Stephan Lauermann
LatestThinking Video on "Informal Elections"
New conference: European Economic Theory Conference (EETC), 19-20 September 2025, Bonn
New paper: Matching with Frictions, with Georg Nöldeke (prepared as a chapter for "The Economics of Matching")
Publications
Auctions with Frictions
2025, with Asher Wolinsky, accepted at Review of Economic Studies
Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections
2024, with Carl Heese, accepted at Journal of Political Economy; Supplement
Bidding in a Common-Value Auction with an Unknown Number of Competitors
2023, with Andre Speit, Econometrica, ;
A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation
2022, with Asher Wolinsky, Theoretical Economics
Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections
2022, with Mehmet Ekmekci, Theoretical Economics
The Balance Condition in Search-and-Matching Models
2020, with Georg Nöldeke and Thomas Tröger, Econometrica.
Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation [Slides]
2020, with Mehmet Ekmekci, Review of Economic Studies.
Learning and Price Discovery in a Search Market [Slides]
with Wolfram Merzyn and Gabor Virag; Review of Economic Studies, 2017.
Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition
with Asher Wolinsky; American Economic Review, 2017.
Search with Adverse Selection [Slides]
with Asher Wolinsky; Econometrica, 2016.
Existence of Steady-State Equilibria in Matching Models with Search Frictions
with Georg Nöldeke, Economic Letters, 2015.
Stable Marriages and Search Frictions [Slides]
with Georg Nöldeke; Journal of Economic Theory, 2014.
Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach
American Economic Review, 2013.
Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect
with Gabor Virag, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2012.
Asymmetric Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets: An Inversion Result
Journal of Economic Theory, 2012.
Working Papers
Matching with Frictions
2025, with Georg Nöldeke, (prepared as a chapter for "The Economics of Matching")
Information Aggregation in Large Protests: A Continuum Model
2024, with Mehmet Ekmekci; Online Supplement
Condorcets Jury Theorem without Symmetry
2024, with Carl Heese.
Fishing for a Veto,
2020, With Kailin Chen and Mehmet Ekmekci
Ongoing Projects, Old Working Papers, and Notes
Stable Assignments and Search Frictions,
with Georg Nöldeke
Bidder Solicitation in Common-Value Auctions,
with Asher Wolinsky
Remarks on Optimal Simultaneous Search,
November 2018, with Asher Wolinsky (SSRN)
A Common Value Auction with Bidder Solicitation: The General Analysis
August 2013, with Asher Wolinsky, Supplement
This working paper is obsolete. It is superseded by "A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation" and "Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition."
