Chapter III and below of the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act (hereinafter “the Act”) in force provides that the Justices should form a Constitutional Court in order to review petitions concerning the dissolution of a political party, which violates the Constitution. And according to Article 2 of the Act, other petitions concerning the interpretation of the Constitution or the uniform interpretations of statutes and regulations should be reviewed in session en masse. However, Article 13 of the Act stipulates that “In case of rendering an interpretation …On petitioner's motion, or sua sponte the Justices may order the petitioners, the pertinent parties or agencies to brief the Justices. The Justices may also conduct its own investigation. Oral arguments may be held in an open court, when necessary. In case oral arguments are held, proceedings for the Constitutional Court as provided infra shall apply mutatis mutandis hereto.”
Constitutional Court Simulation
People should be charitable to diverse voices and harmonize antithetical opinions in a multiple democratic society. Looking at Taiwan today, various social issues follow on the hot heels of one another. Some people stood out on the streets as proponents, and some disputed in the Legislative Yuan. This phenomenon, yet, often led to sharp conflicts and lacked room for conversation. A society with sharp conflicts and without compromise is however no bliss for all citizens. Especially when the core of many social issues is about choosing between different constitutional values, we should sit down, meditate prudently and debate in order to clarify how diverse opinions could be harmonized with a view to protecting people’s rights and interests under the constitutional structure of our country.
In order to provide a constitutional rational debate forum for sharp conflicting constitutional opinions and to eliminate disputes, eradicate disagreements and find solutions that could satisfy different needs. The Moot Constitutional Court program of the Institute of Technology Law, National Chiao Tung University (NCTU) aims to build a forum with such course and invite experts and civil groups from various fields to organize a Constitutional Court Simulation and seek solutions for specific social issues by adopting the oral argument procedures of the Constitutional Court.
Such “Constitutional Court Simulation” has two aspects of meanings. In a legal education aspect, starting from the Constitution courses, this program intends to create a moot court instruction model that could propose a concrete direction for the reform of legal education, which lies in the belief that legal education should begin with constitutional education and should be closely integrated with legal practices. As for social implications, the Constitutional Court Simulation is expected to serve as a civil conversation forum for contrary opinions and thoughts to find the opportunity to reach reconciliation or even a platform that opinions could be gathered and utilized as references later on when it comes to the deliberation of the Legislative Yuan and the review of the Judicial Yuan regarding related issues.
The Constitutional Court Simulation isn’t intended to hold a debate competition but to anticipate the provision of solutions. Though the Justices should not serve as a consultative agency for the legislative authorities, the Constitutional Court Simulation could offer reviewed constitutional information and assist legislative authorities to legislate in caution. The matter this time is set to be the situation when a minority of legislators file a petition for interpretation of the Constitution regarding abstract normative review: When one-third or above of the incumbent legislators file a petition for the interpretation of the Constitution to challenge the constitutionality of Articles 972,1072 and the former part of Article 1074 owing to the fact that the amendment was set aside in the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee and the reviewing date of the revisions seems to be in the indefinite future. (See Article 5 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 3 of the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act and J.Y. Interpretation No. 603)