Stephan Lauermann

LatestThinking Video on "Informal Elections"


CV


Publications

A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation
2021, with Asher Wolinsky, accepted at
Theoretical Economics

Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections
2021, with Mehmet Ekmekci, accepted at Theoretical Economics

The Balance Condition in Search-and-Matching Models
2020, with Georg Nöldeke and Thomas Tröger, Econometrica.

Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation [Slides]
2020, with Mehmet Ekmekci, Review of Economic Studies.

Learning and Price Discovery in a Search Market [Slides]
with Wolfram Merzyn and
Gabor Virag; Review of Economic Studies, 2017.

Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition
with Asher Wolinsky; American Economic Review, 2017.

Search with Adverse Selection [Slides]
with Asher Wolinsky; Econometrica, 2016.

Existence of Steady-State Equilibria in Matching Models with Search Frictions
with Georg Nöldeke, Economic Letters, 2015.

Stable Marriages and Search Frictions [Slides]
with Georg Nöldeke; Journal of Economic Theory, 2014.

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach
American Economic Review, 2013.

Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect
with Gabor Virag, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2012.

Asymmetric Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets: An Inversion Result
Journal of Economic Theory, 2012.


Working Papers

Informal Elections with Dispersed Information
2022, with Mehmet Ekmekci; Online Supplement

Bidding in a Common-Value Auctions with an Uncertain Number of Competitors
2019, with Andre Speit

Auctions with Frictions, New!
2021, with Asher Wolinsky

Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections
2021, with Carl Heese

Fishing for a Veto,
2020, With Kailin Chen and Mehmet Ekmekci


Ongoing Projects, Old Working Papers, and Notes

Stable Assignments and Search Frictions,
with Georg Nöldeke

Bidder Solicitation in Common-Value Auctions,
with Asher Wolinsky

Remarks on Optimal Simultaneous Search,
November 2018, with Asher Wolinsky (SSRN)

A Common Value Auction with Bidder Solicitation: The General Analysis
August 2013, with Asher Wolinsky, Supplement

This working paper is obsolete. It is superseded by "A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation" and "Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition."

Contact

University of Bonn

Institut for Microeconomics

+49 (0) 228 73 6327

s.lauermann@uni-bonn.de

Raum 3.004 (3. Etage Altbau Juridicum)

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Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn

Secretary

Frau Sabine Burch

burch@uni-bonn.de

+49 228 73 9198

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Slides