reasoning and learning. In Chater, N. & Oaksford, M. (Eds.). The probabilistic mind: Prospects for rational models of cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walsh, C. & Sloman, S. A. (2008). Updating beliefs with causal models: Violations of screening off. Gluck, M. A., Anderson, J. R , & Kosslyn, S. M. (Eds.). Memory and Mind: A Festschrift for Gordon H. Bower. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Hadjichristidis, C., Handley, S., Sloman, S. A., Evans, J., Over, D., & Stevenson, R. (2007). Iffy beliefs: Conditional thinking and belief change. Memory & Cognition, 35, 2052-2059.
Fernbach, P. M., Linson-Gentry, P & Sloman, S. A.(2007). Causal beliefs influence the perception of temporal order. Proceedings of the twenty-ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
Over, D., Hadjichristidis, C., Evans, J. St BT. Handley, S. J., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). The probability of causal conditionals. Cognitive Psychology, 54, 62-97.
Sloman, S. A., Lombrozo, T., & Malt, B. C. (2007). Mild ontology and domain-specific categorization. In M. J. Roberts (Ed.). Integrating the mind. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Barbey, A. K. & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From statistical formats to cognitive structures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 287-298.
Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator's intention in naming and what's really what. Cognition, 105, 615-648.
Barbey, A. K. & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 241-254.
Lagnado, D. & Sloman, S.A. (2006). Time as a guide to cause. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition.
Sloman, S. A. & Hagmayer, Y. (2006). The causal psycho-logic of choice. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 407-412.
Sloman, S.A., & Lagnado, D. (2005). The problem of induction. In R. Morrison and K. Holyoak (Eds.). Cambridge Handbook of Thinking & Reasoning, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 95-116.
Sloman, S.A., & Lagnado, D. (2005). Do we 'do'?. Cognitive Science, 29, 5-39.
Ameel, E., Storms, G., Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2005). How bilinguals solve the naming problem. Journal of Memory and Language, 52, 309-329.
Lagnado, D. & Sloman, S.A. (2004). The advantage of timely intervention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 856-876.
Chaigneau, S. E., Barsalou, L. W., & Sloman, S.A. (2004). Assessing affordance and intention in the HIPE theory of function. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 601-625.
Mochon, D. & Sloman, S. A. (2004). Causal models frame interpretation of mathematical equations. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,11, 1099-1104.
Hadjichristidis, C., Sloman, S.A., Stevenson, R.J., Over, D.E. (2004). Feature centrality and property induction. Cognitive Science, 28, 45-74.
Sloman, S.A., & Lagnado, D. (2004). Causal invariance in reasoning and learning. In B. Ross (Ed.) The psychology of learning and motivation, Vol. 44, 287-325.
Sloman, S.A., Rottenstreich, Y., Wisniewski, E., Hadjichristidis, C., & Fox, C. R. (2004). Typical versus atypical unpacking and superadditive probability judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 573-582.
Lagnado, D. & Sloman, S.A., (2004). Inside and outside probability judgment. D. J. Koehler and N. Harvey (Eds.) Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, pp. 157-176. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
Malt, B.C., & Sloman, S.A. (2003). Linguistic diversity and object naming by non-native speakers of English. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 6, 47-67.
Malt, B.C., Sloman, S.A., & Gennari, S. (2003). Universality and language specificity in object naming. Journal of Memory and Language, 49, 20-42.
Sloman, S. A., Over, D., & Slovak, L., (2003). Frequency illusions and other fallacies. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91, 296-309.
Sloman, S. A. & Malt, B. C. (2003). Artifacts are not ascribed essences, nor are they treated as belonging to kinds. Language and Cognitive Processes, 18, 563-582.
Gennari, S. , Sloman, S. A., Malt, B. C., Fitch, T., (2002). Motion Events in Motion and Cognition. Cognition. 83, 49-79.
Sloman, S.A., & Lagnado, D. (2002). Counterfactual undoing in deterministic causal reasoning. Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Maryland.
Sloman, S. A., & Ahn, W. (1999). Feature centrality: naming versus imagining. Memory & Cognition, 27, 526-537.
Malt, B. C., Sloman, S. A., Gennari, S., Shi, M., & Wang, Y. (1999). Knowing versus naming: similarity and the linguistic categorization of artifacts. Journal of Memory and Language, 40, 230-262.
Sloman, S. A. (1998). Categorical inference is not a tree: The myth of inheritance hierarchies. Cognitive Psychology, 35, 1-33.
Sloman, S. A., Love, B. C., & Ahn, W. (1998). Feature centrality and conceptual coherence, Cognitive Science, 22, 189-228.
Sloman, S. a, & Rips, L. J. (1998). Similarity as an explanatory construct. Cognition, 65(2-3), 87–101.
Sloman, S. A. & Rips, L. J. (Eds.) (1998) Similarity and Symbols in Human Thinking, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3-22.
Sloman, S. A. (1994). When explanations compete: The role of explanatory coherence on judgments of likelihood. Cognition, 52, 1-21.
Sloman, S. A. (1993). Feature-based induction. Cognitive Psychology, 25, 231-280.
Sloman, S. A., Bower, G. H., & Rohrer, D. (1991). Congruency effects in part-list cuing inhibition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17, 974-982.
Sloman, S. A., Hayman, C. A. G., Ohta, N., Law, J., & Tulving E. (1988). Forgetting in primed fragment completion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14, 223-239.