Rawdanowicz, Ł., et al. (2021), "Constraints and demands on public finances: Considerations of resilient fiscal policy", OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1694, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/602500be-en.
Turban, S., et al. (2020), "A set of matrices to map the location of profit and economic activity of multinational enterprises", OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 52, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4ec98acc-en.
Millot, V., et al. (2020), "Corporate taxation and investment of multinational firms: Evidence from firm-level data", OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 51, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9c6f9f2e-en.
Rexecode (2018) : Dépenses publiques: d'où vient l'écart entre la France et l'Allemagne, comment le réduire ? Document de travail N.69, juin 2018 http://www.rexecode.fr/public/Analyses-et-previsions/Documents-de-travail/Depenses-publiques-d-ou-vient-l-ecart-entre-la-France-et-l-Allemagne-comment-le-reduire
Martin, S., Souletie, A. & Turban, S. (2015). Une approche économique de la réforme territoriale. Économie & prévision, 206-207, 183-191. https://doi.org/10.3917/ecop.206.0183
OECD (2020), Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Economic Impact Assessment: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0e3cc2d4-en.
Premier rapport du Conseil national de productivité - Productivité et compétitivité : où en est la France dans la zone euro ? (2019) https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/productivite-competitivite-france-zone-euro (Rapporteur)
Premier rapport du Comité d'évaluation des réformes de la fiscalité du capital (2019) https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/comite-devaluation-reformes-de-fiscalite-capital-premier-rapport (Rapporteur)
Communication in context: Interpreting promises in an experiment on competition and trust (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2018). With Alessandra Casella, Navin Kartik and Luis Sanchez.
Abstract: How much do people lie, and how much do people trust communication when lying is possible? An important step toward answering these questions is understanding how communication is interpreted. This paper establishes in a canonical experiment that competition can alter the shared communication code: the commonly understood meaning of messages. We study a sender–receiver game in which the sender dictates how to share $10 with the receiver, if the receiver participates. The receiver has an outside option and decides whether to participate after receiving a nonbinding offer from the sender. Competition for play between senders leads to higher offers but has no effect on actual transfers, expected transfers, or receivers’ willingness to play. The higher offers signal that sharing will be equitable without the expectation that they should be followed literally: Under competition “6 is the new 5.”
Storable Votes and Judicial Nominations in the U.S. Senate (Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2016). With Alessandra Casella and Gregory Wawro.
Abstract: We model a procedural reform aimed at restoring a proper role for the minority in the confirmation process of judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate. We propose that nominations to the same level court be collected in periodic lists and voted upon individually with Storable Votes, allowing each senator to allocate freely a fixed number of total votes. Although each nomination is decided by simple majority, storable votes make it possible for the minority to win occasionally, but only when the relative importance its members assign to a nomination is higher than the relative importance assigned by themajority. Numerical simulations approximate the composition of the 113th and 114th Senates. Under plausible assumptions motivated by a game theoretic model, we find that a minority of 45 senators would be able to win about 20 percent of confirmation battles when the majority party controls the presidency, and between 40 and 60 percent when the president identifies with the minority party. For mostparameter values, the possibility of minority victories increases aggregate welfare.
Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets (Games and Economic Behavior, November 2014). With Alessandra Casella.
Abstract: We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium. In equilibrium, only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demand enough votes to alone control a majority. The probability of a minority victory is independent of the size of the minority and converges to one half, for any minority size, when the electorate is arbitrarily large. In a large electorate, the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant: democracy is undone by the market.
Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders (Journal of Public Economics, April 2014). With Alessandra Casella and Thomas Palfrey
Abstract: Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study, theoretically and experimentally, the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency, but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. The theoretical predictions are strongly supported by the experimental data.
Essays in Political Economy (Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University Academic Commons, 2013)
Abstract: This dissertation presents three essays in Political Economy with different approaches, but a single line of inquiry: how can political institutions shape individual behaviors by modifying the incentives of political actors? Krugman and Wells (2005) defines economics as "the study of economies, at both the level of individuals and of society as a whole" and an economy as "a system for coordinating society's productive activities." Political Economy, in parallel, can be seen at the study of politics, at both the level of individuals and of institutions as a whole, where institutions are defined as systems to coordinate individuals' interactions. The two dimensions are important: although politics consists in decisions taken at the individual level, the outcomes are shaped by the institutional rules which thus partly determines those choices. The three chapters presented here consider particular cases of this interdependence between individual political actors and political institutions. Chapter 1 analyzes how the effective super-majority in the US Senate along with the role of parties as imperfect coordinators of politicians' actions affect the incentives of the centrist senators; and suggests in a stylized model that, counter-intuitively, a smaller minority might be more successful in its effort to fight the majority's priorities. Chapter 2 studies empirically how changes in a country's constitutional executive term limits affect the incentives of politicians and the consequences on a country's default probability by considering the effect those shocks have on the perception that international investors have of a country's financial soundness. Chapter 3 completes the parallel between the standard definition of Economics and Political Economy by investigating the understudied extension of markets for goods to markets for votes, and shows that the idiosyncratic characteristics of votes imply that a typical market performs badly in allocating the decision power to the parties valuing it the most.
The Minority Paradox, 2014 (Part of my thesis and presented (slides) at the Priorat Political Economy Theory Conference, June 2014).
Abstract: I present a model of a two-party system where the majority party has agenda power in a supermajority setting. When the majority requires minority defections to pass its bills, it will be better off by being smaller under certain circumstances when the minority defectors share the sanction from their leadership: it is easy to buck the party line in a group but hard and dangerous to do it alone. The model described here builds on participation games as described by \citet{Palfrey1984} where the change in the contribution technology changes the comparative statics between group size and the probability of a public good provision. I then test the implications of the model in a laboratory setting. I find support for an increase in defections with a larger number of required defectors, but the experiment shows that it fails to compensate fully for the higher cooperation requirement. The experimental results suggest potential channels missing in models of threshold public good provision.
Valuing Institutions: A Measure of the Bond Market’s Views of Term Limits in Developing Countries, 2013. With Laurence Wilse-Samson (Part of my thesis)
Abstract: We study the effect of changes to political institutions on the perception of country risk. In particular, we consider the impact of information about a change in executive term limits on a country’s bond spreads over 101 events in seven emerging markets. We uncover an interesting asymmetry. Investors respond significantly to news about restrictions on the length or number of terms an executive leader can serve, leading to lower country risk spreads over US Treasuries. The one day abnormal returns following news about a restriction of term limits is 2 percentage points below the prediction. Over ten days, the cumulative abnormal return is 5 percentage points. Both numbers are statistically significant. On the other hand, the response to an extension of executive terms in office is not significant in the long run. The result is robust to a non-parametric test. We find a more muted and less asymmetric response in private markets with a 2% abnormal return ten days after extensions, but no long-term effect of restrictions. The relation between investors' responses and countries’ institutions shows tentative evidence that reactions are muted in better institutionalized countries, and stronger when the judiciary signals its independence from the executive.