Yamashita, Takuro, and Shuguang Zhu. 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (4): 494-514.
(Previous working-paper version: July, 2017)
Zhu, Shuguang. 2023. "Private Disclosure with Multiple Agents", Journal of Economic Theory, 212, 105705. (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105705)
Working paper version, February, 2021 (Previous version: November, 2017)
Larionov, Daniil, Hien Pham, Takuro Yamashita, and Shuguang Zhu. 2025. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition", Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 34: 889-898. (https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12628)
Working paper version, March, 2022 (DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4321432)
Yamashita, Takuro, and Shuguang Zhu. 2025. "Bayesian Persuasion Followed by Receiver's Mechanism Design", Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-025-01636-4
(Submitted; Online Appendix)
Yamashita, Takuro, and Shuguang Zhu. 2025. "Optimal Design of Market Access", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.
Previously circulated as "Type-contingent Information Disclosure", February, 2021. (Online Appendix)
Targeted Advertising with Horizontally Differentiated Buyers (with Takuro Yamashita), Working paper, December, 2024. (R&R in June 2025)
(Submitted; Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5081764 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5081764)
Discouraging Effect of Competition On Retailers' Information Disclosure (with Takuro Yamashita), Working paper, March, 2023
(Submitted; Available upon request)
Persuasion in Optimal Financing (with Shiming Fu), Working paper, January, 2023
(Submitted; DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4645558)
Dynamic Inconsistency In Collective Decision, Working paper, October, 2017
Other papers:
Does the Shill Bid Really Mislead The Bidders? The Effect of Information Revelation on Shill Bidding, June, 2013
Abstract: This paper introduces a sequential second price auction model under the common value setting to study the shill bidding problem. We consider two scenarios: one is to announce the result of the first auction before the second auction begins, and the other one is to keep secret the previous result until the latter auction ends. By comparing the seller’s expected total revenue in the Bayesian perfect equilibrium in these two scenarios, we show that the misleading effect of the shill bid is actually canceled out by the bidders’ rational expectation. The potential of shill bidding which intuitively enhances the seller’s revenue may place the seller in a disadvantageous position. Thus the fast revelation of the previous transaction result will impose a negative influence on the seller’s revenue when the seller cannot commit not to shill bidding.
Analysis of Adverse Selection under the Framework of Signaling Model, Insurance Studies, vol. 11: 89-97, November, 2011
Abstract: I deal with the problem of adverse selection caused by information asymmetry in insurance markets by introducing a signaling mechanism. The signal, which may be loss prevention and reduction measures or the qualification of certain underwriting criteria, influences an individual’s utility function in two ways: it helps lower the identified probability of the insured accidents, while the cost of signaling sets a constraint for him. I prove that a stable separating equilibrium where an insurer can exercise price discrimination exists under the following conditions: 1) low-risk individuals have low marginal signaling cost; 2) the proportion of high-risk individuals is relatively large in the market; 3) signals that can effectively reduce the probability of the insured accidents.